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Preface
The Review Team wishes to thank the many people who shared their time and thoughts with
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conducting this review, and neither space nor energy allow a full acknowledgement of each
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Spezzati, the UNDP Resident Representative in Maputo, and Gana Fofang, the Deputy
Resident Representative, who foresaw the need for a Review and then made it happen, and by
Gamiliel Munguambe, Director of the National Demining Institute (IND), for his support of
the Review which allowed the Team such good access to the information and people in IND
and, more widely, within the mine action community.
We also need to acknowledge those individuals who invested many hours in arranging
appointments, flights, accommodation, and the myriad other details on which the success of a
mission depends: Maria Isabel dos Santos and Benjamin Sitoe of IND; and Alberto Alface,
and Clarisse Nhabangue of UNDP-Maputo. Graeme Abernethy, the Technical Adviser for
Operations at IND at the time of the mission, deserves special mention for assistance beyond
the call of duty, Terms of Reference, or – in some cases – a decent night’s sleep.
In preparing this final report, the Review Team also benefited from many comments received
from IND, UNDP, donors, and operators. Special thanks is due to Archie Law, the UNDP
Regional Mine Action Adviser for Africa, both for his own comments and for compiling
those of others.
Finally, we must stress that the findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations
contained in this report represent the views of the Review Team. UNOPS, UNDP, and the
Government of Mozambique are not responsible for the content of this report or bound by its
recommendations.
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Executive Summary
Mozambique is a large country on the south-eastern coast of Africa. Most of its almost 19
million people live in rural areas and most households – including many in urban areas – still
depend on agriculture to a significant degree. When mine action activities began just over a
decade ago, Mozambique was perhaps the poorest country in the world, due in large part to
prolonged under-investment in infrastructure and public services by the Portuguese colonial
regime, coupled with the destruction and social dislocations wrought by almost three decades
of civil war. Transportation and communication networks were woefully inadequate, and
much of what did exist was unusable due to landmine contamination. This contamination
caused many casualties among refugees and the internally displaced as they returned to their
home communities, and further isolated these communities from access to markets and
essential public services.
Mozambique has made great strides since the signing of the General Peace Agreement in
1992. Economic growth has been brisk. Three multi-party elections have been held.
Infrastructure has been rehabilitated and expanded, as have basic public services. Most
fundamentally, peace has been sustained. However, the country remains extremely poor and
still faces enormous social and economic challenges. There is cause for optimism, but no
certainty that the rapid progress over the past decade will be maintained. Poverty reduction is
a particular challenge, requiring new efforts to reform policies, enhance governance, increase
productive investment, and expand public services.
Mine action has played a role in Mozambique’s achievements over the past decade by
opening infrastructure networks, reducing the toll of casualties from landmines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO), assisting landmine survivors, and clearing hazards that posed a
danger to lives and a constraint on development for many communities. As is true for most
activities in Mozambique, observers with the benefit of hindsight can point to many ways in
which mine action organisations and the programme overall could have done better. But in
broad terms, the outcomes are positive. Casualties are down dramatically, and travel in the
country is basically unimpeded by explosives contamination. Large areas that were suspected
of contamination have been released for safe use by civilians through survey and clearance.
The wellbeing of people in hundreds of communities has been enhanced – in many cases,
dramatically so – by mine action. In addition, Mozambique has played an active and high
profile role within the Ottawa process,1 and has met its international treaty obligations to date.
At the same time, the future Mozambique’s mine action programme faces significant
challenges at this juncture. In part these arise because the core objectives of “humanitarian
mine action” either have been achieved in a practical sense (the objective to save lives and
limbs) or are in sight (attaining ‘mine impact free’ status for most of the country).
The core question at this point might be put, in blunt terms, as: is there life for mine action
after people stop dying from landmines? This study reviews the history of Mozambique’s
mine action programme and addresses this core question.

1

This refers to efforts to meet the obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and to
universalise the landmine ban.
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Origin and Nature of the Landmine Problem
The landmine contamination in Mozambique is the result of three distinct phases of conflict:
1. 1964-1975 – Large barrier minefields laid by the Portuguese as protection against
incursions by FRELIMO, plus defensive minefields around key infrastructure.
2. 1976-1979 – Rhodesian military incursions and the emergence of RENAMO during the
Zimbabwean independence war.
3. 1979-1992 – Civil conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO.
The first official attempt to estimate the scale of the contamination problem was in 1992 when
the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) requested information on the “existence
and nature of the mine problem in Mozambique.” The estimate of two million mines was
often quoted at the time and a 1994 report stated that mines “have claimed more than 10,000
victims”. Clearly, the international community viewed Mozambique as one of the most
seriously contaminated countries in the world.
It is now believed that these early estimates overstated the severity of the problem. In 1993
UNOHAC contracted HALO Trust to undertake an emergency “nationwide” survey, but the
budget and duration allowed were limited and HALO could compile only an incomplete
picture. In 1999, CIDA commissioned a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) to define the
contamination problem not in terms of the extent of the hazards, but in the socio-economic
impacts on communities. When completed in 2001, the message was that the contamination
problem was more extensive than intensive. The survey identified 791 mine affected
communities in all ten provinces and 123 of 128 districts, but relatively few of the affected
communities, home to a relatively small number of people, were scored as seriously affected.

Classified by...

Figure 1 – Percentages of all affected people and communities by level of impact (from LIS)
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Evolution of the Mine Action Programme
The mine action programme has gone through three phases:
1. Start-up (1992-95) – Following the General Peace Agreement in 1992 and without benefit
of a thorough assessment of the scope of the contamination problem, separate initiatives
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led to (i) clearance of roads and other key infrastructure networks by commercial
demining firms;2 (ii) HALO Trust “humanitarian”3 demining4 operations in Zambézia and
the northern provinces; (iii) the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) mine action programme
in the central provinces of Manica, Sofala, and Tete; and (iv) the training of hundreds of
deminers by ONUMOZ, following which the UN established the Accelerated Demining
Programme (ADP) in 1994 to employ the trained deminers.5
2. Consolidation (1995-99) – in 1995 the Government of Mozambique (GoM) created the
National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC or CND in its Portuguese acronym). It had
little capacity and never functioned adequately. As a result, the structure of the national
mine action programme coalesced into three geographically distinct “humanitarian”
programmes. HALO Trust operates in the north with NPA in the centre and ADP in the
south (joined in 1998 by Handicap International [HI] which established a more limited
capacity to undertake “proximity demining” in Inhambane province). In addition,
demining firms collectively have significant capacities which serve almost as a shockabsorber: their activities ebbing-and-flowing with the availability of commercial contracts.
During this period, the GoM became increasingly active in the Ottawa process centred on
the Convention6 on anti-personnel landmines. The Government was in the first cohort to
sign the Convention (in December 1997) and to ratify it (in 1998) to come into force in
March 1999.7 It also hosted the first Meeting of the States Parties in 1999, and has since
played an active and high profile role in the Ottawa process.
3. Maturation (1999-2004) – in 1999, the GoM replaced the NMCC/CND with the National
Demining Institute (IND). Reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation (MINEC), IND is a distinct statutory body, giving it some freedom from
cumbersome civil service policies and procedures. In the same year, CIDA commissioned
the LIS. Completed in 2001, the LIS data were stored in the Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) maintained by IND. Drawing upon the LIS data, in
late 2001 IND issued Mozambique’s first five year strategy for mine action – the National
Mine Action Plan 2002-2006 (NMAP) – which has as its central objective the

2

The initial contract rounds initiated what has been termed a “feeding frenzy” (DHA, 1997), leading
some donors to adopt extremely nationalistic stances, complicating donor coordination for some years.
3
The mine action community often employs the term “humanitarian” to refer to “not military” and “not
commercial”, rather than in its normal use to refer to activities motivated by the “humanitarian
imperative” to save lives and limbs solely on the basis of need. In the Mozambique mine action
programme, “humanitarian operators” refers to the international NGOs, the UNDP’s ADP, and the firm
Ronco, which is financed by the US Department of State to support Mozambican demining
organisations. MgM – a German NGO – also managed a demining programme from 2000 to late 2003.
4
“Demining” refers to the survey, marking, and/or clearance of minefields.
5
In addition, international NGOs delivered Mine Risk Education (MRE) for refugees prior to their
return and, subsequently and increasingly in conjunction with local partners, within Mozambique.
Disability assistance projects had been underway since at least the mid-1980s, and from the mid1990s assistance was targeted specifically to people disabled by landmines and unexploded ordnance
(UXO) – in the mine action field, these are termed victim assistance activities.
6
Formally the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction.
7
Mozambique has not passed legislation giving effect to the provisions within Mozambique.
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achievement of “mine impact free” status within 10 years, with all high- and mediumimpact sites cleared by the end of 2006.8
Although performing far better than the former NMCC/CND, IND has as yet been unable to
establish fully adequate coordination to ensure the activities of the humanitarian operators are
consistent with a overall national plan for mine action. In part this is because operators saw
the LIS as flawed and largely ignored its findings or the priorities identified by IND on the
basis of LIS data.
During this period US assistance, delivered via Ronco, led to the creation of two additional
demining entities: army (FADM) units, and the Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF),
available for rapid mobilisation to trouble spots such as Afghanistan and Iraq, but otherwise
working in Mozambique. Commercial demining also continued, with the size of the sector
rising and falling in line with the demand for demining services to support work on major
infrastructure projects, and following the massive floods in 2000.

Current Status of the Mine Action Programme9
The Minister of Foreign Affairs serves, essentially, as the national mine action authority.10 He
has played a respected and high profile role in the Ottawa process but – understandably given
with the natural priorities of a foreign affairs portfolio – has had less influence on the
domestic aspects of the mine action programme.11
The Minister is supported by IND serving, essentially, as the national Mine Action Centre
(MAC), maintaining the IMSMA database, issuing annual plans and reports, preparing reports
to the States Parties to the Convention, adopting National Mine Action Standards (NMAS),
conducting some regulatory functions to ensure adherence to these standards, and providing a
modest level of service to other public sector bodies when these request assistance in dealing
with suspected contamination. With headquarters in Maputo, IND also has regional offices for
the central and northern regions.
8

The NMAP also adopts a “‘development oriented’ approach that seeks to maximize the socioeconomic impact…by integrating its program framework into the overall PARPA [Mozambique’s
poverty reduction strategy].” While endorsing the aim, the Review Team notes that mine action is not
mentioned in the existing PARPA. We understand that, subsequent to our mission, IND has steppedup its engagement with the consultation processes that will lead to a new PARPA later in 2005.
9
There have been significant developments since the Review Team mission in January-February
2005, including the collapse of ADP, one of the largest operators. These have been noted in a chapter
added to the main report, but are not incorporated into this Executive Summary which reflects
developments up to the mission. In the view of the Review Team, the validity of the recommendations
and lessons learned has not been affected by the more recent developments.
10
The actual divisions of authorities and responsibilities between the Minister and IND are very
ambiguous in Decree 37/99, which established the Institute. Essentially, these are all assigned to IND,
but then IND reports to the Minister. In many mine affected countries, an inter-ministerial group serves
as the mine action authority. Mozambique lacks such a body, which would have provided a conduit for
concerns from ministries with mandates more focussed on domestic concerns.
11
In his interview with the Review Team, the outgoing Minister stated that it is an advantage to have
the mine action programme under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because that ministry had few other
responsibilities relating to domestic development, and could devote greater political attention to mine
action. While perhaps true, it also means mine action is viewed in the context of the policy agenda
facing the minister, which has focussed largely on the Ottawa process and resource mobilisation from
foreign donors. As a result, links between mine action and other public sector bodies, and particularly
those responsible for development investments, are not yet sufficiently developed.
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IND is supported by a UNDP “Nationally Executed Project” focusing on capacity-building,
with three Technical Advisers (TAs) in place at the time of the Review Team’s mission. Most
stakeholders agree that IND represents a vast improvement over NMCC/CND, and that its
performance has been gradually improving. There remain, however, gaps between IND’s
current performance levels and what is required if the national mine action programme is to
enhance its contribution to Mozambique’s broader development and poverty reduction efforts.
In some cases, performance gaps do not result from a lack of staff capabilities or tools: many
staff appear well trained and have sound ideas regarding how their performance, and that of
the Institute, could be improved. A centralised approach to management (as is traditional in
Mozambique’s public service) coupled with an absence of administrative policies and
procedures to support more decentralised operations are the root cause of many of the
performance gaps.12 Further, the feeling is that the biggest operators would not take direction
from IND, regardless of how well it functioned, which cannot be good for staff motivation.
Finally, IND’s existing mandate is based on the needs perceived some five years ago, while
the present and (particularly) future challenges are significantly different. A re-orientation of
mandate will be required to align IND’s capacities with evolving requirements.
Over 20 demining operators are currently accredited,13 but most of these are commercial
operators and apparently only three of these (plus one Quality Assurance firm) had contracts
in 2003. About 1300 personnel are employed by the humanitarian operators (including FADM
and Ronco-QRDF). FADM’s mandate covers all regions, but the others operate regionally –
HALO Trust in the north; NPA and Ronco-QRDF in the centre; and both ADP and HI in the
south. HALO Trust, NPA, and HI set their own priorities, as does ADP although with greater
consideration to the list of IND priorities.14
From an operational point of view, this system functions reasonably well. The organisations
are technically capable and the four main humanitarian operators, representing the bulk of the
capacity, have deep roots in their operating theatres, with reasonable (albeit different) systems
in place for establishing priorities.
In terms of its overall structure, the programme has been stable in recent years, and three
distinct regional programmes still co-exist in Mozambique. Major changes are in-stream
however. The three international NGOs plan to close their operations by the end of 2006, at
which point they believe their regions will be, in essence, “impact free”. ADP has been given
the goal of transforming itself from a UNDP-supported project into a “local NGO” (although
it seems to have made scant progress in this regard).15 While these decisions have been made
independently, they imply that the mine action stakeholders (GoM, IND, operators, UNDP,
donors, etc.) are – collectively – facing a number of inter-related, strategic decisions which
will change the structure and orientation of the programme.

12

Management and administrative approaches are, in large part, inherited from the civil service. Both
the GoM and donors view these as antiquated and significant efforts are underway or planned for civil
service reform – a notoriously difficult process even in industrialised countries.
13
All are listed in Appendix 3.
14
FADM and (to a significant degree when not called away to a trouble spot by the American
government) Ronco-QRDF also take instruction from IND regarding priorities.
15
ADP’s operations collapsed subsequent to the Review Team’s mission, and it remains unclear
whether it will be revitalised successfully. This is touched upon in the added chapter.
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Achievements of the Mine Action Programme
The early establishment and subsequent consolidation of three semi-autonomous regional
‘humanitarian’ programmes has greatly complicated efforts to plan and coordinate
Mozambique’s mine action programme on a national basis. Still, the programme has achieved
or contributed to some excellent outcomes.
The numbers of landmine and UXO accidents and victims – which some had estimated at 600
a year in the early 1990s – have fallen dramatically, reaching 13 accidents and 14 victims
(four of whom were deminers) in 2003;16 likely the lowest number of victims per capita of
any developing country with a large mine action programme.17
Figure 2 – Annual Victims of Landmine & UXO Accidents, per capita
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While it is impossible to ascertain how much the fall in victim numbers can be attributed to
mine action in general, or to any specific mine action component, certainly the programme
has contributed to this important achievement. In a practical sense, landmine and UXO
contamination no longer represents a humanitarian emergency in Mozambique.
In addition, significant progress has been made in terms of clearance and, more broadly, in
generating a better picture of the extent and precise location of suspected hazard areas
(SHA).18 IND data suggest that an average of over 5.5 million square metres has been cleared
per year since 2000; meanwhile, an analysis of data from IND and deminers suggest the total
contamination is far lower than had been feared (perhaps in the range of 25 million square
metres, although any estimate at this point should be treated with great caution). From this
perspective, the “mine impact free” target is in sight, although some residual capacity for
demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) will need to be sustained to deal with the
threats emerging from residual contamination.
Given the great progress in reducing landmine accidents and victims, stand-alone MRE
projects seem no longer warranted, in spite of the statement in the NMAP that “There is an
urgent need for an aggressive and sustained Mine Risk Education and Marking campaigns to
16

The numbers of victims rose to 29 in 2004, but from the same number of accidents. Most civilian
accidents in recent years appear to be from UXO rather than landmines.
17
Calculations are the averages for the two most recent years for which data are available. Data for
Angola are thought to be very incomplete, even more so than for Mozambique. Even still, recorded
casualties in Angola are 17 times higher on a per capita basis than in Mozambique.
18
The term suspected mined area (SMA) is more commonly used in Mozambique. We prefer SHA as
it comprises UXO as well.

vi

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

October 2005

be re-launched.” This is an important milestone, freeing scarce resources for other
development priorities.
Assistance projects targeting victims of landmine and UXO accidents have generally been
grafted onto larger disability assistance programmes supported by ICRC, HI, and other
specialist NGOs. These disability assistance programmes have built substantial capacities in
the form of orthopaedic clinics, physiotherapy centres, and highly trained personnel, but these
capacities appear to be far in excess of what the GoM can sustain. Facilities are under-utilised,
not because of a lack of need but because most of the disabled, including landmine and UXO
victims, are unaware of the facilities, or cannot reach them, or have no accommodation close
to the clinic for out-patient treatment. Further assistance to victims of landmine and UXO
accidents should focus on these service gaps (as part of broader disability assistance efforts),
and on the capacity of the health sector more generally.
The GoM has also played an important and greatly appreciated role on the international stage
of the Ottawa process. In particular and on schedule, it reached its critical milestone for
stockpile destruction in early 2003, which also symbolises the important achievements the
country has made in peace-building. Mine action has made other contributions to peacebuilding by giving good employment to members of both former warring factions and, more
generally, by contributing to human security in mine affected areas of the country. The value
of such contributions may be impossible to quantify, but they are also very real given the fact
that Mozambique was in armed conflict for almost 30 years.19
Claims that mine action has contributed to the country’s development and to the government’s
overarching goal of poverty reduction are also accepted by most parties, although IND and
other mine action organisations have found it difficult to quantify or compile a compelling
picture of such contributions (a common problem for most national mine action programmes).
Donors and others were also disappointed that neither landmines nor the mine action
programme was even mentioned in the initial PARPA – the Government’s key development
strategy document. The failure by the GoM to provide more of its own funds to the mine
action programme has also been noted with concern by donors.
A significant but overlooked mine action donor contribution that has had broader
developmental benefits was the support provided by CIDA to DINAGECA, the national
mapping agency. While this project was motivated by the desire to benefit from the
geographic information system (GIS) and mapping functionalities within IMSMA, it also
provided Mozambique with the capacity to produce a wide variety of maps and other
information based on digitized toponomy and a gazetteer. Such capacity is a great boon to
development planners and poverty researchers.
One area of concern is the role mine action agencies may play in the transmission of
HIV/AIDS infection. At 13.8 per cent of the population, HIV infection rates in Mozambique
are extremely high and appear to be rising quickly. The Review Team is not aware of any
studies on infection rates or, more generally, sexual practices among deminers, but significant
percentages of the staff in some operators are unable to work because of illnesses that are

19

Research by The World Bank indicates that almost half of all post-conflict countries will slip back
into conflict within a decade of the peace agreement. (Collier et al, 2003)
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often associated with AIDS.20 Given the lag between infection and visible symptoms, there is
every reason to fear that deminers serve as a vector of transmission, both to communities in
mine affected areas and to their wives or sexual partners at home. In addition, by assisting to
open road networks, demining may be contributing indirectly to HIV/AIDS transmission by
well-known high risk groups such as long distance truckers.21

Assistance by the International Community
The achievements garnered by Mozambique’s mine action programme have, in large part,
been made possible by generous donor support, which appears to have totalled over $150
million since 1993. The level of support22 appears to have been reasonably constant, at least
since 2000 when IND began compiling estimates.23 Certainly Mozambique has never suffered
the kind of precipitous collapse in funding experienced by many other large mine action
programmes, allowing IND and the major operators to plan with greater assurance.

US $ millions

Figure 3 – Estimated donor funding to Mozambique for mine action
$ 20
$ 18
$ 16
$ 14
$ 12
$ 10
$8
$6
$4
$2
$0
93

94

95

96

97

98

99

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Although collectively, donors have provided consistent support to mine action, they never
have endorsed a collective plan for the national programme. UN and donor initiatives lacked
coherence particularly during the start-up phase, when relations among key donors, among
diverse UN agencies, and between the donors and the UN were often strained.24 This
validated the unofficial division of the country into three theatres of operation.
From the mid-1990s until recently, donor coordination appears to have been far smoother,
with UNDP assuming the main responsibility for convening donors within a mine action
20

Reportedly eight per cent in NPA. ADP acknowledges a problem of similar magnitude. Note
however that Mozambican law prohibits the testing of employees to see whether they are HIV positive,
so it cannot be assumed that all these employees are suffering from HIV/AIDS.
21
The main operators have had HIV/AIDS policies in place for some years, but the impact of the
pandemic is so great that these should be re-assessed regularly in light of best practice.
22
Not all assistance was provided as financial support. A good deal has come in the form of
equipment and, particularly in the consolidation phase, as technical assistance.
23
Again, data are incomplete. The most complete compilation of data uncovered by the Review Team
(Lambert-Madore, 2003) arrived at roughly $100 million from 1993 to 2001. We have used those
estimates for 1993-1999, and the estimates provided by IND since then.
24
The Mozambique case study report from the multi-country study on indigenous capacity
development (DHA, 1997) covers this period in some detail. A major problem was the multiplicity of
UN agencies with different mandates – peacekeeping, relief, development, and so on. As a result of
that study, the UN reformed its own architecture for dealing with mine action issues.
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support group. This appears to have served as a good mechanism for sharing information, for
resource mobilisation, and for delivering a unified message in policy dialogues with the GoM
on occasion.25 There is no indication of a concerted attempt to raise the dialogue to a more
strategic level: indeed, this may have threatened established activities and, as the programme
seemed to be working reasonably well, donors saw no great urgency to fix it.
As shown by its commissioning of this review, the UNDP recognises the need for greater
urgency today. There is widespread talk of donor fatigue, implying that international funding
for Mozambique’s mine action programme is likely to fall. However, there are many factors
influencing future programming decisions by donors, and these carry different weights in the
decisions of different donors: the term “donor fatigue” needs to be unbundled by examining:
(i) the perceived need for continued international funding; (ii) factors affecting the supply of
international funds for mine action; and (iii) the degree of confidence donors have that their
funds will contribute to a sustainable solution. There is a need for greater leadership on the
part of the GoM to address the underlying issues that might lead to donor fatigue by:
•
•
•

Formulating a national strategy that incorporates credible plans for a sustainable solution
to the country’s medium- and long-term mine action challenges;
Enhancing transparency and accountability within the key organs of the mine action
programme, and taking decisive action whenever problems arise in the use of funds;
Taking credible steps to assume greater responsibility for the country’s mine action
problem, including enhancing the institutional foundations of the programme (i.e. its
structure plus the legal and regulatory framework); the appropriate incorporation of mine
action into the PARPA; and the infusion of additional government funds.

Thus, the dangers inherent from donor fatigue can be addressed if the GoM exercises the
rights and responsibilities of “ownership” – the rights to determine priorities and to formulate
plans for addressing these; the responsibilities to contribute materially to the solution and to
account for the results achieved, in part, with foreign assistance.

The Links to Development
Current efforts to improve aid effectiveness and achieve better development outcomes hinge
largely on the concept of recipient government ownership. If a mine action programme is to
link strongly with development, the key organs of the national programme must engage with
development managers within the government arena. Given Mozambique’s size and its
transportation/communication difficulties, links must be forged at the macro (core economic
and development policy units), meso (sector ministries, provincial governments, etc.), and
micro (community) levels. In addition, sound links must be maintained with the international
arena and, particularly, the mine action donor community.
Links at the Macro Level
The links between the mine action programme and the government arena in Mozambique are
in some instances good, but require strengthening overall. IND is yet to engage systematically
with the core economic management and development policy units and it needs to do so to
25

One example was the push for the GoM to assume responsibility for the country’s landmine
problem, leading to the establishment of the first National Authority in 1995 and, subsequently, the
creation of the more effective IND in 1999.
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ensure mine action is properly reflected in the two most critical development management
instruments – the PARPA and the annual state budget.26 GoM funding of mine action also
remains modest.
Meso Level Links
Links with certain units in sector ministries or parastatals do exist,27 but these often reflect the
initiative of those organisations rather than IND. IND has provided reasonable support when
approached. However, other government units whose work programmes are constrained or
distorted by contamination, but which do not take the initiative to approach IND, are not
receiving advice or assistance. A more proactive approach by IND is warranted to ensure
these government units are aware that assistance is available. A proactive approach would
also pay dividends in spreading best practice among government units requiring demining
assistance in support of the infrastructure work programmes.
Perhaps the most important finding of this review is the existence of substantial demand for
demining services – engaged mainly through competitive processes – to support infrastructure
rehabilitation and development. This demand appears likely to increase and should continue at
a robust level for the next decade. The Review Team’s partial survey of public sector units
suggests demand for demining could be in the range of $10 million to over $20 million per
year over the coming decade.28
National mine action authorities are aware that commercial demining has been occurring, but
not of the magnitude of demand. As well, recent plans and statements have not reflected the
fact that demining services in support of major infrastructure work is almost certainly the
main contribution of mine action to Mozambique’s development and to poverty reduction at
the present time. For example, a recent IND document stated that “Focus has now moved
from clearing Roads, Bridges, Railways and Power Lines to Land release.”29
The Review Team also found that planning and implementation procedures relating to
demining services differ significantly across the various government units responsible for
infrastructure programmes. Procedures range from excellent to non-existent. There is
tremendous opportunity to substantially enhance the developmental and poverty-reducing
impact of mine action simply by turning best practice into common practice.
While links between the humanitarian operators and provincial governors/district
administrators appear for the most part to be adequate and improving, links between IND and
sub-national administrations remain, on average, weaker. Decentralisation of IND functions
should help more in this regard, but the decentralised offices require greater authority if they
are to reach their potential. One of the two regional offices is making a good effort at carving26

Subsequent to the Review Team’s mission, the newly installed government did highlight mine action
as a cross-cutting issue within its Five-Year Programme (Programa do Governo para 2005-2009),
indicating mine action is now on the Government’s agenda and that the new PARPA (due later this
year) will give it some mention.
27
Of the units visited, ANE (roads) and EDM (electricity), have sound policies and procedures in place
for dealing with suspected contamination. The National Water Authority also works closely with IND,
although the Review Team recommends it align its procedures with those of ANE and EDM.
28
Such estimates need to be treated with caution, but clearly there is substantial demand.
29
IND, 2004, Communication Elements of Plans to Implement Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention,
(marked “draft” but apparently submitted), p. 1.

x

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

October 2005

out a useful role for itself, but the other needs clearer direction and support from IND
headquarters in Maputo.
Micro Level Links
Much of the impact of landmine and UXO contamination is extremely localised, representing
a danger to civilians and a constraint on community development. Therefore, the mine action
programme also requires sound links with the community development arena comprising
local officials, community-based organisations, and community development NGOs. Links
between the humanitarian operators and the local community arena have improved over the
years and now appear adequate or better in most cases. Those between IND and local
communities are inconsistent. Again, IND’s decentralisation effort has not yet delivered the
full dividends in this regard, and further progress will be contingent on the delegation of
appropriate degrees of authority and resources to regional offices, coupled with clear direction
concerning priorities and expected levels of performance.
Links with the International Arena
Of course, in any aid dependent country such as Mozambique, much of the financing for
development comes from donors. Links with the international arena remain vital therefore.
For the mine action programme, these links range from excellent (in matters relating to the
Convention) to weak (with regard to systematic dialogue between the government and the
representatives of donors supporting mine action in Mozambique). The international NGOs
appear to have good relations with most of their donors. A common concern expressed to the
Review Team was the lack of a regular forum comprising ADP’s management, UNDP, and
the donors providing support to the ADP programme.
Understanding Development Planning and Management Processes
If the mine action programme is to enhance its contribution to development and poverty
reduction, mine action actors need a better understanding of how development is planned and
implemented by governments, and how the international community is trying to align its
assistance in support of government priorities. The omission of any reference to landmines in
the PARPA or in subsequent State Budgets demonstrates that mine action was not on the
government’s development agenda in a concrete fashion, although the significant space given
to mine action in the recent Five Year Programme may herald a welcome change. However,
while mention in the Five Year Programme and, eventually, the new PARPA for 2006-2010 is
necessary to demonstrate that the problem of landmine contamination is firmly on the
government’s development agenda, it would be far from sufficient on its own.
Any national development document, such as PARPA, is based largely on more detailed
planning work at the sector level. The threat of landmine contamination affects specific
sectors such as transportation (roads, bridges, railways), power (electricity generation and
distribution), water, and agriculture, as well as social sectors such as education, health, and
social welfare. The evidence garnered by the Review Team indicates that the work
programmes of these sectors and others are being constrained by contamination, but these
problems are not adequately reflected in IND plans and annual reports, and there is
insufficient communication between IND and the government units responsible. In turn, the
development plans of these sectors and sub-sectors do not reflect their requirements for
demining services.
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IND needs to engage more actively with the government units and parastatals that require
demining services to execute their work programmes. It needs to provide the technical advice
necessary, and to encourage these units to identify landmine contamination as a problem
within their sector plans and budget submissions. If this happens, IND will find a ready
audience in the core economic management units responsible for compiling the PARPA and
the State Budget.

Assessment of Current Challenges
Extent and Socio-economic Impacts of Contamination
The LIS was never designed to produce an accurate assessment of the area contaminated by
landmines and UXO contamination: indeed, the methodology employed was certain to
generate an inflated figure.30 Regardless, the LIS estimate for the total area suspected of
contamination – 562 km2 – was for many years treated seemingly as a mantra, perhaps in an
effort to demonstrate great need for continued assistance. It has always been clear to
knowledgeable observers that the true area would be far smaller, and extrapolating the results
from systematic re-survey work by several of the operators in the past two years (not yet fully
reflected in the IND database) suggests the true figure may be in the 25 km2 to 50 km2 range
(depicted in the graph below as ‘best guess’). Some of this contamination has no current
impact on human safety or economic activity. Therefore, the contention of HALO Trust,
NPA, and HI that the country can be mine impact free by the end of 2006 seems plausible.
Figure 4 – Total suspected hazard area (SHA) as per IND (and Review Team’s ‘best guess’)
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Of course, mine impact free in this sense is a static concept. Some new investments in
infrastructure will be constrained by contamination and so new impacts emerge. The evidence
garnered by the Review Team suggests that mine action organisations are not fully aware of
how significant this type of emergent impact is at the present time, or that it is likely to
increase. As well, population and economic growth in mine affected regions will also enlarge
the “economic footprints” of communities, bring them into contact with minefields and UXO
which hitherto had not posed a problem. Finally, political instability within a neighbouring
state could in future lead to refugees entering Mozambique. If so, minefields that do not affect
Mozambicans at this time could suddenly pose a grave danger to refugees.

30

Strengths and weaknesses of LIS methodologies are analysed in Scanteam & Demex, 2003.
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For these reasons, the achievement of ‘static’ mine impact free status, while an important
milestone, does not imply the absence of a need for mine action. A definition of ‘dynamic’
mine impact free status should incorporate the concept of a sustainable capacity to address the
residual threats. The main mine action stakeholders should re-orient their thinking to focus on
the achievement of dynamic mine impact free status as the next major milestone.
National organs and the operators should also re-orient their perception of the central purpose
of the mine action programme. The principal contribution is no longer humanitarian (at least
in a strict ‘saving lives and limbs’ sense) but rather developmental – services in support of
infrastructure and community development investments to promote economic growth and
reduce poverty.
Mine Ban Treaty Perspective
In addition to the humanitarian and developmental perspectives, Mozambique is a State Party
to the Convention and an active participant in the Ottawa process. Article 5 of the Convention
obliges mine-affected states to:
•
•
•

Make every effort to identify all areas in its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel
mines are known or suspected to be emplaced (i.e. mined areas) and
Ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other
means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians… (paragraph 2)
Destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into
force of this Convention for that State Party. (paragraph 1)31

Thus, the Convention sets a much more ambitious target – “mine free” rather than simply
“mine impact free.” An additional factor is that the Convention imposes an absolute
obligation on a States Party not to use anti-personnel landmines. Leaving defensive minefields
in place along borders could be considered “use”, and Mozambique has a number of such
minefields.
Meanwhile, the Convention also calls upon wealthier signatory states to assist mine affected
States Parties in meeting their obligations. Mozambique will still have international treaty
obligations after it has achieved mine impact free status, and has the right to request
assistance in meeting these obligations. Presumably, the country’s excellent performance to
date within the Ottawa process will be taken into account by the other States Parties.
Before turning to what might be done to address the remaining challenges, the following
diagram depicts the architecture of the existing programme – including the principal links
with the government, international, and local community arenas.

31

For Mozambique, the deadline is 1 March 2009. As well, paragraph 3 of Article 5 makes provision
for a State Party to request an extension of up to ten years for clearing the minefields identified.
Paragraph 4 of Article 5 outlines the information that should accompany a request for extension. It is
unclear whether further extensions would be considered.
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Figure 5 – Existing Architecture for Mine Action in Mozambique
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Responding to the Remaining Challenges
The humanitarian and development challenges posed by landmine and UXO contamination
can be classified as shown in the table below.32

1. Humanitarian

2. Development

3. Humanitarian

4. Development

Big Task

Future: no current impact

NGOs & ADP
clearing with grant
funding

Best practice
(clearance by
commercials financed
by project budget) in
some but not all sub33
sectors

Many options for
clearance of
emergent hazards
(but how to finance?)

Clearance should be
via commercial
tender & financed by
project budget

Small Task

Short-term: impacts now exist

NGOs & ADP
clearing with grant
funding

Various
arrangements but
with some important
34
gaps

“Fire brigades”
needed to handle
residual risks (but
how to manage and
finance?)

Clearance should be
via commercial
tender & financed via
government systems

QUANTIFYING THE CHALLENGES
The magnitude of these various challenges is not known with precision because (i) a
systematic re-survey of SHA has not been completed, (ii) not all records from the operators
have been entered into IMSMA, and (iii) no mechanism has been established to obtain
information on a systematic basis from public sector units regarding their requirements for
demining services. These omissions could be rectified in the short-term, and the Review Team
has made a number of recommendations in this regard.
Recommendation 1 (page 97) – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to discuss
their various understandings of the term “mine impact free” (or, better, mine/UXO impact free)
and to initiate a process to formulate a common definition, to be adopted as a national
standard, which should incorporate the need for a sustainable demining capacity to address
the residual threat (i.e. the impacts that will emerge over time).
Recommendation 2 (page 97) – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to:
 discuss alternative approaches to systematic re-survey,
 agree on either (i) a common approach or (ii) a set of acceptable approaches for
undertaking systematic re-surveys that would lead to similar outcomes in terms of
reduced, defined SHAs and to a preliminary classification of all SHA according to the
following or a similar schema:
The SHA is now exerting:
 a High impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
 a Medium impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
 a Low impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
 no current impact on a community

32

There is the additional challenge from the Convention perspective of achieving “mine free” status.
For example, the Water Directorate requests IND to arrange both clearance and financing of
clearance – a distinctly second-best approach. Best practice should be made national policy.
34
For example, small-scale irrigation works.
33
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agree on ways and means for re-surveying the country (including all records in IMSMA
which have not been re-surveyed) within two-to-three years.

Recommendation 3 (page 98) – IND should meet with all operators to agree upon the
information management system to ensure IMSMA data are accurate and up to date, including:






(if necessary) redesigned forms to be submitted by demining operators concerning resurveyed SHAs;
(if necessary) additional fields in IMSMA to record the better-defined SHA;
format of reports from the central IMSMA unit back to the operators so they can validate
that the new data they have submitted have been entered correctly;
35
clear and measurable performance standards for all operators and the central IMSMA
unit; and
formats for monthly reports on progress achieved on the national re-survey and the current
figures (broken at least to provincial aggregates) on SHA, and clearance.

Recommendation 4 (page 99) – The IND Director should draft a letter, for the Minister’s,
signature, to the GICHD requesting the early installation of the new version of IMSMA at IND
(supported by the requisite training for staff), and documenting the reasons why Mozambique
should be among the first programmes to benefit from the new IMSMA.
Recommendation 7 (page 102) – IND should immediately initiate a systematic outreach
programme to all public sector agencies which undertake or promote development
investments:
 To ensure all such agencies are aware of the extent and impact of mine and UXO
contamination on their planned development investments, and of the mine action services
available; and
 For agencies which do not have clear policies in place for addressing contamination
concerns in an appropriate manner, or which are lacking systems to ensure these policies
are followed, to develop a clear, time-delimited plan to:
• inventory all development investments which have been avoided because of
contamination concerns;
• develop a joint plan with the agency concerned to schedule both the demining services
and the development investment;
• assist these agencies in formulating the necessary policies and implementing systems
to ensure these policies are followed;
• agree on periodic meetings to review the agency’s investment programme, identify
possible contamination concerns, and initiate demining services to address these
contamination concerns.

Until a more complete needs assessment is completed, it is impossible to give a proper
estimate of the size and financing requirements of a national programme capable of
addressing the remaining challenges. Based on our Review Team’s partial survey of public
sector units that will require demining support for their infrastructure work programmes, and
recognising the continuing need for demining services to address public safety concerns from
the residual landmine/UXO threat, it appears the future programme will be (very roughly) of
the same magnitude as the existing programme. Its make-up and sources of finance will,
however, be significantly different than today. There will be more demining on commercial
terms and more of the financing will come from government sources, investment loans, and

35

An example of a performance standard would be: within one month of receiving an operator’s
monthly re-survey report, the IMSMA unit shall return the corresponding data entry report to that
operator so it can verify that all records have been correctly entered – target performance standard, 98
per cent of records entered completely and correctly.
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donor development funds (as opposed to dedicated mine action funds). Some donor financing
dedicated to mine action will still be required for at least a transition period.36
In the opinion of the Review Team, it will be feasible to obtain the financing needed to
sustain a national mine action programme with the capacity necessary to address
Mozambique’s remaining contamination challenges. However, a number of reform measures
will be required to re-align the programme to meet the current and emerging needs.
ADDRESSING CHALLENGES FOR WHICH SOLUTIONS ARE APPARENT
We have divided the challenges according to three broad parameters:
•
•
•

short-term (or current) versus long-term (or future)
humanitarian versus developmental
small versus large tasks

Solutions are already in place for the short-term humanitarian demining requirements (both
large and small tasks). This is what the humanitarian operators are focused on, and where
most donor funding is going.37 At least the three international NGOs now see their work will
be completed by the end of 2006.
Solutions are already in place for many of the existing demining requirements in support of
large development investments. Some of these are “best practice” solutions, but others could
be improved. The GoM should issue policy directives to convert best practice into common
practice for both public sector units and investment financing agencies (e.g. The World Bank,
African Development Bank, and donors).
Recommendation 5 (page 99) – The Government of Mozambique should issue a policy
statement that, henceforth, provisions for demining services required to support any “large”
infrastructure investments shall be as follows:







financing for the required demining services will be provided in the budget for the
infrastructure rehabilitation, reconstruction, or development project, following
consultations with IND on the likely extent of contamination that will be encountered;
tender documents soliciting proposals from potential prime contractors shall specify that
all bidders must include in their proposal (i) a demining sub-contractor, currently
accredited in Mozambique for landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal,
and (ii) a separate Quality Assurance sub-contractor, currently accredited in Mozambique
to provide external QA with respect to landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and
disposal operations;
such tender documents shall specify that the successful prime contractor shall be
responsible for the efficiency and quality of work done by the demining and QA subcontractors, and that no claim for additional compensation due to the presence of
landmines or UXO shall be entertained;
these tender documents shall also specify the minimum liability insurance requirements
with respect to landmine and UXO contamination for the prime contractor, demining subcontractor, and QA sub-contractor, as currently specified in national mine action
legislation or regulations;

36

Additional donor financing would also be warranted to assist Mozambique achieve its ‘mine free’
treaty obligation.
37
Since the Review Team’s mission, the collapse of ADP means most demining activities have halted
in the South.
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all tender documents and contracts shall specify the basis of payment (e.g. fixed-price or
actual-and-reasonable, plus progress payments) for expenditures related to landmine and
UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal operations.

Recommendation 6 (page 100) – The Government of Mozambique should advise The World
Bank, other development banks, and other agencies providing financial credits for large
infrastructure projects that:



Professional assessments of landmine and UXO contamination issues must be made
during the project design phase, and
Adequate provision for possible demining expenses must be incorporated into the
financing plan for such projects.

These policy measures will also address the future requirements for demining services in
support of large development projects.
CHALLENGES FOR WHICH NEW SOLUTIONS ARE REQUIRED
Appropriate responses for some of these challenges described in the above table are not yet in
place or have not yet been devised for the future. For example, some demining is now
provided to support smaller infrastructure/community development investments by the
humanitarian operators, drawing on grant funding earmarked for mine action. However, at
least the three international NGOs are planning to close their mine action programmes by the
end of 2006, so no solution to future requirements is at hand for the parts of the country
covered by those operators. In addition, it seems clear that some public sector units
responsible for smaller infrastructure investments are avoiding rather than addressing the
issue of landmine and UXO contamination. It is unclear how widespread this policy of
avoidance is, which is a problem in itself. Recommendation 7 (noted previously) addresses
this problem – in brief, IND should conduct a systematic outreach effort to all public sector
agencies which undertake or promote development investments.
In addition, the issue of landmine contamination raises an important policy question,
particularly given the poverty reduction goals espoused by the GoM and donors. It is the
responsibility of the government to determine the appropriate policy and to communicate this
clearly throughout the public service and the donor community.
Recommendation 8 (page 108) – The GoM should adopt a clear policy – and communicate this
to both public sector units and to donors – concerning the priority given to mine-affected
communities when planning and implementing community or area development work
programmes and aid projects. Two reasonable policy options exist; either…
•

•

equal treatment – communities should not be penalised by the presence of landmine or
UXO contamination and, if a community would benefit substantially from a small-scale
investment, the additional cost of demining support should not used as a reason for
38
withholding that investment; or…
priority treatment – the needs of mine-affected communities for small-scale
investments would receive priority attention when planning and implementing
community and area development projects.

Clarifying the policy vis-à-vis contamination and smaller investments for community or area
development purposes should also lead to an infusion of funds to pay for the requisite
demining: these should be bundled into the investment project (whether funded by donors,
38

In the language of cost-benefit analysis, the “shadow price” of such demining services would be set
at zero as a matter of government policy.
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development banks, or government39). This infusion will not be sufficient to cover all such
requirements however, at least in the medium-term, because few of the existing projects that
finance small infrastructure works will have incorporated funding for demining.
It is, of course, important to quantify the amount of funding that may be required in the shortto medium-term to provide the necessary demining services in support of smaller
infrastructure investments, and the recommended outreach campaign (Recommendation 7)
will help IND estimate the financial requirements. This will be important evidence to support
the case that mine action should be appropriately reflected in the government’s two key
development management documents – PARPA and the State Budget.
Recommendation 9 (page 112) – IND should, with the utmost urgency, compile its case for (i)
adequate reflection of the national mine action programme and of landmine and UXO
contamination as a cross-cutting issue in the PARPA for 2006-2010 and (ii) the allocation of
additional financial support for mine action from resources available to the government
treasury.

It also is important to ensure officials in the various sectors that require demining services are
aware that they need to reflect the need for such services in their submissions to PARPA and
for the annual State Budget.
Recommendation 10 (page 112) – As part of its outreach to government units (as per
recommendation 7), IND should encourage and assist those units to reflect their requirements
for demining services into their briefs during PARPA consultations and their budget
submissions.

While the policy and outreach measures recommended in this section will help ensure that the
government-wide requirements for demining services are identified, acknowledged, and
financed, such measures would not fully address three closely related questions:
•
•
•

For tasks the international NGOs cannot undertake before the end of 2006, and after
the departure of these NGOs, what organisation should provide the demining services?
How should the demining organisation be contracted?
How should the demining work be monitored?

Transaction costs would be high if small demining tasks were to be awarded via competitive
tenders on an individual basis, and many project implementation units would lack the
expertise to tender for demining services and enforce the contracts. Such concerns might be
addressed by bundling many small tasks into a single tender (e.g. all demining services for
small infrastructure projects in a province), but no organisation now exists to pool such
requirements, issue the tenders, and monitor performance.
The planned exit of the international demining NGOs will also leave a gap in the capacity to
address both big and small tasks for humanitarian purposes in the future. This gap will be
difficult to fill as such tasks are inherently hard to define clearly in advance, and it is difficult
to monitor the performance of any organisation assigned to demine in geographically
dispersed and often remote communities.

39

In Mozambique, many “government funded” projects are, in fact, funded by donors through direct
budget support.
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Funders naturally want to engage trustworthy organisations for such work, and should use
contractual arrangements that do not provide incentives to cut corners in terms of quality or
safety. Established international NGOs working under grant agreements have generally been
the preferred candidates for such assignments, at least for most donors. Local organisations
such as ADP could try to fill this gap by transforming themselves into not-for-profit
associations, but Mozambican law does not impose sufficiently high and clear standards
regarding integrity, good governance, and transparency. Local not-for-profits are thus advised
to self-impose international best practice if they expect to attract donor confidence and
funding.
In short, there is no ready mechanism to provide demining services for relatively small and
dispersed tasks – whether for humanitarian or development purposes – given the current
institutional make-up of Mozambique’s mine action programme.

Toward a Sustainable Solution
As not all of the foreseeable mine action challenges can be properly addressed given the
current institutional make-up of the mine action programme, some reforms to the programme
are required. The various challenges should not be considered in isolation; rather, the
decisions on how to resolve all challenges should be incorporated into a single strategy
because these decisions are inter-related. For example, if it is determined to create a new
organisation to provide “fire brigade services” to respond quickly to community requests for
small mine or UXO clearance tasks, that organisation may then be the best solution for
standard demining to reduce future humanitarian risks.
Thus, the programme reforms should be incorporated into a new National Mine Action
Strategy. Such a strategy should also recognise needs for:
•

An enhanced policy framework – the future effectiveness of the mine action programme
will depend in large part on the actions of many agencies not normally considered as part
of the mine action field. For example, government agencies whose work programmes are
adversely affected by landmine and UXO contamination need to be encouraged to address
their problems squarely including, whenever possible, lining-up the financing required. A
clear policy framework is required to ensure these diverse agencies are working in concert
to address the contamination problem. Thus the policy framework needs to be
government-wide and not directly purely to mine action organisations.

•

Enhanced regulatory capacity – commercial demining will be growing in relative
importance, putting a premium on regulation. National standards need to be issued in
Portuguese. The licensing system through which firms and other demining operators are
accredited needs to function better. Quality Assurance also needs to be strengthened to
avoid a competitive environment that rewards firms which “race to the bottom” in terms
of quality and safety. More fundamentally, there is no legislation to give national effect to
the provisions of the Convention and to confirm the legal authority underpinning any
regulations that have been, or will be, issued.

•

New and enhanced services – Many public service agencies are forced to cope with
landmine and UXO contamination. They need complete and accurate information
concerning contamination and clearance in order understand how their planned work
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programmes may be affected. They may also need information on possible solutions to
any problems they face (i.e. technical advisory services).
Recommended Institutional Make-up
International best practice for mine action is for the following programme structure, supported
by appropriate legal, regulatory, and procedural instruments:
Level
Government
National authority
National Mine Action Centre
Operators

adopts
adopts
enforces
adopt

Instrument
Mine Action Legislation
Regulations & National Standards
Standing Operating Procedures

The Review Team considered whether there was any reason why Mozambique would not be
best served by this best practice model, but could find no such reason. Accordingly, it is
reflected in our detailed recommendations. These recommendations also reflect the Review
Team’s belief that responsibility for mine action should shift to a ministry more focused on
Mozambique’s internal social and economic development, with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs still playing an important role vis-à-vis the international mine ban treaty processes. As
a practical matter, it may be necessary to defer this decision until the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and IND have addressed the many mine action issues that need immediate attention.
Recommendation 12 (page 123) – The Government of Mozambique should establish an interministerial body to serve as a national authority responsible for Mozambique’s mine action
programme, chaired by a minister whose responsibilities focus on the country’s socioeconomic development, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs serving as Deputy Chair,
responsible for Mozambique’s continued participation in the Ottawa process and for the
regional dimensions of landmine contamination problems. Other ministers on the body should
be allowed to deputise senior officials to represent them if they so choose.40
Recommendation 13 (page 124) – The Government of Mozambique should establish a
Mozambique Mine Action Centre (M-MAC) as a regulatory and public service body for mine
action, and to provide secretariat services to the Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA).
Recommendation 14 (page 124) – The Government of Mozambique should appoint a Board of
Directors to oversee the implementation of the government’s mine action policy and the
performance of the M-MAC and its Managing Director. Members of the committee should be
drawn from the civil service and from other public agencies which depend on timely, highquality mine action services, together with representatives nominated by the private sector
mine action operators (both firms and not-for-profit organisations).

As noted previously, the proposed M-MAC will need to deliver new or enhanced services to a
wider range of clients. IND does not currently have the capacity to discharge these added
responsibilities.
Recommendation 15 (page 124) – The Chief Technical Adviser to IND should assess the
existing capacities for (i) analysis of data from IMSMA and other sources of socio-economic
and geographic data, and (ii) the provision of technical advisory services to government and
40

Traditionally donors have pressed for representation by ministers on such inter-ministerial bodies,
but this has resulted in a plethora of such committees which do not function because their members
do not have time to attend. This recommendation seeks to reduce the time burden on ministers, but
the Review Team recognises that the organisational culture within the government may make it
necessary to have only ministers.
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other public sector agencies whose work programmes are impacted by landmine and UXO
contamination, then prepare a capacity development plan specifying the required levels of
these capacities, how the capacities should be developed, how the staff responsible for these
functions would fit into the organisation structure of IND and/or the proposed M-MAC, and
what performance targets should be established for each position.

More generally, future capacity development efforts should adopt a performance management
approach. Work on this should begin immediately:
Recommendation 20 (page 128) – To initiate the next stage of capacity development, the IND
Director, assisted by the CTA, should institute a performance management approach to:
•

•
•
•
•

clearly define the levels of performance required for the key functions of a Mine Action
Centre, including: policy analysis; national planning; information exchange; regulation;
information management; and services to operators, government and other public
sector units, donors, and other stakeholders;
set measurable performance targets for each function;
communicate these performance targets to all staff;
monitor performance; and
take appropriate actions, including capacity building when necessary, when and if
there are gaps between actual performance and the performance levels required for the
proper functioning of mine action in Mozambique.

The support of key clients (operators, donors, and government/public sector units needing
demining services) should be enlisted in defining the necessary levels of performance,
establishing performance targets, and monitoring actual performance.

The following diagram depicts the recommended architecture for Mozambique’s Mine Action
Programme, featuring (relative to the existing programme architecture):
•
•
•

a National Mine Action Authority distinct from the Mozambique Mine Action Centre;
stronger policy linkages with the government arena;
common linkages – based on a commonly accepted national mine action strategy –
between the programme and (i) the government arena, (ii) local communities, and (iii)
the members of the international community supporting mine action in Mozambique.
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Figure 6 – Recommended MA Architecture for Mozambique
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Recommended Process to Formulate the Strategy
For mine action today and in the future, a national strategy should reflect a partnership
between the GoM and donors. Once a strategy is in place – and accepted by all – it provides a
foundation for a deepening partnership: one less dominated by funding issues but giving more
attention to the reciprocal responsibilities of the partners, with the government in the driver’s
seat and its partners providing considered advice and adequate support once they are assured
the government is steering in the right direction.
From the donor side, this new approach to working together in support of a government’s
strategy for a sector has acquired the ungainly name of Sector Wide Approach to
programming (SWAp). As a SWAp is rooted in the partnership concept, donors and
governments in developing countries have learned that the process (or ‘road map’) followed
in formulating a sector strategy is all important. Although mine action is a cross-cutting issue
rather than a sector, the same principle is true when preparing a national mine action strategy.
Recommendation 16 (page 126) – As an essential first step, the Government of Mozambique
should announce its desire to work with donors and other stakeholders on a new strategy for
mine action, following the practices commonly used by Sector Wide Approaches to formulate
and subsequently implement that strategy.
Recommendation 17 (page 126) – As an essential second step, the Government of
Mozambique, the UNDP, and interested donors should formulate (based on models from
existing SWAp arrangements) and adopt a statement of reciprocal responsibilities relating to
the national mine action programme. This should feature:
•
•

the GoM in the driver’s seat, exercising the rights and responsibilities of national
ownership,
the UNDP and donors providing considered advice and adequate support once they are
assured the government is steering in the right direction and is confirming its
commitment to mine action with appropriate policy initiatives and levels of funding.

Recommendation 18 (page 127) – (Step 3 on the Road Map, but to get underway immediately)
Building on recommendations 1, 2, 7, and 10, the M-MAC (or IND if the M-MAC has not yet been
created), assisted by its CTA, should compile a document outlining a complete and accurate
assessment of needs for mine action services, now and in the future, and distribute that
document to all stakeholders for discussion and refinement.
Recommendation 19 (page 127) – Further steps on the Road Map should be sequenced as
follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Step 4 – Confirm consensus on the needs assessment by formal adoption by the GoM,
UNDP, and supporting donors – this will then provide the basis for developing the
strategy itself;
Step 5 – Formulate strategic options for each of the unresolved strategic issues, for
discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;
Step 6 – Formulate a draft strategy for discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and
participating donors;
Step 7 – Adoption of the strategy by the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;
Step 8 – Agree on a joint monitoring and evaluation plan for reporting on (i) the
progress in implementing the strategy, and (ii) the compliance of the partners in
41
discharging their reciprocal responsibilities.

41

For example, a major concern from the government side will be donor performance on such
measures as (i) contributing to pooled funding arrangements for mine action rather than to separate
projects; (ii) the numbers of donors incorporating funds for demining within their development projects;
and (iii) measures to increase the predictability of funding (e.g. multi-year funding agreements).
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Other Recommendations
The report also contains the following recommendations related to mine action and
HIV/AIDS, and to the proposed transition of ADP to a distinct legal entity.
Recommendation 11 (page 113) – The Director of IND should meet with, at least,
representatives of ANE and of the HIV/AIDS Council of Mozambique to identify best practice
provisions relevant to the needs of the mine action sector. Following discussions with
operators and other interested stakeholders, he should then:
•
•

have these best practices incorporated into the National Mine Action Standards, and
communicate in writing to all mine action donors requesting them to take appropriate
measures to ensure that all future funding agreements with mine action organisations
specify the adoption of these best practices.

Recommendation 21 (page 130) – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it
should transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should incorporate within its
statutes international best-practice with respect to provisions for integrity, governance, and
transparency.
Recommendation 22 (page 130) – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it
should transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should seek a partnership
with an international NGO willing and able to assist it in the transition into well functioning and
well governed Mozambican NGO.

Summary Picture
The following diagram provides a stylised picture of the stages of Mozambique’s mine action
programme from its commencement to today, and the Review Team’s prognosis for the
future. During the start-up phase, expenditures grew rapidly, driven by both the need to
establish internal security (the ONUMOZ Peacekeeping Mission’s priority) and to address the
very real threat that landmine and UXO contamination posed for civilians.
Humanitarian concerns have dominated both the consolidation and maturation phases, and
over the past decade mine action in Mozambique has generally been viewed as a humanitarian
endeavour. However, it is clear that demining to support reconstruction and development has
been taking place. It is also clear that demining for reconstruction and development has grown
to represent a significant proportion of all mine action expenditures, but the data available
does not allow a precise estimate.
Important milestones have been achieved and mine impact free status – at least in a static
sense – is on the horizon. Accordingly, humanitarian mine action activities and expenditures
should fall over the coming year or two, but should then continue at a reduced level to address
the residual threats to lives and limbs. However, demand for demining in support of
reconstruction and development should expand in line with the growth in expenditures for
major infrastructure networks and facilities, and to support smaller infrastructure investments
for community or area development.
The size and effectiveness of the future programme will depend largely on an enhanced policy
framework and the reform of the institutional make-up of Mozambique’s mine action
programme.
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Figure 7 – Stages of Mine Action in Mozambique
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Events Since the Review Team’s Mission
There have been some major developments within Mozambique’s mine action programme
since the Review Team’s mission. While we are unable to comment on these in depth, the
report contains a brief addendum noting the following:
•
•
•
•

a reduction in the IMSMA data entry backlog;
inclusion of mine action as a cross-cutting issue in the new government’s Five Year
Programme;
the sudden collapse of ADP, coupled with the subsequent efforts to revive it; and
efforts by IND to engage actively in the consultation processes leading to the new
PARPA.

These developments are important, but do not alter the recommendations contained in our
report.
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Introduction
Mine action began in Mozambique shortly after the 1992 General Peace Agreement ended
decades of civil wars, which had left the country the poorest in the world, burdened not only
by crumbling infrastructure, ethnic rivalries, international debt, endemic diseases, and the
other typical constraints faced by the world’s least developed countries, but also the grim
heritage of widespread landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination. The
complexities and rapid evolutions in post-conflict Mozambique42 represented a stern test for
mine action, a field that was in its infancy at the time.
A decade provides a natural anniversary for taking stock. In this case, Mozambique’s ten-plus
years of experience roughly coincides with the fifth anniversary of the Convention on the
Prohibition on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
their Destruction (hereinafter, the Convention), marked by the Nairobi Summit on a MineFree World – the first Review Conference for the Convention.
In light of these important milestones, the UNDP Country Office in Maputo, in collaboration
with the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and donor partners, commissioned43 a
“comprehensive review” of the mine action programme to “look at the historical context of
the programme, outline the achievements, relate them to the overarching development plans
and most importantly analyze the tasks that lie ahead.”44
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assembled a Team of
four to undertake the Review: two from the Centre’s staff roster (Ted Paterson, who served as
Team Leader, and Tim Lardner, who served as the expert on mine action operations and
management), and two independent consultants in Mozambique (Pamela Rebelo, an
evaluation specialist, and Roberto Tibana, a development economist and expert in economic
management). Following a preparatory phase to collect and review relevant documents on
Mozambique’s mine action programme and its development planning and management
systems (including the rapid innovations in aid management in recent years), the Team
undertook a four-week mission in Mozambique, starting on 17 January 2005.
The Terms of Reference had emphasised the need to consider the programme and its future in
light of the remaining contamination, the Convention and the current and future links between
mine action and Mozambique’s development priorities. Accordingly, the consultants worked
in two sub-teams: one focusing on “inside the mine action programme” issues, and the other
examining links between the programme and other arenas – the government sector; the
international community; and the set of local actors within the community development
arena.45 The basic conceptual framework is depicted in the following diagram.

42

The term “complex emergency” originally entered the international lexicon in reference to
Mozambique of the late-1980s/early-1990s.
43
The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) issued a Request for Proposals for the Review on 1
November 2004 and GICHD was awarded the contract on 26 November 2004.
44
The quotes are from the Terms of Reference, which are reproduced in entirety in Appendix 1.
45
For logistical reasons, the “inside the programme” team met local officials and other community
development actors on the ground, while the second team met with those working on decentralization
policies and programming in Maputo, as well as with Maputo-based representatives of civil society
organisations active in community development.
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Figure 8 – The Architecture of Mine Action: Actors, Arenas, and Linkages
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During its mission in Mozambique, Review Team members were able to meet representatives
from most of the organisations within the mine action community, and with many other
stakeholders (public sector units, donors, UN agencies, the World Bank, and representatives
from civil society organisations).
Unfortunately the Review Team did not benefit from the views of the newly-installed
government. The outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation was generous in
meeting the Team during his final week in office, but members to the new cabinet were
appointed toward the end of the mission and were unable to meet the Review Team.
In early March, the Review Team submitted a draft report which, following an internal review
by UNDP and IND, was distributed more widely to operators and donors for comment. These
were compiled by UNDP and transmitted to the Review Team in July – this lag reflecting in
large part the facts that: (i) the various development agencies had heavy agendas following
the installation of the new government; and (ii) the mine action sector in particular was faced
with the sudden collapse of one of the principal demining operators.
While understandable, the time lag raised questions concerning how best to complete the
report. Should the final report reflect the situation at the time of the mission, or should it
incorporate subsequent developments in Mozambique and, in particular, the country’s mine
action programme? Because the Review Team is aware of the important developments since
the mission, but has not had the opportunity to study these first-hand, it has taken the
following approach:
•

•

Comments and data relating to the period up to the time of the mission have been
incorporated into the main body of the report. For example, data reported in the Annual
Report on the Mine Action Programme: 2004 are reflected in the main text, although this
document was not issued by IND until after the submission of the draft report.
Important events which have taken place since the mission are described in a
supplementary section (within the Executive Summary) and chapter (for the overall
report). Where these recent events have an important bearings on the discussion in the text
of the report, references to this supplementary chapter and to the specific event are
provided in footnotes.

Therefore, readers should be aware that the main text of this report relates to developments up
to February 2005.
It should be emphasised that this exercise is a review and not an evaluation. Accordingly, and
in addition to its analysis of the way forward, this report focuses more on lessons learnt than
on accountability issues. Additionally, and as agreed with the UNDP-Country Office, the
Review Team did not attempt to encapsulate its findings in terms of the standard evaluative
criteria used for development: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.
The remainder of this report is laid out as follows:
Chapter 1 gives a brief overview of key features of Mozambique’s society and economy, the
history of conflict and subsequent developments in the political sphere, how people
understood the problems posed by landmine and UXO contamination at the start of the
programme, and how this understanding has evolved.
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Chapter 2 covers the history of the mine action programme through a number of phases: startup; consolidation; maturation. It provides a summary of achievements within each of the
components of mine action – demining; MRE; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and
advocacy – touching as well on the contribution to peace-building and the possible role of the
mine action community vis-à-vis the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The programme’s current
capacities; embodied principally in the various demining operators and IND; is next
examined. The Chapter ends with a discussion of the role played by international assistance to
the mine action programme.
Chapter 3 analyses the role played by international assistance in terms of supporting an
assessment of needs and the formulation of a national strategy, financial assistance, and
capacity development. The chapter also discussed donor coordination and the perception that
donor fatigue is an important concern.
Chapter 4 focuses on the links between the mine action programme and the other arenas of
interest: (i) government, responsible for development planning and management; (ii) the
international arena, including the other States Parties of the Convention as well as
Mozambique’s main development assistance partners; and (iii) the local arena, embracing
local authorities and other community development actors.
Chapter 5 examines the link between mine action and development from another perspective:
the development management structures and practices that the mine action programme will
need to link into. This includes an overview of how the Government of Mozambique (GoM)
is structured and operates, focusing on the policies, practices, and instruments of development
planning and management in Mozambique today and how these are evolving. The Chapter
also discusses how the international assistance community delivers aid and tries to harmonise
among its members and align with government priorities.
Chapter 6 provides an assessment of the current status and the challenges remaining.
Following a discussion on the apparent extent of the remaining contamination, the chapter
touches on what this implies in terms of socio-economic challenges (humanitarian,
reconstruction, and development) and from the perspective of the Convention.
Chapter 7 then analyses how these humanitarian and development challenges might be
addressed both today and in the future. Many of the current and most of the future
requirements stem from the need to support development investments – in particular,
infrastructure projects – and the Chapter provides recommendations for how mine action
officials should engage with the units responsible for the infrastructure work programmes as
well as with the core economic management units preparing the five-year PARPA and the
annual budget. In addition, a set of issues are identified that will need to be addressed in a
more strategic fashion by the main stakeholders (GoM, mine action organisations, the UNDP,
and donors).
Chapter 8 concludes the main report with a discussion of the way forward. It analyses the
unresolved issues highlighted in Chapter 6 and discusses how options for tackling various of
these may affect the alternatives available for the other unresolved issues – in short, how the
different issues are inter-related and must be approached as a set from a strategic perspective.
The Chapter then turns to the long-term requirements in terms of the legislative and policy
framework for mine action, plus the structure and key organs of a national programme
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(collectively termed the institutional make-up of the programme). Following a discussion on
transition issues centring on the recommendation to initiate something akin to a Sector Wide
Approach (SWAp)46 to mine action programming, a Road Map is outlined to describe the
recommended process and sequence for the transition. The Chapter concludes with a brief
discussion on other transitional issues: the likely misallocation of demining assets that will
emerge as the international NGOs withdraw; the proposed transition of ADP; and the possible
role of FADM.
A Supplementary Chapter covers important events that have occurred since the Review
Team’s mission to Mozambique, chiefly: (i) a significant reduction in the IMSMA data entry
backlog; (ii) the inclusion of mine action as a cross-cutting issue within the new government’s
Five-Year Programme, laid before parliament in March; (iii) the cessation of ADP activities
in the wake of a strike by its employees over non-payment of wages, leading to (iv) the
agreement by UNDP, the Irish Government, and the Government of Mozambique on
financing a substantial compensation package ($1.8 million) for ADP employees, and (v) the
engagement of a consultant in June to assist IND in representing mine action within the
working groups created to assist in the preparations of Mozambique’s second Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PARPA).
Appendix 1 contains the Terms of Reference; Appendix 2 the list of people met during the
mission; and Appendix 3 the list of accredited demining organisations in Mozambique.
Finally, the lessons learned from this review are listed for reference in Appendix 4.

46

Mine action does not constitute a distinct sector but rather supports activities in a variety of sectors.
In this sense, the term SWAp is inappropriate. However, the SWAp approach centres on three key
tasks that the GoM, donors, and operators need accomplish sequentially to formulate a new national
strategy for mine action: (i) agree on a common understanding of needs; (ii) agree on a common
strategy to address these needs; and (iii) agree on a common monitoring and evaluation framework to
assess progress and update both the needs assessment and strategy as necessary.
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1. General Background
Key features of the society and economy
Lying in South-eastern Africa, Mozambique is bordered by Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and has a coastline stretching almost 2,500 km. At just
over 800,000 km2 (almost twice the size of California), and with fewer than 19 million
people, much of the country remains sparsely populated. Many communities are remote and
ill-served by transportation and communication networks.
Mozambique remains a predominately rural country. About 75 per cent of the population lives
in rural areas, and as many as 80 per cent of the economically active still depend of
agriculture to some degree.47 Agricultural productivity is extremely low. Only two per cent of
those engaged in agriculture have any training in agricultural techniques, and only three per
cent have access to irrigated land. Most rural households also have limited access to markets,
either to sell their products or to obtain modern inputs such as fertilizer or improved seeds.
This reflects the poor state of the country’s transportation network. Mozambique has the
lowest road coverage in Southern Africa, with only 32 km of roads per 1,000 square
kilometres in 2003; one fifth the regional average (135 km per 1,000 square kilometres).
Further, only 57 per cent of the road network is adequately maintained (the regional average
is 71 per cent).
Mozambique is an extremely poor country, with a gross per capita income of only $210.
Recent estimates indicate that just over 54 per cent of the population were below the “absolute
poverty line” and unable to satisfy their basic consumption needs. Fortunately, economic
growth has been vigorous over the past decade, buoyed by peace and the return of refugees,
resulting in the revival of peasant agriculture and other basic economic activities, the
rehabilitation of infrastructure, and the restoration of basic public services. This has led to a
reduction in poverty and a concomitant rise in many of the standard measures of human and
social wellbeing (see Textbox 1 – Mozambique’s progress toward the MDGs)
Textbox 1 – Mozambique’s progress toward the MDGs

At the Monterrey Summit in 2000, the world’s heads of government adopted a development
compact based on: (i) a focus on poverty reduction, (ii) the centrality of country ownership,
(iii) the need for a comprehensive, long term approach, and (iv) the need for partnership. The
Monterrey consensus also embraced a focus on outcomes and on the importance of agreeing
benchmarks against which to measure progress. These benchmarks, recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty, are termed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).*
In spite of its excellent economic growth record, Mozambique’s progress on its MDG targets
has been less rapid, in part because of low absorptive capacity (i.e. limited capacities,
particularly in some key ministries delivering basic services) coupled with problems of
sustainability (i.e. donors deliver projects outside the public service to avoid capacity
constraints, but then the benefits cannot be sustained). In some sectors, poor government
policies also constrain progress.

47

Even in urban areas, almost half the population engages in agricultural activities.
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A recent assessment by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected
that only three of the 18 specific targets would be met: those relating to income poverty,
hunger, and primary school enrolment. However, with better government policies in some of
the key sectors, coupled with higher levels of aid, at least three other targets could be met:
completion rates for primary school; halting the increase in HIV/AIDS infection; and halving
the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water.
Even with better policies and increasing aid in line with growth in public sector capacities, the
Bank does not project that targets for gender equity (to eliminate gender disparity in primary
and secondary education) or for child and maternal mortality rates (reduce by two-thirds the
under-five mortality rate; reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality rate) can be met.
(World Bank and IMF, 2003)
More recently, an expert group commissioned by the UN advocated a much more aggressive
push to achieving the MDGs. Their report emphasises the need for each country to begin with
an assessment of what resources are required to achieve each of the targets, and then adjust
their poverty reduction strategies to aim for those targets, making it clear to donors what aid is
required – what one observer has termed “aspirational financing”. (UN Millennium Project,
2005)
* There are eight goals and 18 specific targets. For example, the first goal is to eliminate extreme
poverty and hunger, and there are two targets to achieve by 2015: (i) to halve the proportion of people
whose income is less than one dollar a day, and (ii) to halve the number of people who suffer from
hunger.

Conflict and Political Developments
Conflict began in 1964 when the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), formed
two years earlier in Tanzania, started infiltrating and establishing bases in northern
Mozambique. By 1970, FRELIMO operations stretched well into central Mozambique. The
independence struggle ended in 1974 after a military coup d’état in Portugal gave power to
officers favouring independence for its African colonies. Following a transitional government,
FRELIMO declared full independence in 1975, forming a government led by President
Samora Machel.
By 1976, Mozambique was providing active support to other independence movements in
Southern Africa; the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army and the African National
Congress (ANC). The following year, FRELIMO declared itself a socialist vanguard party
and turned to the Soviet Union for support. In the same year, the Rhodesian security forces
created the Mozambique National Resistance (commonly known as RENAMO) and initiated
operations in central Mozambique.
The 1979 Lancaster House Agreements ended the civil war in Rhodesia, creating hope for an
end to Mozambique’s conflict. However, South Africa’s Military Intelligence Directorate
stepped in with support for RENAMO, which soon expanded the scope of its military
operations in the central provinces. By 1986, famine and intensifying RENAMO operations,
including the killing and mutilation of civilians, led to an exodus to Malawi.
By 1988 the war had reached a stalemate and pressures on both sides prompted a number of
initiatives to bring about peace talks. Mozambique, facing economic disaster, had exchanged
its socialist economic programme for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural
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adjustment programme in 1987. In 1990, the government adopted a new constitution,
providing for multi-party elections. Meanwhile, the opening dialogues between South
Africa’s apartheid government and the ANC led to curtailed support for RENAMO.
Peace talks started in 1990, leading to the Rome Peace Agreement signed in October 1992.
This provided for an immediate cease-fire, demobilisation of both armies, and agreement on
holding legislative and presidential elections every five years. To oversee the transition to
elected government, the UN deployed a 6,400-strong peacekeeping force, ONUMOZ, with a
mandate that included coordinating the clearance of landmines.

The Contamination Problem
Landmine contamination in Mozambique is the result of three distinct phases of conflict:
1. 1964-1975 – Large barrier minefields laid by the Portuguese as protection against
incursions from Tanzania by FRELIMO,48 plus defensive minefields around key
infrastructure such as the Cahora-Bassa hydroelectric dam in Tete.
2. 1976-1979 – The Zimbabwean independence war resulted in Rhodesian military
incursions into Mozambique and the emergence of RENAMO, operating initially in
central Mozambique.
3. 1979-1992 – Civil conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO with limited South African
and Zimbabwean interventions.
During all three stages, the forces loyal to the government of the day laid large numbers of
mines to defend economic infrastructure and military installations, while the opposition forces
(FRELIMO to 1975, then RENAMO supported by Rhodesians and, later, South Africans)
often planted anti-tank mines on roads, bridges, and river crossings to inhibit government
troop movements, interdict shipments, and cripple the economy.
During at least the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO, both sides also used mines
more indiscriminately, resulting in many small or low-density minefields. In a 1994
assessment report, Human Rights Watch claimed evidence that both sides had targeted
civilians – particularly in central Mozambique – “to deny them access to fields, water
sources, and fishing points.” The same report singled-out RENAMO for “laying mines
specifically to discourage or make impossible the return of displaced people.”49
The first formal attempt to estimate the scale of the contamination problem was in 1992 when
the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) requested information on the “existence
and nature of the mine problem in Mozambique.” Its mission in early 1993, which was
hindered by the security constraints in place at the time, led to a provisional (and very rough)
plan for clearance.
The estimate of two million mines was often quoted at the time and, clearly, the international
community viewed Mozambique as one of the most seriously contaminated countries in the
48

FRELIMO also used both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. By the late 1960s, Portuguese
forces had nicknamed the north “Minas Gerais” or “General Mines”.
49
Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Landmines in Mozambique, quoted in DHA, 1997, pp. 10-11.
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world. This impression was reinforced when Human Rights Watch published its 1994 report
on landmines in Mozambique, which stated that mines “have claimed more than 10,000
victims” and that an estimated 8,000 amputees had received medical treatment.
Today it is widely believed that the early estimates on the numbers of landmines vastly
overstated the scope of the problem, from that perspective at least. IND records covering over
ten years of clearance show fewer than 100,000 mines found. The number of landmines
provides, of course, but a small glimpse of the problem. A clearer picture emerges from
information on the number of hazardous sites, the total area suspected of contamination, the
numbers of communities and individuals affected, and the nature of the impacts on people. A
proper assessment only becomes possible when we have data on multiple dimensions of the
contamination problem and true understanding only evolves once people begin to analyse this
data. Unfortunately, in Mozambique after more than ten years of mine action, the
contamination picture remains decidedly unclear and a concerted effort is required to analyse
the data that are available.
After months of talking about the urgent need for a survey, in December 1993 UNOHAC
contracted the HALO Trust to undertake a “nationwide” survey on an emergency basis. The
budget and duration allowed for such a survey of a large country were inadequate.50
Understandably, the survey teams focused particularly on roads and other facilities important
to the relief agencies. It eventually identified 981 mined areas.
HALO itself recognised this survey was “seriously flawed” in some respects (DHA, 1997, p.
23), but it did generate the SHAMAN dataset,51 which allowed some degree of planning and
prioritisation. No national clearance plan was, in fact, produced until after the subsequent
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was completed in 2001, so the principal use of the SHAMAN
data was by the demining operators for their task planning.52 In spite of its limitations, the
SHAMAN database provided the only picture – however incomplete – of the extent of
contamination until the completion of the LIS seven years later.
The LIS was commissioned by CIDA in 1999 to define the contamination problem not so
much in terms of the numbers of landmines or the areas suspected of contamination, but
rather in the socio-economic impacts at the community level.53 When completed in 2001, the
overwhelming message that emerged was that the contamination problem was more extensive
than intensive. The survey identified 791 mine affected communities, 1,374 suspect mine
areas, and a suspected contaminated area totalling 562 km2.54 Contamination existed in all ten

50

Only $395,000 and four months duration were provided. The survey was also hampered by poor
roads, insecurity, inadequate maps, and simple inexperience within the Mine Action field concerning
how to conduct such a survey.
51
SHAMAN is the name of the database software used.
52
The operators all knew the limitations of the survey, which resulted in significant inaccuracies in
data on the location of hazards. Accordingly, they used the database more “as a point of departure”
that as a definitive reference.
53
The LIS methodology does not attempt to document national development priorities, programmes,
or targets. Thus, the LIS results cannot be related to development plans without significant analysis,
drawing on additional data sets. The Review Team is unaware of any cases in which such analysis
has been conducted by a mine action programme, although some efforts have been made by
researchers affiliated with the Survey Action Center – the NGO that oversees LIS exercises.
54
Since then, re-surveying by operators has significantly reduced the suspected hazardous area
(SHA). By the end of 2004, the national mine action database showed just over 170 km2 of SHA (IND,
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provinces and 123 of 128 districts. But relatively few of the affected communities, home to a
relatively small number of people, were scored as seriously affected.55

Classified by...

Figure 9 – Percentages of all affected people and communities by level of impact (from LIS)
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2005, Annual Report: 2004, p. 2), although most operators and the Review Team believe the true
figure is much less than this.
55
Community impact scoring is based on (i) the numbers of recent victims, (ii) the presence of
landmines, UXO, or both, and (iii) reported blockages to various types of land or community facilities
(schools, water points, etc.). Scoring is done using a separate computer module based on data stored
in the LIS database.
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2. The Mine Action Programme56
Origin and evolution
Start-up phase (1992 – 1995)
Protocol VI of the General Peace Accord provided for the Mozambican government and
RENAMO to take responsibility for the implementation of the ceasefire process, to
“…organise and implement mine-clearing operations” and to give assurances that they would
not “prevent [any] mine-clearing operations”.
The subsequent ONUMOZ deployment of 6,400 soldiers and UN workers had a mandate
based on the Accord, which provided for them to work with the national authorities to
coordinate mine clearance within the country. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
(DHA) initiated early efforts to obtain information on the nature and extent of landmine
contamination, and developed a preliminary plan by January 1993, within three months of the
start of the UNOMOZ mandate. This however was referred to the Ceasefire Commission,
comprising representatives from the UN and the warring parties, and became hostage to the
tortuous negotiations in that highly politicised forum. The plan was not approved until another
11 months had passed. During this lag the UN did not initiate the preparatory actions
envisaged by the plan, such as establishing the training school for deminers.57
The ONUMOZ mine clearance plan called for three phases:
1. Clearance of 2,000 km of priority roads to allow access of food supplies to refugee camps.
2. Clearance of further roads to allow refugees to return home.
3. Setting up a training school to train Mozambican deminers to complete the remainder of
work required.
Thus, while the plan proposed training demobilised soldiers to develop indigenous capacity, it
centred on the short-term needs of the ONUMOZ mission and, particularly, the opening of the
major transportation corridors, for which tenders were issued seeking proposals from
commercial contractors. This initiated a “feeding frenzy” (DHA, 1997:17) among some
donors, each seeking to promote the interests of their country’s firms. This led to challenges
of the tender process and ill-will among the donors. Once the successful bidder finally was
selected, administrative delays within the UN caused a further seven-month delay before the
contract was signed in July 1994.58

56

The history of Mozambique’s Mine Action programme is well documented. The Mozambique
country report published by DHA in 1997 (part of The Development of Indigenous Mine Action
Capacities study) covers the period to early 1997. The 2001 UNDP/GICHD report, Socio-economic
Approaches to Mine Action, contains a chapter of Mozambique, covering up to mid-2000. The Peace
Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) published community-level studies in 2000-01. More recently
GICHD has commissioned country case studies on Mozambique for its studies of (i) the role of local
organisations, (ii) capacity development, and (iii) the use of surveys.
57
UNDP and UNOPS did, however, do the groundwork so that commercial tenders for road clearance
could go forward as soon as the Ceasefire Commission approved the plan.
58
One of the firms in the winning consortium was an arms manufacturer: international mine action
NGOs, most of which were active in the international mine ban movement, were outraged.
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In the meantime, the training school opened in Moamba, Maputo Province. However, it soon
became clear that no benefits would accrue from training 500 deminers unless organisations
existed to deploy them. Accordingly, the UN initiated the Accelerated Demining Programme
(ADP) in July 1994, proposing that the government would eventually absorb this as the
implementing arm of a future national mine action centre (MAC) – a recommendation that
was roundly attacked by some donors who advocated that clearance be left to the international
NGOs and commercial firms already present in the country.59
Indeed, distinct survey and clearance projects had been underway as early as 1992. The first
two international NGOs arrived in 1993, with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) operating in
the central provinces60 and the HALO Trust taking responsibility for the northern region plus
Zambézia. From February 1995 they were joined by ADP, operating in the south. This
delineation of operational areas appears spontaneous rather than designed: apparently an
informal agreement evolved in the absence of any national guidance to “coordinate by
avoidance.”
Although the UN (and principally ONUMOZ) did try to push mine clearance forward during
this start-up phase, the UN was not yet well organised to play a leading role in mine action.
Multiple UN agencies were involved with overlapping mandates. In some cases such as
Mozambique, early efforts to initiate a nationwide mine action programme were hamstrung
when UN Peacekeeping missions were in place because demining was viewed as the preserve
of the military.
As a result of the UN’s lack of preparedness61 and the overtly competitive behaviour of some
of the principle donors, coupled with the very real need to initiate operations to cope with the
humanitarian emergency, mine action in Mozambique began through a number of distinct
initiatives without an overall plan to establish a coordinated response.
Lesson 1
When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination
following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before the international community
understands the true nature of the problem and then more time before it learns from
experience how best to address that problem.

Mozambique was among the first-generation mine action programmes and could not,
therefore, benefit significantly from the experience elsewhere.
Lesson 2
In many post-conflict situations, the government is not in a position to give the necessary
attention to all facets of humanitarian needs. In such situations, the international community
requires an international organisation such as the UN to take the lead in defining the scope and
intensity of the humanitarian emergency, and to facilitate the preparation of a strategy to
address the emergency in a reasonably coordinated fashion.

With respect to landmine and UXO contamination, the international community has learnt this
lesson: in particular, in 1998 the UN issued its policy on mine action that clarified the roles of
59

All these arrangements were carried out under the auspices of ONUMOZ and with the oversight of
UNOHAC (the predecessor of UNOCHA and working within DHA).
60
NPA also provided mine risk education (MRE) in refugee camps.
61
Some critics went as far as asserting, with some hyperbole perhaps, that demining occurred during
the start-up phase “despite, not because of the UN.” (Boulden & Edwards, 1999, p. 87)
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different UN agencies involved in this field and designated UNMAS as the agency
responsible for overall coordination. However, this policy was not issued until 1997 – too late
to be of guidance during the start-up of Mozambique’s mine action programme.
Lesson 3
In the absence of a commonly endorsed assessment of needs and a commonly endorsed
strategy to address those needs, donors are likely to support a range of separate and relatively
uncoordinated mine action initiatives, implemented via firms or NGOs, in response to the
humanitarian emergency.

Consolidation phase (1995 – 1999)
Although a number of key stakeholders did not believe it was appropriate for the Mozambican
government to assume control of ADP as originally intended, they did want the government to
take responsibility for mine action. In May 1995, the government established the National
Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC – generally known under its Portuguese acronym,
CND), which comprised the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (as the responsible minister),
Finance, Agriculture, Public Works, National Defence, and Industry.62 The CND mandate
was to:
“…collect, process and analyse information and data relevant to demining,
elaborate a strategy and action plan for mine clearance, and establish
procedures for setting priorities at the local and national level; monitor and
coordinate all ongoing demining activities; act as the approval and licensing
authority in respect of new operator…; adjudicate public tenders for service
contracts…; and promote and oversee the implementation of a national
programme to improve public mine awareness.” (DHA, 1997, p. 28)
The Executive Director’s Office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was intended to serve
as the secretariat for CND, and to coordinate, assist, propose, license, and regulate all mine
action activities in Mozambique. Unfortunately, CND failed to provide leadership. It did not
meet formally until over a year after its establishment. As well, its secretariat proved unable to
discharge its responsibilities. It had virtually no capacity and the UN did not get a project in
place to provide technical assistance until the passage of another year.63 As a result, no
national plan was formulated and the mine action operators in the country were left to their
own direction, with no overall coordination.
Fortunately, the operators acquitted themselves well. Although mistakes were made in the
early years,64 the operators appear to have learned from these and have improved their
performance over time. For the most part they maintained good relations with donors and
developed progressively better relations with provincial governors and district administrators.
The division of the country into three distinct regions complicated the task of national
coordination, but it also minimised concerns over duplication and unhealthy competition
among the three large “humanitarian” operators (a term embracing the international NGOs
plus ADP).

62

Government decree 18/95.
This project saw 85 per cent of the funds going to expatriate salaries and lacked a counterpart
strategy, with the result that little indigenous capacity building took place. (DHA, 1997, p. 32)
64
See for example PRIO, 2000, and Chr. Michelsen Institute with Nordic Consulting Group, 1997.
63
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In 1998, Handicap International (HI) also started a mine clearance programme, but its strategy
of undertaking only small tasks to free-up valuable community resources (which it termed
proximity demining) was seen as a complementary rather than a directly competitive
approach. As well, HI had long been active in disability assistance and then in both MRE and
the collection of data on landmine victims, so it was already seen as part of the mine action
community in Mozambique.65
The amount of work on offer to commercial firms declined after the initial push to demine the
main roads network and other vital infrastructure. As a result, some international demining
firms left Mozambique. Others however established joint ventures with local managers and a
few purely Mozambican demining firms began to form, some competing successfully for
smaller commercial contracts.
The main problem remained the weakness of NMCC/CND. Donors, UN agencies, and other
actors questioned the viability of a Mozambican authority which enjoyed little evident support
from the Government and seemingly had little to contribute that would add value to the work
of the operators. The UNDP, donors, and operators pushed for improvements, leading
eventually to the replacement of CND in June 1999, after perhaps $3 million in assistance had
been given by donors in support of NMCC/CND.66
Lesson 4
Once a series of independent mine action programmes are established, it is more difficult to
put in place an effective mechanism for national coordination.

Maturation (1999 – 2004)
The reformed and restructured organisation, the Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND) was
given a mandate similar to that of CND, to: “successfully establish and develop a
coordination, supervision and management mechanism, in close cooperation with all other
relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a national mine
action plan.”67 However, IND enjoyed much greater autonomy than its predecessor, reporting
directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and operating outside the cumbersome
governmental bureaucracy.
Their unhappy experience with CND meant that donors and demining operators initially were
wary of the government’s new attempt at establishing a coordination mechanism; hence, the
build-up of IND was slow. There was only limited technical support at the start and it was not
65

This began in 1993 with MRE projects in Tete and Zambézia, which were subsequently merged into
the Programme of National Co-ordination of Education Activities to Prevent Landmines and Other
Explosive Devices Accidents (PEPAM in the Portuguese acronym). See FINNCONSULT (1999) for an
evaluation of HI programmes to the end of 1998. HI subsequently turned PEPAM into a nation-wide
programme and, in 2001, transferred responsibility for this to IND.
66
The table on p. 153 of UNDP/GICHD, 2001, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine
Action, Geneva , shows more that $10 million going to CND. This seems to be overstated, perhaps
including funds destined for ADP. The 1997 DHA country case study for Mozambique shows on p. 29
just over $900,000 went to MNCC/CND up to the end of 1996. A more complete dataset compiled by
Lambert-Madore in 2002 indicates about $2.4 million went to CND via UNDP from Finland, Germany,
the Netherlands, and Norway. Adding to this the figures from the DHA study for Italy ($412,000) and
the U.S. ($175,000) gives an estimate of about $3 million, much of which came in the form of technical
assistance rather than funds or equipment.
67
IND Statutes.
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until 2001 that a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) was fielded (although there was a temporary
adviser attached after the 2000 floods). A finance and administration adviser also was
engaged in 2001 and advisers for both operations and information were added in mid-2002.
Lesson 5
A half-hearted attempt to impose coordination on a group of organisations with established
programmes is worse than no attempt at all. It does not solve the problem and it leaves the
government facing a credibility gap to overcome once it advances a better conceived
coordination mechanism.

Shortly before the creation of IND, CIDA announced funding for a national Landmine Impact
Survey (LIS), to be implemented by the Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC).
The objectives were “to collect, record and analyze information on the location of known or
suspected mined areas throughout the country, and to provide an overview of their social and
economic impacts as perceived by the residents of landmine-affected communities”. The
survey was a difficult undertaking in a country as large as Mozambique, with inadequate
transportation infrastructure that also had been ravaged by extended conflicts. Dogged with
controversy from the start,68 the survey also was severely disrupted by the floods in early
2000. Ultimately, it was completed in July 2001 and certified by the UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) in September of that year.
The LIS data was stored on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database, which also offered Geographic Information System (GIS) and mapping
functionality.69 To enable this functionality, CIDA funded a parallel project with DINAGECA
(the Mapping and Cadastral Authority) which yielded a national gazetteer and Mozambique’s
first set of digitised maps and toponomy. This was classified as a mine action project but in
fact provides very far-reaching benefits for any agency engaged in spatial planning, natural
resource management, poverty analysis, etc.
Drawing on the data produced by the LIS, IND developed a national strategy and in 2001
issued a Five-Year National Mine Action Plan (termed the National Mine Action Plan or
NMAP) covering 2002 – 2006; a plan that is still extant and unrevised, although annual plans
have been issued.
IND has been far more successful than its predecessor. Although there was initial scepticism
concerning IND’s ability to stamp its authority over mine action operators, which had been
working independently in Mozambique for over five years before the Institute’s
establishment, a more productive relationship gradually has evolved. The need for IND, or at
least a national authority coupled with a solid national mine action information system, is
more widely recognised in the Mozambican mine action community today. However,
increased acknowledgement of IND’s potential importance also implies increased scrutiny
concerning its actual performance in discharging its responsibilities – an issue that is taken-up
later in this Chapter.
68

Some of these controversies were common to all the early Landmine Impact Surveys (e.g. the
expense and the “community focus”, which typically results in huge increases in the area suspected of
contamination): others were specific to the Mozambique LIS (e.g. the decision by CIDA to restrict
bidding to Canadian organisations – cutting-out the more experienced Mine Action NGOs already
active in Mozambique – and the award of the contract to CIDC, which was viewed as a “semicommercial” organisation rather than an authentic NGO). See also Scanteam and Demex, 2003,
particularly Annex H.
69
IMSMA can plot larger scale (1:50,000) maps that are useful to demining operators.
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Achievements, contributions, and consequences
Mine Survey and Clearance
The Big Push to Clear Infrastructure Networks
As noted above, various actors initiated a number of separate mine survey and clearance
projects by early 1993. In broad terms, international firms were contracted mainly to survey
and clear the major road and electricity networks – tasks they completed quickly because they
imported specialised survey assets and because there were, in fact, few mines left on the
major roads at least. The international NGOs also started with a focus on roads to facilitate the
return of refugees and the work of agencies delivering humanitarian assistance, but soon
shifted much of their efforts to area demining programmes.
Records for the period are incomplete, and the comparison of rapid survey and clearance of
roads with area demining is not very useful: regardless, the following graph gives some
indication of the scale of the survey and clearance operations undertaken from 1993 to 2001
to clear the main transportation and power networks. (Note: The data provided by IND for
1993-97 are not separated by year, so the annual averages for this period are used.)
Figure 10 – Survey & Clearance of Infrastructure Networks: 1993-97
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In addition, clearance records show Minetech (a Zimbabwean firm) accounting for almost 20
million square metres of “area clearance” from 1993-1999. This is an improbably high figure.
As well, relatively small numbers of devices were found, suggesting that most of the area
covered by Minetech was declared safe following survey, and did not require actual clearance.
Accordingly, the Minetech figures for this period are not included in the following section.
Other Demining
The graph below gives the pattern of “area” demined over the years. It should be interpreted
as suggestive rather than a definitive picture as some of what has been recorded as clearance –
particularly by commercial firms – is either a combination of survey and clearance, or is

18

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

October 2005

Battle Area Clearance (BAC – a visual inspection for surface explosives). 70 Once again,
figures for 1993-1997 are not available by year, so the annual averages for that period is used
to provide some comparison of the scale of operations over time.71
Figure 11 – Area demining operations: 1993-2004
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Some clear patterns emerge. First, the scale of operations by humanitarian deminers rose
gradually until about 2002; then levelled-off. Second, FADM has been making modest
contributions since at least 2000, but there appears to be a problem in either the reporting or
the recording of FADM clearance work. Third, there are much bigger year-to-year swings in
the amount of work completed by commercial operators than is the case for the humanitarian
operators and (probably) FADM.
This last observation is consistent with the market niche now filled by commercial deminers.
Firms maintain a skeleton staff, but recruit demining teams when they win contracts. The total
value of contracts issued in any year ebbs-and-flows with the pattern of infrastructure
rehabilitation and development work underway in Mozambique. Over the past five years, the
amount of demining conducted in any year by commercial firms has ranged anywhere from
under one million m2 to almost seven million m2. Commercial demining has come to account
for a significant component of all demining activity since 2000 and, in 2004, the area recorded
as cleared by commercial demining firms exceeded that of the humanitarian operators (again,
much of what is recorded as ‘cleared’ by firms may be a combination of survey and
clearance).

70

We are not suggesting anything untoward: only that many of the tasks for which commercial firms
have been engaged are not as resource intensive as the manual demining, which constitutes the bulk
of the activity by the humanitarian and, in recent years, FADM.
71
As well, the graph does not include HALO Tasks in 2004 which are recorded as “technical survey”
by IND. The IND database shows 106 such tasks for HALO in 2004, which “released” over 4 million
m2. As discussed later, it is likely that IND has not entered all such records from HALO.
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Figure 12 – Cumulative areas demined: 2000-2004
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Ideally it would be useful to compare the annual clearance activity against the scale of the
contamination in the country to gauge how long it might take (and how much it might cost) to
overcome the landmine problem. As noted earlier however, IND’s existing records stem
principally from the LIS, which all parties recognise overstates the total hazard (i.e. area
suspected of contamination). Therefore, we defer this question until a later section where we
analyse the likely extent of contamination remaining in Mozambique today.
One other point warrants mention here. Clearly, data from early years of the programme are
unreliable. However, there are continuing concerns about whether the national mine action
database contains complete and accurate records of demining even for recent years. This will
continue to detract from what should be a valuable national asset unless it is resolved.
Lesson 6
An information management system capable of maintaining complete and accurate data on the
landmine/UXO hazards, and on survey and clearance activities, is an essential capacity for a
national mine action programme. Failure to establish such a system in the early years of a
programme will severely constrain the ability of programme planners and managers to
formulate proper plans and priorities for years to come.

Mine Risk Education
Both NPA and HI (along with a number of other agencies) were active in MRE since at least
1993. As has been the pattern in most countries, MRE shifted from (i) emergency projects
featuring direct delivery organised by international agencies to refugees, displaced persons,
and other at-risk groups through (ii) efforts to deliver MRE via local organisations (such as
the Mozambican Red Cross – CVM) and via radio and other media, in order to reach more
communities in a cost-effective manner, and finally to (iii) efforts to “institutionalise” MRE
by, say, incorporating it into the school system, thus making it more likely to be sustained.
As depicted in the following graph, the number of deaths and injuries from landmine and
UXO accidents has fallen dramatically, suggesting the current level of risk to civilians is
modest.72 (Notes: (i) These data include deminer casualties, which appear to account for about
72

Note: IND records for 1996 and 1997 cover only six and seven provinces respectively. Figures
shown in the graph for those years (dotted line) are estimates extrapolated to all ten provinces based
on calculations made by the Review Team. The trend line is based only on data from 1998 to 2004.
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a quarter of all deaths and injuries recorded since the start of 1999! (ii) IND data provided to
the Review Team did not give a breakdown between the type of explosive device causing
accidents, deaths, and injuries. Such a breakdown is important to understand whether the
remaining risk stems largely from minefields or from UXO – obviously a critical question in
assessing whether MRE is warranted and what type of risks MRE should focus upon.
Figure 13 – Landmine & UXO Victims over time (showing trend)
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The largest programme for MRE was developed by HI. Its National Co-ordination of
Education Activities to Prevent Mine and UXO Accidents (PEPAM) programme commenced
in 1995.73 PEPAM sought to involve local partners (e.g. provincial and district staff of
Education, Social Welfare, Health and Police as well as the CVM), create district and
community committees, and introduce MRE into the school system. It made significant
progress on all these fronts before handing responsibility to IND in 1999, at which point HI
ended its MRE activities.74
Until 2003, there were some agencies including UNICEF and the CVM still active in MRE in
some form or another. Since early 2004 however, it appears that no MRE activities have taken
place in the country (other than information sessions for local residents when mine clearance
teams start working on a new site). UNICEF has recently undertaken a review of their
activities in Mozambique and believes there is no serious requirement for further MRE.
The current IND strategic plan states that “There is an urgent need for an aggressive and
sustained Mine Risk Education and Marking campaigns to be re-launched.” Given the current
levels of accidents and victims however, the Review Team does not agree. While operators
should continue to provide MRE sessions to local residents when they move to a new vicinity,
and IND should continue to monitor the numbers of accidents and victims, resources that
might be allocated to MRE would probably be better utilised in other mine action activities.
Lesson 7
Over time (and assuming a country does not return to conflict), MRE takes a progressively
lower profile within a national mine action programme – a reasonable trend given:

73

See FINNCONSULT, 1999, especially pp. 24-27.
However, HI developed further intensive MRE campaigns in the central region districts following the
floods in 2000/2001. By the end of 2001, IND assumed responsibility for these activities as well.
74
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Risks to civilians are highest when they are unfamiliar with the contamination in the area,
such as when forced to flee conflict regions or when they return to their home communities
after the conflict ends;
MRE gradually reaches most of those at risk;
Lessons are quickly learned when local populations venture into contaminated areas;
Targeted survey and clearance operations gradually address the most dangerous
minefields.

Victim Assistance
Similarly (and in line with experience in other mine affected countries), victim assistance has
taken a back seat within the mine action programme in recent years. IND’s role appears to be
limited to donor liaison and reporting for purposes of the Convention. However the disability
assistance programme within the ministries of Social Action75 and Health received extensive
support in the past from ICRC and the international NGOs HI,76 POWER, and the Jaipur
Limb Campaign, as well as from CVM.77 In all, ten orthopaedic clinics were established,
along with sixty physiotherapy centres and ten transit centres.
An evaluation of HI programmes conducted in 1998 found “The orthopaedic workshops and
physiotherapy units are largely under-utilised. No feasibility studies were carried out of the
need for the construction of orthopaedic centres nor have the reasons for the low utilisation
of the units, particularly by women, or client satisfaction been studied.” (FINNCONSULT,
1999, p. 4) It also questioned whether the Ministry of Health would be able to sustain that
number of facilities and the highly skilled staff required to make use of them, and expressed
concern that the underutilised orthopaedic and physiotherapy facilities might be draining
resources from other essential public health services such as maternal and child care.
One interpretation of such findings was that the facilities are, in fact, needed to serve the large
number of disabled in the country (including landmine and UXO victims), but most of those
in need are unaware these facilities exist or are unable to access them due to a lack of either
transport or temporary accommodation near the treatment facility.
In the second half of 2001, a specific project was initiated by CVM for mine victim assistance
in three provinces: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Gaza. The focus was on identifying amputees
and facilitating their access to orthopaedic clinics, although reports on SHAs and mine
accidents were also sent to IND. The targeted project for mine victims seems to have ended,
although CVM still provides this service in some areas of the country for disabled people in
general. Presumably, some beneficiaries are landmine victims.
In 1999, Landmine Survivors Network established a Peer Support Network of disabled people
– many of whom are landmine survivors – in Zambézia Province. This provides home visits,
the distribution and repair of mobility devices and medicines, and the provision of schools
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Formally, The Ministry for Women and the Coordination of Social Action (MMCAS), which is the
national coordinating agency for assistance to persons with disabilities. In 2004, MMCAS reported that
140 mine victims in Zambézia were assisted with transport to the orthopedic center.
76
HI began its disability programme in the country in 1986.
77
Until recently CVM worked with the Jaipur Limb Campaign to operate the Jaipur Orthopedic Center
(COJ) in Gaza. It also ran a special Mine Victims assistance project to provide transport to the
orthopedic centers and to facilitate accommodation in transit centres maintained for patients who need
to travel to a clinic for out-patient treatment.
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supplies, building materials, etc. In addition, it has organised small business training courses
and assisted a group of 12 survivors to start their own business.
The Mozambican Association for Disabled Persons (ADEMO), the Association of Military
Disabled (ADEMIMO), and the Forum of Mozambican Disabled Persons Association
(FAMOD – a network of other associations) have been engaged in advocacy for the rights of
the disabled. In June 1999, parliament enacted a national disability law and the Council of
Ministers adopted a national policy on persons with disabilities (Resolution no. 20/99) that
included a commitment to encourage the active participation of disabled people in the
country’s socio-economic development. However, implementation remains limited due to a
lack of resources.
The evidence available to the Review Team suggests that, should additional resources be
provided for victim assistance in Mozambique, efforts should focus on addressing
accessibility problems by providing travel to and lodging near existing facilities, rather than
expanding or upgrading facilities. It does not appear warranted for a distinct service of this
type to be created and maintained for mine victims alone; rather, existing programmes for
disabled people in general need to be supported and expanded.
Lesson 8
Initiatives to establish orthopaedic and physiotherapy facilities available to landmine survivors,
and to enhance the skills of the medical and technical personnel at these facilities, often have
failed to deliver sustained benefits. Such initiatives should be undertaken as part of a broader
strategy designed to:
•
•

establish disability assistance programmes that the relevant government ministries, in
concert with local self-help organisations, can hope to sustain,
provide a range of other basic services including monitoring, transport to and lodging at
treatment facilities, and referral to services for psycho-social rehabilitation and economic
re-integration of landmine survivors and other disabled persons.

Lesson 9
National mine action programmes have a specific responsibility to promote programmes aimed
at meeting the needs of landmine survivors. However, except in rare cases – often during
emergencies – mine action programmes are not the appropriate vehicle for implementing these
programmes, which should be part of broader efforts at meeting the needs of disabled people.
Mine action programmes often can help to focus attention on the rights and needs of disabled
persons, and bringing to light serious gaps in services available to landmine survivors and
other disabled persons.

Stockpile Destruction
All stocks in the country were destroyed by the end of February 2003 with the exception of
1,470 mines retained by organisations for training purposes as permitted by article 7.1 of the
Ottawa treaty. This is a major achievement, sending a strong signal concerning the country’s
commitment to the Convention – a particularly important message in a region that has
suffered immensely from conflict. The GoM is to be congratulated for achieving this
important milestone and Treaty obligation.
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Advocacy
Mozambique was among the first 40 countries to adopt the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (or
Convention78) The government signed on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 August 1998.
The treaty entered into force for Mozambique on 1 March 1999. The Convention places a
number of obligations on countries that have signed and ratified it (termed States Parties) and
enjoins them more generally to push for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines.
Mozambique has been a leader in support of the Convention. The country hosted the first
Meeting of the States Parties in May 1999. It also served as co-chair of the first Standing
Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in 1999 and 2000. This active participation,
together with the destruction of the remaining stockpiles, has sent a strong message of support
for the treaty. This very positive contribution appears to have been appreciated by other States
Parties and rewarded by continued donor support.
In many countries, local NGOs and civil society organisations are active advocates for the ban
on landmines. The Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines: towards a Mine-free
Southern Africa, was held in Maputo in February 1997. More recently, in late 2004 a “Mine
Action Week” was organised, which attracted significant participation by local development
NGOs as well as by government, donor, civil society, and business representatives.

Other contributions
Peace-building
Mine action makes a substantial contribution to peace-building by facilitating the return of
civilians to their home communities and allowing them to live more securely. In addition,
Mozambique’s support of the Convention and the subsequent destruction of landmine
stockpiles demonstrate the government’s commitment to avoid future conflicts and to ensure
the military operates under legitimate civilian authority – important messages for a country
with a prolonged history of civil war79 situated in a region that has suffered disproportionately
from conflict in recent decades.
The principal peace-building role explicitly played by mine action related to the
demobilisation effort. Mine action was not incorporated into the “official” demobilisation
programme financed by a variety of donors, but many of the operators played useful roles. For
example, the original recruitment policy of the international demining NGOs was to achieve a
balance of former combatants from FRELIMO and RENAMO. In general this was a
successful process, albeit informal – there was no general guidance and, as in many other
cases, operators developed their policies based on common sense as perceived at the time.
The Mine Clearance Training Centre established by UNOHAC formally adopted a similar
policy, and many of its trainees then were employed by ADP.

78

Its full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction. It also is termed informally as the Ottawa Treaty.
79
Research by The World Bank indicates that almost half of all post-conflict countries slip back into
conflict within a decade of the peace agreement. (Collier et al, 2003)
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The consensus is that peace-building has been largely successful in Mozambique: most
visibly, the country has now gone through three cycles of democratic elections since the
General Peace Agreement. Demobilisation is also seen as a success story. Social reintegration
proceeded rapidly. Economic integration has been more challenging, but good agricultural
conditions in the immediate post-war period, plus the buoyant economy, have helped
immensely. By offering attractive employment to former combatants on an even-handed
basis, mine action organisations undoubtedly made a small but worthwhile contribution to the
peace-building process.
Lesson 10
Although typically the mechanisms are not in place for linking mine action into the broader
peace-building programme in a practical and concerted fashion, mine action can make
important contributions to the peace-building process.

Unforeseen Consequences
HIV/AIDS
Deminers and other mine action workers, as well as others, may be spreading HIV/AIDS
directly through sexual contacts with residents in communities close to their worksites and
camps. They also risk becoming infected themselves and in turn infecting their wives. To our
awareness, there have not yet been any studies which have focussed specifically on deminers
as a vector for HIV/AIDS transmission, but the high rates of long term illness among
demining teams gives cause for concern. In 2003, NPA lost eight per cent of its operational
capacity to AIDS-related diseased, and ADP acknowledged that its rates are very similar.80
As well, demining activities can indirectly contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS by opening
roads and connecting previously isolated communities to the transportation network and,
hence, greater exposure to long distance truckers, who constitute a well known at-risk group
in Southern Africa.
The latest most reliable figures come from a report81 on 36 sentinel sites dated November
2003 but referring to data gathered in 2002. The report provides the following figures on
HIV/AIDS prevalence by region, which show already high rates of infection plus an alarming
trend:82
South
Centre
North

2000
12.0%
14.4%
5.7%

2002
17.0%
16.7%
8.4%

Documents continue to stress the role of the road-rail corridors in spreading the disease. They
also single out the defence forces as a vector of transmission – another indicator that
80

It is illegal in Mozambique for employers to test their workers to confirm who are HIV-positive, so it
is impossible to know whether all these illnesses are, in fact, due to HIV/AIDS. But with eight per cent
classified as too ill to work, and given the gestation period before the immune system weakens to the
point when opportunistic diseases take hold, a much higher percentage may be infected – figures in
the range of 30 per cent would not be inconceivable.
81
Relatorio sobre a revisao dos dados de Vigilancia Epidemiologica do HIV – Ronda 2002 Grupo
Tecnico Multisectorial de apoio a luta contra a HIV/SIDA em Moçambique, 6 November 2003.
82
Note that, contrary to the MA community definitions, the province of Zambézia is considered a
central, not a northern province.
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HIV/AIDS is a great risk to deminers and, in turn, deminers represent a source of risk to local
communities and to their own wives.
Programmes to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique are now out of their infancy, and
a variety of services are now available from specialised firms or not-for-profit agencies. The
National Roads Administration (ANE) has instituted a number of sound practices for all road
reconstruction projects. In broad terms, these entail requirements written into the contract of
the prime contractor including:
•
•
•

Engage a specialised organisation providing HIV/AIDS education and related services;
In advance of the mobilisation of the work crews, visits by that specialised organisation to
communities in the road’s vicinity to assess awareness and provide education services;
Provision of HIV/AIDS education to all workers employed by the prime contractor and
sub-contractors.

At least ADP and the international NGOs have instituted measures to address HIV/AIDS
concerns. However, programming to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS is a comparatively new
field and there is a great deal of experimentation concerning what works best with specific
groups and for specific situations. IND and operator representatives should visit the
HIV/AIDS programme at ANE and with the representatives of the HIV/AIDS Council of
Mozambique to investigate the entire inventory of best practice measures and assess whether
existing practices within the mine action field could be improved.

The main mine action organisations
Operators
The current national capacity can be analysed in a number of ways. First there are the “core”
organisations that have formed the mainstay of mine clearance since 1992. In addition, there
are a number of more transient (by design or accident) organisations which have added
capacity to Mozambique’s demining programme. Currently there are more than 1,300 people
employed full time for mine action in Mozambique,83 plus several hundred more who are
“transient” deminers who provide services to commercial firms as and when required. Figure
10 on the following page shows the breakdown of numbers between the core agencies (i.e. not
including the “transient” capacities of the demining firms).
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
NPA has maintained a mine action programme in Mozambique continuously since 1993.
Recently it relocated from Tete to Chimoio and downsized significantly to three manual teams
(60 staff), 12 dogs with handlers, two machines with 10 staff – about 126 persons – operating
in Tete, Manica, and Sofala Provinces. The programme has a small dog capacity for area
reduction and verification tasks. Based on a needs assessment undertaken by NPA head
office, it is planning to finish clearance operations in Mozambique by the end of 2005 and
mine action activities sometime in 2006. Clearance and technical survey in 2005 will focus on
high priority areas indicated by IND and, finally, selected in cooperation with provincial and
local authorities and using NPA’s Task Impact Assessment (TIA) methodology to ensure all
83

At the beginning of 2005 there were almost 760 sappers employed by the humanitarian operators –
a drop of over 230 from a year ealier.
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clearance is justified and that priorities are set in accordance with expected post-clearance
land use.
Figure 14 – Core demining capacity (number of sappers): Jan 2005
NPA, 7%

ADP, 29%

HALO, 45%

FADM, 11%

RONCO/QRDF, 4%

HI, 3%

Prior to complete withdrawal, the NPA survey capacity will expand to complete a TIA survey
of all tasks conducted by NPA since 1993 to establish the scope and impact of mine action
work to date. It will use the national LIS, with its known limitations, as the benchmark to
provide a status report of the remaining mine contamination in the areas of operations at the
time of phase out.
NPA clearly has given much thought to how it should manage its exit from its demining
programme in Mozambique. At this time however, it has not settled on a firm plan; rather, it
has a number of options, and the choice will depend in large part on the measures taken by
other stakeholders, such as the GoM/IND and NPA demining staff.
HALO Trust
The HALO Trust has operated in the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula,
and Zambézia since 1993, when it undertook the first nationwide survey on behalf of
ONUMOZ, the results of which were stored in the SHAMAN database, the basis for national
planning until the completion of the LIS in 2001. HALO currently has a staff of around 600
and has developed a policy (in agreement with the IND) of working with district authorities to
declare districts “Mine Impact Free”. Given progress to date and what it believes is the true
level of contamination in the northern four provinces, HALO expects to have cleared all high
and medium impact contaminated areas by the end of 2006.
For a number of years HALO Trust spoke of leaving an indigenous capacity in place in terms
of “fire brigades”.84 However, it never identified a suitable institutional home within one of

84

To our knowledge, the composition of a “fire brigade” has never been completely defined, but it is
clear the term refers to smaller mobile teams, cross-trained in demining and EOD, that could respond
quickly to requests for assistance or reports of new mines/UXO.

27

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

October 2005

the public sector ministries85 and, in the absence of a clear decision by the GoM regarding its
preferred solution to the need for a long term national capacity, HALO made no real progress
in this regard. At this point, HALO Trust plans to close down by the end of 2006, and has no
plans to leave a residual capacity of any form. The programme manager said that HALO did
not feel that they could dictate to the GoM what the long term capacity should be.86
Handicap International (HI)
HI initiated operations in Inhambane province in 1998. The initial vision was to develop a
capacity that would be absorbed into the provincial administration, at the disposal of the
governor. However, HI no longer believes this is a feasible target. Currently, the organisation
has a manual team, an integrated team, and two EOD teams. The HI philosophy is to clear,
district by district, all sites less than 15,000 m2 and to survey larger sites for updates to the
national database. At the current rate of progress, HI expects to clear all sites smaller than
15,000 m2 and survey all other suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) by the end of 2006, after
which it plans to close down. HI advised the Review Team that, at this point in time, it has no
concrete plans to retain or hand-over a residual capacity.
Textbox 2 – What is “mine impact free”?

The National Mine Action Programme (NMAP) five-year plan 2002-2006 defines “impact
free” as “the elimination of impediments to fundamental socio-economic activity and
significant reduction in the risk of encountering landmines.” It also specifies a number of
“Impact Free Milestones” for the 2002-2006 period, as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•

All High and Medium Impact Sites Cleared
All UXO Destroyed
All Existing Stockpiles Destroyed
Remaining Low Impact Areas Surveyed and Marked
Fully Operational National Mine Risk Education/Marking Program
Long-term Survivor and Victim Assistance Programs Established

More generally, IMAS 04.10 defines “impact” as “the level of social and economic suffering
experienced by the community resulting from the harm or risk of harm caused by mine and
UXO hazards and hazardous areas.” It further notes that “impact is a product of:
a) the presence of mine/UXO hazard in the community;
b) intolerable risk associated with the use of infrastructure such as roads, markets etc.
c) intolerable risk associated with livelihood activities such as agricultural land, water
source etc.
d) number of victims of mine and UXO incidents within the last two years.”
It is unclear how closely the “impact free” vision of the humanitarian operators corresponds to
that defined in NMAP. The IMAS definition simply suggests that impact must be understood
in terms of both (i) the level of risk to people and (ii) economic constraints, and thus impact
85

Apparently, both FADM and the police (under the Ministry of Interior) were considered at various
points. (Craib, 2003)
86
Clearly, this view was endorsed by the evaluator for DfID: “The major problem has been that the
government directly, or though IND, has not made the policy decisions on the long term shape of mine
action.” (Craib, 2003, section 7.6.6)
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free would imply at least the removal of “intolerable risks” and constraints on economic
activities needed to maintain or enhance livelihoods.
What is lacking in these various definitions – at least for countries with extensive
contamination such as Mozambique – is explicit mention of a sustainable capacity to address
the residual risks posed by contamination that does not impact people today, but may in the
future because of population movements, expansion of economic activities, etc. Such
sustainable capacity is required if “impact free” status is to be sustained.
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP)87
The ADP was formed as part of the ONUMOZ peacekeeping operation in 1994; an extremely
confused period characterised by bitter infighting among the many UN and donor agencies
with some role in mine action. It was established as an organisation that filled an emergency
need, and there appears to have been little initial thought put into the longer term development
of the programme; simply an assumption that the GoM would assume responsibility
eventually. It has, however, remained under the auspices of UNDP and currently has nine
operational teams (about 350 persons) operating in Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane provinces.
ADP represents the primary capacity in the South and it is likely that such a capability will be
required for the medium-term before “impact free” status is achieved.
ADP is acknowledged by most donors to be technically proficient and well-managed
(although a number of donors highlighted concerns they had with the adequacy of reporting
compared to that by the international NGOs).88 However, the future of ADP is unclear. The
organisation has been “in the process” of transforming from a UNDP nationally executed
(NEX) project into a national NGO for more than three years,89 but apparently has not yet
developed draft statutes of association or a business plan. The Review Team understands that
part of the general concept is to reduce the size of the organisation from the current level of
350, to around 250. This however requires an outlay of over $200,000 (which the organisation
does not have) to cover legally-imposed obligations relating to retrenchment.
In fact, this may represent a far higher hurdle than currently understood: there may be an
obligation to cover retrenchment costs for all staff with at least three years experience prior to
a transition to a legally distinct organisation, regardless of the organisation’s ultimate legal
status – after all, even the staff who will be retained in the new organisation will first be laid
off by the UNDP project. While clearly there has been much discussion on whether ADP
could obtain the requisite operating funds if it became an NGO or a parastatal, it remains
unclear to the Review Team whether all potential hurdles to any such transition have received
adequate attention (see Textbox 3 – Labour Retrenchment Legislation in Mozambique).

87

A few months after the mission for this review, ADP was beset by crisis and suspended operations
– at least temporarily – at the end of June 2005. The final chapter contains an update.
88
The Review Team did not determine whether this problem resides with ADP (which, as a project,
reports to UNDP), or with UNDP, or with the reporting requirements of the donors, who may want their
funds to be treated distinctly even though all donor funds are pooled via the UNDP trust fund. If the
latter, the donors are non-compliant with “harmonisation” policies espoused by all major donors and
international financial institutions (IFIs), and the onus for improvement lies with them.
89
Donors were pushing for ADP to be converted into an NGO as early as 1996. (DHA, 1997, p. 32)
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Textbox 3 – Labour Retrenchment Legislation in Mozambique

90

Mozambique’s labour law affords significant protection to workers in the formal economy.
Layoffs are legal, but workers with at least three years of service are entitled to three months’
salary for every two years of service, which is high by international and regional standards.
For “good” employers, this adds 12.5 per cent to basic wage costs. As well, the labour law
does not allow dismissal of staff on the grounds that they are sick, which depletes teams as
fixed budgets don’t allow ‘filling gaps’ as staff on sick leave remain on payroll.
This has three chief implications in the mine action sector. First, it creates a significant cost
advantage for demining firms (which engage most staff purely on a contract-by-contract
basis) versus the so-called humanitarian operators (which employ most staff on a long-term
basis, triggering the labour law protection). Second, the inability to dismiss on the grounds of
sickness depletes budgets of the humanitarian operators (the international NGOs plus ADP),
leaving insufficient funds to engage replacement workers. Third, at least some of the
humanitarian operators have not factored future retrenchment costs into their annual budgets
and, therefore, face substantial legal liabilities that will need to be resolved before downsizing
or ceasing operations entirely.
In ADP’s case, it may well be that same obligations would become due if and when ADP
completes a transition from a UNDP project* (with no distinct legal existence) into an NGO,
firm, or some other legal entity. If so, this existing liability could amount to $1 million or
more. But even if ADP did not have pay-out labour retrenchment costs before completing its
legal restructuring, the legal obligation exists: in this case, the “new” ADP would start its
existence with a financial liability of perhaps $1 million. Unless donors or the GoM injected
this amount into the organisation at the start, the “new” ADP would be, essentially, bankrupt
from day one. It may not be legal – and certainly not ethical – to proceed on this basis.
* The Review Team was advised following the mission that there are provisions by which the GoM
could waive the standard labour legislation provision in the case of “projects”. Because of its project
status, ADP staff have been serving on a series of one year contracts. The GoM could decide that
these staff did not have many years of continuous service (justifying retrenchment benefits) but rather
had been engaged anew on a separate contract each year.

RONCO Consulting
RONCO have been operational in mine action in Mozambique since 1994 and currently
provides a two-fold approach. The US Department of State (DoS) sponsored Quick Response
Demining Force (QRDF) is managed by RONCO. This is a team of around 60 who operate
globally but use Mozambique as a base for operations. Their deployment in Mozambique is
agreed with the IND.91 In addition, RONCO are providing support services, training and
supervision for capacity development to the Mozambique Armed Forces (FADM).
Forças Armadas de Moçambique (FADM)
FADM has, over the last few years, developed some capacity for humanitarian mine
clearance. In the early phase of the programme, FADM undertook some clearance tasks, but
they were unrecorded and are not believed to meet the current Mozambican Mine Action
Standards (MMAS). Since receiving training and equipment from the US DoS (now through
90
91

On labour retrenchment laws, see IMF, 2004c, Article IV Consultations, p. 20.
It appears much of their work has been to support rehabilitation work for rail lines.
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RONCO and previously from US Special forces training teams) FADM has become a viable
operator, with three teams of 30 in each of the three regions.
Other clearance organisations
Over the period reviewed, a number of other operators have operated in support of the
national demining programme. These have included the German NGO Menschen gegen
Minen (MgM), which operated a programme in Mozambique from 2000 to early 2004, a few
so-called local NGO operators (see Textbox 4 – Legislation affecting “NGOs” in
Mozambique), and a larger number of “local” firms92 including Mozambique Mine Action
(MMA – a subsidiary of Armor Group), JV Desminagem, and ECOMS Desminagem SARL.
Quality management firms
There are two local companies registered to undertake quality management in support of IND.
Only one, CCQ, appears to be operational at the present time. It appears capable.
Future intentions of operators
All three international NGOs plan to leave the country within the next two-to-three years.
HALO expects to achieve Mine Impact Free districts in the northern four provinces by the end
of 2006; HI expects to have cleared all sites less than 15,000 m2 and to have surveyed all
remaining SHA in Inhambane, Manica, and Sofala by the same time; and NPA is planning to
close their operation down (also by the end of 2006) having completed a resurvey and cleared
high and medium priority tasks to the limit of its capacity. As noted previously, none of the
international NGOs have adopted firm plans for transferring their assets to other demining
organisations extant in Mozambique, or for leaving a local organisation in place after their
departure.
ADP is somewhat different. ADP managers view the organisation as the “national capacity”.93
However, its vision for the future remains unclear. While plans have been in place for some
years for a transformation to a national NGO, there is no business plan in place for the
conversion and indeed there are no statutes of association yet developed. (See also Textbox 4
– Legislation affecting “NGOs” in Mozambique.)
Textbox 4 – Legislation affecting “NGOs” in Mozambique

As in most countries, the term Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) has scant legal
meaning. There are no legal provisions allowing an “NGO” to be created: rather,
Mozambicans can form an “association”i and – perhaps – a “foundation”.ii In addition, Decree
55/98iii regulates the authorisation procedure for a foreign NGO’s operation in Mozambique.iv
In short, there is no such thing as a Mozambican NGO in any legal sense. As well, the laws
and regulations governing associations are deficient in many respects. For example, there are
potential obstacles to the efficient and sustained functioning of associations, including:
• the use of a “standard” organisation structure based on the members’ financial
92

Some of these are joint ventures with, or subsidiaries of, foreign firms.
Of course, existing Mozambican NGOs and firms also view themselves as “national capacity”, and
the local staff and managers of the international NGOs could try to establish as local NGOs or firms as
their current managers exit.
93
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contributions, imposing lengthy decision-making procedures which may require resort to
the general assembly;
the “voluntary and non-remunerated” work to create and eventually operate the
association on the part of members, including their representatives on the board.

Recognising these deficiencies, in the mid-1990s The World Bank commissioned the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law to propose model NGO legislation based on the
Center’s “good practice” guidelines.v However, the government of the day did not act on this
proposal and the issue does not appear to be high on the current legislative agenda.
i Under Law no. 8/91; BR no. 29 (Sup.) of 18/7/91 – law regulating the freedom of association
including the establishment of associations.
ii Under Decree no. 48/94; BR no. 41 (Sup.) of 12/10/94 – Authorises the Minister of Justice to
regulate procedures for registration of foundations, but such regulations do not seem to have been
promulgated (i.e. published in the Government Gazette – Boletim da República or BR, which is a
prerequisite before any statute is binding).
iii BR Series I – No. 40-2nd Supp, of 13 October 1998
iv There are also various provisions in fiscal legislation affecting the tax status of associations. It
should be noted that demining is not included in the activities which warrant special tax
treatment either for the donor or the person/entity engaged in the activity.
v e.g. ICNL, 1995, Regulating Not-for-Profit Organizations, <www.icnl.org/gendocs/COMP3.html>

It should be noted that the future intentions of all major mine clearance operators in the
country have been developed in isolation, without real reference to IND.
The commercials remaining in Mozambique plan to stay as long as there is business. (As
detailed in subsequent Chapters, demand for demining services on a commercial basis is
likely to grow; perhaps substantially; over at least the medium term.)

Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND)
Mandate and Structure
The IND was formed in 1999 to replace the previous demining commission, CND. Article 4
of IND’s statutes states that its principal responsibilities are to “propose policies and
strategies, the setting of priorities and action plans, as well as managing, coordinating and
controlling the mine action in Mozambique”. Article 5 then lists the duties IND should
undertake, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Proposing policies and government strategies for mine action;
Proposing short, medium, and long-term plans, and managing the execution of these
plans once approved;
To facilitate, coordinate, manage, and control mine action activity;
To develop and approve mine action standards;
Resource mobilisation;
Maintaining a database and mine action information system; and
To perform quality assurance on mine clearance.

IND falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has the following organs:
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•

The Management – i.e. the Director and Deputy Director (now vacant), both of whom
are appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

•

The Board of Governors94 – the Director, Deputy Director and the heads of the various
directorates/departments: Research, Planning, and Information, Operations, International
Relations, Administration and Finance, and Human Resources. This is to hold monthly
meetings to discharge the following functions:
• Pronounces on the general orientation, management and direction of the IND
• Pronounces on the acquisition of property
• Pronounces on the opening and closing of delegations

•

The Technical Council – A consultative body that pronounces on aspects of the
programming, organization, and analysis of the operation of IND submitted to it by IND,
and “pronounces itself on the progress report of IND and the program for next year”. The
statutes do not indicate who chairs the Committee, but presumably the IND Director
assumes this role. The statutes stipulate this organ should meet four times a year.
Composition: Board of Governors plus representatives of the following ministries:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Foreign Affairs
Planning and Finance
Defence
Public Works
Home Affairs (Interior)

Agriculture and Fisheries
Social Action
Labour
Health

The statutes also provide for semi-annual meetings with “cooperating partners” (i.e.
representatives of the UN, donors, and civil society “including demining operators”95).
The statutes are curious in a number of ways, including:
•

•
•

the fact that what is termed the Board of Governors (at least in the English translation of
the statutes) is not a Board providing direction for and oversight of IND’s management;
rather, it is simply a management committee comprising the director, deputy director, and
department heads;
the inter-ministerial Technical Council serves only an advisory function, and its
membership includes the IND Board of Governors (i.e., the management committee);
only the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the IND Director appear to have any input into
the agendas of the Technical Council and the meeting of cooperating partners,96 which
suggests these organs do not provide an adequate forum for discussing issues which other

94

The English translation of the statutes terms this body the “Board of Governors”, but it is unclear
how the Portuguese term used in the original should be translated into English. In Mozambique, the
term Conselho de Administração is normally used when referring to a Board of Directors. However,
the IND statutes uses the term Conselho de Direcção, which often is used for what in English would
be termed a Steering Committee or for a Management Council/Committee. From its composition, it
seems clear that the latter would have been the most accurate translation.
95
This omits mention of NGOs involved in other aspects of mine action such as MRE or victim
assistance, and suggests that firms are not viewed as cooperating partners.
96
For example, cooperating partners can pronounce themselves “on important subjects… that have
been submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.” (Article 17)
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government agencies, donors, or implementing partners believe should merit attention, but
which are not priorities for the Minister or the IND Director.
Clearly, the statutes do not provide for an inter-ministerial committee to provide policy
direction that reflects the broader priorities and concerns of the GoM.
Capacity-building
As its predecessor CND was moribund, IND was essentially a new organisation facing a wide
range of capacity-building requirements. In 2001 a consultant completed a review on these
requirements for IND (Kiggundu, 2001), and proffered the following recommendations (with
the last column showing our assessment97 of the progress achieved since his report):
Main recommendation
•

Match Mandate to capacity

Sub recommendation
•
•
•

•

Strengthen the Institute’s
Internal Management

•
•
•

•
•

Address Human Resource
Management Challenges
Improve operations

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Improve external relations
management

•
•
•
•
•

Focus mandate and priorities to match
resources.
Develop multi-year business plan and budget to
correspond to activities
Build capacities related to priorities as stated in
the work plan
Re-organise and strengthen the management
council into a working senior management
committee
Restructure the office of the deputy director to
take direct responsibility for operations
Clarify roles and reporting relationships
Ensure smooth working relationships between
TA and counterparts by holding workshops
Ensure effective transfer of data from CIDC to
IND
Strengthen IND database by conducting client
satisfaction surveys
Outsource QA to contractors
Strengthen regional offices
Decentralise authority to regional offices
Create a regional office for the South in the
headquarters
Create a LAN for internal communications
Provide PCs to all managers
Create IND web site
Use governance bodies provided to create
value for mine action community
Publish regular newsletter for community
needs

Progress
Some
Some
Some
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Some
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

The international community has provided significant assistance to IND, either by grants
directly to IND or with contributions channelled via the UNDP Trust Fund (which supports a
Nationally Executed Project). This project has provided a series of international experts

97

This assessment has also been reviewed with the former CTA for IND, who concurred with it.
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(recruited by UNOPS) for the following technical adviser (TA) positions: Chief Technical
Adviser (CTA); Operations; Finance and Administration; and Information.
Clearly IND represents an improvement over CND, and virtually all informants state that the
organisation’s performance has been improving over time. However, performance has been
constrained because the management policies and administrative procedures remain weak.
The organisation remains far too centralised, to the point where no documents are allowed to
be processed without the signature of the director. When the director is away on travel,
service levels sometimes fall because authority is not delegated.
This makes it extremely difficult for a short review to assess staff capacities: in brief,
individuals may have too little latitude to perform to the level of their capabilities. In other
cases, individual performance is constrained by a lack of clear direction – staff may not have a
clear idea of what is expected of them in terms of duties and performance targets. Motivation
is also a problem. Employees reported to the Review Team that they work under widely
different terms and conditions of service, leading to morale problems. Both tardiness and
absenteeism appear to be common problems.
On the other hand, many staff appears to possess considerable skills that could be better
utilised, and some provided the Review Team with solid suggestions that would lead to better
performance. Staff feel that mine action is a worthy endeavour, and they would welcome the
opportunity to make a larger contribution to Mozambique’s development.
In short, it seems clear that IND’s performance has been improving since its establishment.
This is a worthwhile record given that capacity-building in the public sector of Mozambique
and other post-conflict countries has been notoriously difficult to achieve and sustain
(Beschel, 2002; World Bank 2005). Further, there appears to be significant scope for
performance improvements in the short to medium term. In many cases what is needed is to
harness the existing capacities of IND staff rather than to build additional capacities.
This broadly positive assessment must be tempered with the recognition that the current
performance of IND still falls short of what is required to address the current and future
challenges facing it in its central role within the national mine action programme.
Performance in discharging key responsibilities
POLICY FORMULATION
IND has supported the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ottawa process. This entails
articulation of GoM policy with respect to Convention matters. Owing to the changeover in
government, the Review Team was unable to ascertain the degree to which policy
pronouncements are referred by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Council of Ministers
for ultimate decision, but our impression was that the outgoing Minister felt that he had
sufficient latitude to make any policy decisions himself, within the framework of obligations
outlined in the Convention.
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Of note is that there is no mine action legislation in Mozambique to clarify precisely how the
provisions of the Convention apply within the country.98 More generally, the Review Team
did not find any instances where IND, via the Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed policies
to the Council of Ministers99 to guide government departments and other public or private
agencies on the procedures they should adopt when dealing with issues of landmine and UXO
contamination. As we discuss later in the report, there is significant potential for IND to
exercise leadership in spreading best practice if it becomes more active in proposing policies
for adoption by the government.
NATIONAL PLANNING
It is clear that LIS data are, in isolation, inadequate for national mine action planning (see
Textbox 5 – Landmine Surveys: Hazards or Communities). IND states that it compiles the list
of priority tasks based on the LIS, but the reality many be more complex (see Textbox 6 –
Where do priorities really come from?).
Textbox 5 – Landmine Surveys: Hazards or Communities

Originally, surveys of landmine and UXO contamination focused on suspected minefields or
areas of UXO contamination (collectively, “hazards”). The LIS departed from this approach,
focusing instead on communities. Because of the perceived problems in getting accurate
estimates of contaminated areas from the community informants, the LIS was designed so that
the areas and specific boundaries of each SHA were of marginal importance. As a result, most
of the first generation LIS returned vastly larger estimates of total areas suspected of
contamination, with many SHA defined in very loose terms.
Of course, deminers need far more precise data on the position, shape, and size of an SHA in
order to plan what resources to allocate and for how long. Thus, the demining operators
found, initially at least, that data from the first generation LIS were of little practical use and –
in some cases including Mozambique’s – presented a distorted picture of the contamination
problem. As well, because each impacted community might be affected by multiple hazards,
some follow-up step was required to determine which hazards should be dealt with as a
priority, and in what way.
It should be clear that a proper assessment of contamination needs good information on both
communities (who needs help first) and hazards (what specifically needs to be done to help).
As part of their priority-setting processes, many mine action organisations now conduct a task
planning survey to examine both the technical challenges for clearance or marking, and to
collect “socio-economic” data to ensure the target beneficiaries are clearly identified and there
is nothing preventing the beneficiaries from making use of the land after clearance (e.g.
ownership disputes, lack of seed or tools). The first well-documented use of this approach
seems to be from NPA in Angola, where it was termed Task Impact Assessment (TIA). In this
case, the focus was on individual hazards that NPA was considering for clearance.
More recently in Bosnia, the TIA model was adapted for a community focus. When the LIS
98

This implies that the legal authority for IND to enforce policies and standards it adopts could be
questioned.
99
Given there is no inter-ministerial committee with any decision-making authority above IND, it
appears any such policies would need to be adopted by the Council of Ministers if they are to have
government-wide effect.
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identified a highly-impacted community, a second multi-skilled survey team was fielded to
conduct a Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) exercise. This results in a multi-year
integrated mine action plan for the community, identifying which hazards required immediate
clearance, which should be marked or fenced, and which people needed mine risk education.
(See Annex VII – BHMAC Task Assessment and Planning Final Report in Survey Action
Center, 2004, Landmine Impact Survey: Bosnia and Herzegovina, available from www.sacna.org)
Textbox 6 – Where do priorities really come from?

In general, IND management has been strongly supportive of the LIS – the director recently
stated that the LIS represents a “quantum leap” in terms of the range and quality of data
available to inform the planning and priority-setting processes. For the most part, demining
operators in Mozambique have been dismissive of the LIS and the database created by the
survey. The main humanitarian operators have also been established in their regions of the
country for many years. They know and consult the provincial governors and district
administrators concerning priorities.
However, a recent study raises some interesting questions: “A review of activities in 2003
revealed that of the 207 tasks identified by IND in its annual demining priorities, only one
third were drawn from the LIS.”* Further, operators often turn down tasks identified as
priorities by IND on the grounds that their clearance assets are elsewhere engaged. The same
study goes on to observe that “…of 150 tasks carried out in 2003, only 47 were derived from
the IND annual plan and only 36 of those from the LIS. Among 103 tasks completed that were
not in the IND priorities, 46 were identified in the LIS.” This implies that the clearance
actually done by operators is more in line with the LIS (82 of 150 tasks; almost 55 per cent)
than are the priorities compiled by IND (69 of 207 tasks, or 33.3 per cent)!
* The data are from Grau de implementacao das prioridades de desminagem 2003, IND, 30 July 2004,
and are quoted in Cumming-Bruce, “The Case of Mozambique”, Chapter 5 in GICHD, forthcoming, A
Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action, p. 122. The Review Team does not have the original
document.

The current five year plan (2002-2006) is based on the LIS survey data that appears to have
serious gaps while, at the same time, overstating the magnitude of the problem in terms of the
area suspected of contamination. As well, the criteria used in categorising the level of priority
for each community were deemed inappropriate by the operators which, in the main, have not
followed them. It is therefore difficult to assess the achievement of the main objective – that
all high and medium impact sites are cleared by 2006 – at least if the criteria used are those of
the LIS impact scoring system.100
The autonomy of the four main humanitarian operators has meant that, until recently, each
applied its own criteria in defining priorities. The resulting list of sites was then discussed
with the provincial administration, which made the final choice in the light of the operator’s
capacity. The provincial lists were then combined by IND to form its annual national plan.
The annual plan gives little analysis other than basic interpretations of the statistical data (e.g.
Inhambane is the province most affected in all aspects; Zambézia was second in terms of
affected communities and area, whereas Nampula was second in terms of affected
100

Note that IND’s plan talks of “high and medium impact sites” but the LIS impact scores are
generated for communities; not specific sites where hazards are suspected.
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population). The plan has a table showing the “impact” by province and region according to
three criteria (areas, communities, and population), but goes on to note with regret that the
main methodological criterion – the availability of an operator – means that the most needy
northern area does not receive the attention it should due to the uneven distribution of
operator capacity.101
In the last couple of years there has been more emphasis by operators on community
consultation (and, as a consequence, the coverage of sites missed by the LIS). The District
Administrators, often supported by the District Police Chiefs, now prepare a list of all known
sites and rank them in order of impact importance – specific forms are used for this purpose,
with a column for a brief indication of the nature of the socio-economic impact. The District
lists are then incorporated into a Provincial list to the extent possible, taking into account the
operator’s capacities. This means that, in practice, it is likely that the annual provincial plans
diverge from the out-dated and/or inappropriate targets in the Five Year Plan.
The current strategic plan states that the country will be mine impact free by 2009. However,
both the outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the IND advised the Review
Team that the new strategic plan will target a country “mine free” by 2009.
COORDINATION
IND holds an annual meeting with the key operators, and this has been carried out with
commendable regularity. However, annual meetings may not be adequate even to address
administrative chores that require attention, let alone deal with more complex matters such as
priority-setting, annual and multi-year planning, and policy dialogue (i.e. identifying issues of
strategic importance that will require IND, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the GoM to set
or revise policies). For example, some operators reported that the 2004 meeting discussed
customs import procedures and little else.
Of course, coordination can and should take place outside these annual meetings. Whether
this is done effectively depends not only on the personal relationships among the key players
but also on the access that managers of the operators have to the IND Director. We understand
that relations among the various mine action managers are cordial and that they share reports
among themselves to avoid deployments to tasks which have already been addressed by
another operator.102 Access to the IND Director also appears to have improved markedly since
the appointment of the current incumbent.
STANDARDS AND REGULATION
The IND is responsible for regulation of mine clearance assets. It has recently changed the
system of accreditation to a system of licensing, which gives each operator authorisation to
operate for up to five years. This system is flawed and does not provide an effective process
of regulation. To become licensed by the IND, a local commercial organisation merely needs
to show that it is a legal entity in Mozambique, has a set of Standing Operating Procedures
(SOPs), and wishes to undertake demining in the country. The IND has an excellent
opportunity to coordinate and manage the professional implementation of mine clearance
101

Note that the capacity of HALO Trust, which covers the north, has increased relative to that in
NPA, ADP, and HI.
102
Because IND clearance records are not always accurate or up-to-date, IND sometimes requests an
operator to clear a site that has already be cleared.
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throughout the country, but the existing licensing regime provides no real control over the
operational assets.
Textbox 7 – National Mine Action Standards

Mozambique subscribes to the principles of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and
developed the first set of Mozambican National Mine Action Standards (MNMAS, which are
based on IMAS) in 2002. The preparation and adoption of national standards within a year of
the formal international adoption of IMAS in September 2001, and well ahead of the majority
of the rest of the international community, clearly was a positive and commendable step.
However, continued progress seems to have slowed considerably.
In 2005, some 12 years beyond start-up of mine action in Mozambique and eight years after
the first IMAS were produced by the international community, the MNMAS (which were
written by expatriate technical advisers) have still not been translated into Portuguese: this,
despite the fact that operators – most of which are Mozambican organisations – requiring
licensing by the IND are required to deliver detailed SOPs to IND based on MNMAS.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
The IND bears responsibility for the maintenance of a national database of SHA, cleared sites,
and confirmed minefields. The baseline data were provided as part of the LIS undertaken in
1999-2001 by CIDC.
The LIS undertaken in Mozambique was controversial from the start. Some of the criticisms
levelled were common to all first-generation LIS.103 Some mine action practitioners thought
the costs were too high and the surveys took too long to deliver benefits. Many in the
demining community were critical that the LIS measured impacts on communities but not
individual minefields, meaning an additional assessment often was required to determine
which of the minefields around a highly impacted community needed to be cleared as a matter
of priority. Operators were also unhappy that, because of this community focus, little attention
was given to the exact boundaries of individual SHA. This typically resulted in huge increases
in the total area listed as SHA in a country, which seemed to magnify the contamination
problem.104
Mozambique’s LIS came in for additional criticism for two principal reasons. First, CIDA
decided to restrict the tender to Canadian organisations, eliminating all member organisations
of the Survey Working Group – a network of (mainly) mine action NGOs – that had
developed the LIS methodology. Second, a new organisation, with no prior experience in
Mozambique or humanitarian demining, was awarded the contract. At least in part because of
these controversies, the quality of Mozambique’s LIS data has always been questioned, and
many observers were unhappy with the decision by the UN Mine Action Service to certify the
LIS. Regardless of its quality as a baseline, the LIS methodology used in Mozambique and
elsewhere made no provision for regular updates to the socio-economic data fields. In the
absence of updated data and, given the rapid pace of development in many parts of the
country, the LIS data would not provide a reliable basis for planning and priority-setting
103

The evaluation of “first generation” Landmine Impact Surveys (Scanteam, 2003) includes an annex
on the case of Mozambique that gives a flavour of these controversies.
104
Action has been taken on many of these perceived problems, and satisfaction appears to be higher
with more recent LIS.
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today, even had the technical data from ongoing survey and clearance work been updated
assiduously.
Unfortunately, much of the technical data supplied by the operators has not been entered
accurately or at all.105 These information management issues have been addressed on a
number of occasions, and the most recent supporting visit by the IMSMA unit of GICHD
identified specific issues requiring attention by the IMSMA section of IND.106 At the time of
the Review Team’s mission, these issues did not appear to have been addressed.107 Because of
this, the deployment of operators to sites which have already been cleared has been a
recurrent problem. In addition, commercial organisations – and the government agencies
which contract them – appear not to trust the clearance data available from IND. As a result,
demining firms typically are instructed to re-survey and clear entire stretches of roads, power
lines, etc. slated for rehabilitation (an issue discussed in Chapter 4).
The data handling processes are confusing for all concerned and there is no standardisation of
the processes. For example, HALO Trust operates a separate Excel database of all the work
they have undertaken in the northern region. Their clearance, progress, and cancellation
reports are delivered in hard copy to the IND regional office, which then send the reports to
Maputo because the northern office currently has no data entry capacity. The data are then, in
theory, entered manually into the IMSMA database in Maputo. ADP on the other hand, has a
“pirated” version of IMSMA which allows them to enter their data directly, which is then
transferred to IND’s IMSMA database.
Lesson 11
When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination
following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before adequate tools – such as a
means for assessing the true extent of the humanitarian needs – can be developed, tested, and
improved so they meet the true requirements in the field.

Mozambique was among the first-generation mine action programmes to implement an LIS,
and a number of actors involved in this exercise made decisions that – with the benefit of
hindsight – led to problems which have reduced the benefits that might have accrued from the
survey.
Lesson 12
Proper mine action planning requires reasonably complete and up-to-date data on both
suspected hazard areas (SHA) and the impacts of these on both communities and development
programmes. For countries with extensive contamination, provision needs to be made not just
for an initial survey to establish the baselines for physical contamination and socio-economic
impacts, but also for systematic efforts to update these data to refine understanding of the
contamination problem, and to assess progress.

105

Some problems may arise because operators do not have IMSMA and do not always cross
reference their data against the LIS records, presenting problems for IND, which works from LIS
records in IMSMA.
106
IMSMA was not designed to facilitate data entry in multiple locations, which is a constraint for large
countries such as Mozambique, which have regional offices and, often, poor communication facilities.
It is possible to enter data from multiple sites, but this requires additional procedures and
administrative discipline to keep the databases in the various offices synchronised. IMSMA is currently
being re-engineered and the new version will make this task far easier.
107
Figures in the Annual Report for 2004 (released a month after the mission) suggest however that
IND has since made progress in reducing the data entry backlog.
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QUALITY ASSURANCE
The IND formed three Quality Assurance (QA) teams in 2004, one allocated to each of the
three regions. Each team comprises several staff, plus a vehicle, whose responsibility is to
undertake quality assurance and provide post-clearance sampling of cleared sites. These teams
appear to be inefficient and task planning is generally poor. In addition, the teams are not yet
sufficiently equipped (18 months after initiation of the project and after more than six months
of operations) for them to undertake post-clearance sampling; this is despite funding
specifically for this equipment being provided by several donors.
The IND also claims to have a dog capacity to support quality assurance which, in reality,
does not exist. (see Textbox 8 – IND Quality Assurance Dog Capacity)
Textbox 8 – IND Quality Assurance Dog Capacity

For several years, the IND has stated that it has a dog QA capacity and the outside perspective
is one of an organisation with an effective QA dog capacity. The reality however is vastly
different. When the team visited a site where FADM were working, the FADM team was
collocated with the IND QA dog capacity. What the team saw was distressing. There were six
remaining dogs from the eight originally donated to CND in 1998 by Mechem when it left
Mozambique. Two had died over the Christmas break period – one believed to be of
starvation. The remaining dogs are too old for work, constantly caged, underfed and, in
several cases, diseased. One was blind.
Although IND states it is trying to sell the dogs, they are of no use to any mine clearance
programme in the country or elsewhere and should be destroyed.
The IND has spent considerable resources – both time and money – to develop these QA
teams but they do not appear to provide value-for-money. The recommendation made in 2001
that this important function be contracted-out still appears the best option. A tightly controlled
contractual system to enable external QA organisations to operate effectively has been proven
in such programmes as South Lebanon, Kosovo, and Cambodia. In South-eastern Europe, the
International Trust Fund of Slovenia (ITF) also makes extensive use of external QA provided
by specialised firms on a contractual basis.108

OTHER ISSUES WITHIN IND
DOCUMENTATION – The structure of administration within IND remains weak. At the lower
level, reports from the operators are frequently lost and require re-submission. Every operator
spoke of frustration at the lack of paper trails. Many documents apparently require the
signature of the director before they can be issued to outside organisation, creating additional
problems as delegation policies are either not well thought-out or not followed.
108

Some observers have queried how IND could accept responsibility for any residual risk if the
quality assurance of clearance tasks were sub-contracted. This is a very real concern, but it can be
addressed with proper mine action legislation (e.g. specifying that mine action organisations and
personnel are not liable if they have acted in accordance with prevailing national standards) and/or
with well-conceived accreditation procedures for QA organisations (e.g. requiring site insurance with
residual risk coverage). It is also hard to understand how IND’s exposure to residual risk claims would
be reduced by retaining direct responsibility for QA when it lacks the capacity to discharge this
responsibility to accepted standards.
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DECENTRALISATION – The establishment of the regional offices was a promising initiative and
a reasonable strategy given the size of the country and the inadequate transportation and
communication networks. Again however, the lack of clear and appropriate policies for
delegation leaves the offices with little scope for independent action. The regional offices
need greater authority and clear direction if they are to become effective. At the moment, both
donors supporting the offices in Beira and Nampula plan to cease funding in summer 2005, in
part because they feel effective regional capacities have not been developed in spite of their
financial support.
GENERAL SUPPORT SERVICES TO THE MINE ACTION COMMUNITY – IND is also supposed to
provide support to the operators in more general terms. In some cases, operators have claimed
that adequate support has not been forthcoming. In one instance, an international NGO stated
that IND did not move quickly to clear equipment from customs, which resulted in bonded
warehouse storage charges of $35,000, and that IND then did not process the claim for
repayment until after the deadline had passed. The NGO’s version has been contested by IND,
which says it is not responsible for customs clearance of mine action equipment.109 At the
very least, the case illustrates communication problems between IND and at least some of the
operators, which should be rectified.
Other areas specifically mentioned by operators include:
•
•

delays in obtaining letters of support for work permits and visas for expatriates;
receiving tasking instructions from IND without the accompanying background
information, necessitating repeated visits by managers to IND headquarters to obtain
the information IND has, which could be easily compiled in a proper task folder.

The Review Team is not in a position to assess in detail why these problems continue. The
central message, however, is that dialogue between IND and the operators remains too
sporadic to identify and rectify problems in a timely manner. What should be minor problems
remain constant irritants, frustrating the evolution of a more effective partnership.
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY – a senior manager of IND was implicated in the theft of Adopt-aMinefield funds. He has been released from staff but the position remains vacant. As a UNDP
staff member was also implicated (and has since been terminated), UNDP-headquarters
commissioned a forensic audit. The audit report has not been distributed, but the UNDP
Resident Representative provided an update on the matter to donor representatives attending
the briefing session at the start of the Review Team’s mission in Maputo.
About two years ago, IND purchased an expensive vehicle for use by the Director, which then
was criticised in local newspapers. A number of mine action donors were upset at what they
perceived to be an ill-considered expenditure and at the publicity which might damage the
reputation of the national programme. The Review Team is not in a position to confirm the
109

The underlying problem is that mine action is not included in the list of tax exempt activities within
Mozambique’s tax laws (q.v. note iv in Textbox 4). As such, Customs has no authority to waive duties.
Mozambique has instituted a system by which the government pays the Customs Department for
duties on mine action equipment, but the legislature (quite properly) must authorise this spending
(probably via a supplementary appropriation bill). It appears in this specific case that the storage
charges payable on the imported equipment by the NGO were not included in the supplementary
appropriation, so no government agency had authority to reimburse the NGO.
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veracity of the newspaper accounts (and understands from IND that the controversy has been
resolved to the satisfaction of the donors). But the perception that funds are being used for
luxuries rather than essentials may affect resource mobilisation for IND and the mine action
programme overall.110
SUMMARY ON IND
To summarise, all parties agree that IND is responsible for important functions, many of
which need to be sustained over the long term. Virtually all parties state that IND has
performed better than its predecessor, CND, and that its performance has been improving in
recent years. However, there still remain gaps between the levels of performance required –
now and in the future – and what is being delivered. The Review Team is not in a position to
make a thorough assessment of individual capabilities, but we are confident that many staff
are able and willing to perform at higher levels. The Review Team believes that IND
management and technical advisers should define and institute clear performance targets to
give more concrete meaning to the capacity building efforts.111
Lesson 13
The potential benefits from developing capacities of individual staff members and functional
units within an organisation will not be captured in full until the organisational management
systems for (at least) human resources, financial management, information management, and
performance management are functioning well and there is appropriate delegation of authority
so staff and unit managers can use their skills and experience to discharge their
responsibilities and achieve the specific performance standards set for them.

110

Apparently, the funds used to purchase the vehicle were repaid by the government, but
disbursements from one donor were delayed for a time pending a more complete accounting.
111
Later in this report we provide some specific recommendations in this regard.
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3. The Role of International Assistance
Needs assessments and strategies
As was well documented in the 1997 report from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the
UN was unable to conduct a proper assessment of the extent of contamination prior to the
ceasefire, and had to develop the preliminary mine action plans without the benefit of such an
assessment. The resulting plan highlighted the need to clear roads required for ONUMOZ,
refugee returns, and the operations of the humanitarian relief agencies, as well as the
desirability of a mine clearance training facility. The plan envisaged that the GoM would
eventually assume responsibility for the mine action programme, but did not outline the
process by which this transfer might take place. Nor did the plan propose a forum for
discussions with donors, complicating resource mobilisation and the evolution of a consensus
on the needs, priorities, and strategies for achieving these.
In late 1993, UNOHAC engaged HALO Trust to conduct a rapid survey, which focused on
roads, refugee sites, and other facilities of immediate importance. Such a survey could not
provide a complete picture of the nature and scope of contamination and, in the absence of
such an assessment, planning could never be fully adequate.112 In fact, the “national” mine
action programme emerged as a series of discrete initiatives without an overall strategy and,
by the time CND was created as the national authority, three distinct regional programmes
had been established by HALO, NPA, and ADP.
After the creation of CND in 1995, the responsibility for formulating a national strategy
clearly fell to the GoM and not to the international community. Of course, the international
community could and did provide assistance for this purpose, but CND proved incapable or
unwilling to engage. As well, without a proper national needs assessment, any strategy put
forward would be open to criticism from established interests.
In 1999 CIDA agreed to finance a national Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) based on the
“community-focussed” methodology that had recently been developed by a group of mine
action NGOs and endorsed by UNMAS. This promised at last to provide the kind of needs
assessment required as a basis for proper planning. Unfortunately, CIDA allowed only
Canadian organisations to bid on the tender and selected an inexperienced organisation with
no prior exposure to Mozambique. The results of the survey were hotly contested by operators
with years of experience in the country, and any opportunity for all stakeholders to agree on
the needs and a strategy for addressing these was lost.113 Subsequent failure to update the
socio-economic fields or to compile complete and accurate records on further clearance and
survey work means there still is no commonly agreed basis for assessing needs from a nationwide perspective and to formulate an appropriate national mine action strategy.

Financial assistance
The absence of a commonly accepted national strategy has not prevented significant progress.
The UN and individual donors paid for the rapid survey and clearance of major roads and
112

However, it was a necessary tool for “emergency” planning of mine action in Mozambique at that
time and in the absence of a more systematic national survey.
113
The LIS in Mozambique was only the fifth to be initiated and was undertaken at a time when
lessons from prior surveys had not been documented.
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other essential infrastructure by international demining firms during the initial “big push”
phase of opening essential infrastructure networks in the post-conflict period. Commercial
demining firms (and, increasingly, Mozambican firms or joint ventures) have remained active
in providing demining services in support of major infrastructure projects.
This work has been financed almost entirely from international sources.114 While data are
incomplete, the following graph provides a reasonably accurate picture of grant financing
since 1999. It does not include funding for commercial demining, which may have amounted
to $3 million or more in some years according to IND estimates.
Figure 15 – Grants to Mozambique’s Mine Action Programme
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What strikes at first glance is that the grant support has been remarkably steady in recent
years, certainly when compared to many of the other heavily mine-affected countries. This
has allowed the humanitarian operators to maintain their activities on a relatively even keel,
which greatly enhances their ability to plan and achieve results.
Currently, however, there is considerable speculation concerning donor fatigue. The relatively
low level of accidents, together with plans by the international operators to withdraw by the
end of 2006, seem also to confirm the sense that Mozambique is rapidly approaching “mine
impact free” status and that scarce funding should be allocated to other mine affected
countries. In broad terms, this is a reasonable position. As well, donors have become
increasingly discouraged that the GoM has not increased its own funding to mine action.
However, a complete and rapid collapse of donor support at the end of 2006 or before may
well jeopardise the sustainability of capacities that need to be retained for: (i) addressing the
residual threat to civilians that will remain after 2006 from isolated UXO or newly discovered
arms caches left over from the civil war; (ii) addressing the threats to civilians that will
emerge as the “economic footprints” of communities in mine affected regions expand; (iii)
providing regulatory and information services to public sector agencies responsible for large
infrastructure works programmes; (iv) providing similar services as well as assistance in
procuring and financing demining services in support of public agencies and others
responsible for smaller development investments (for community development; feeder road
114

This includes both grants from donor countries and, to a lesser degree, loans from international
financial institutions (IFIs); particularly the World Bank; and loans from some donors. It must be noted
that these loans constitute a financial obligation on the GoM and, therefore, a financial contribution by
the government. Note however that Mozambique is likely to benefit from the debt-forgiveness accord
announced at the recent G-8 Summit, so past debts from IFIs and other official creditors will not
constitute a significant financial burden on the GoM.
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maintenance; etc.), and (v) disaster preparedness should civil conflict erupt in a neighbouring
state, causing a movement of refugees into Mozambique.
While the GoM should be increasing its financial contribution to mine action,115 the ideal
would be for a dignified disengagement of donors from mine action rather than a rapid
collapse of donor support. How to engineer such a dignified disengagement should be a
central issue on the agenda of the donor support group for mine action – an issue which is
taken-up again in the penultimate chapter of this report.
116

Figure 16 – GoM Contributions to Mine Action
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Donor coordination
As noted previously, the original ONUMOZ plan did not incorporate a formal mechanism to
facilitate donor coordination. Heated disagreements between key donors and the UN
concerning the appropriate strategy for the national mine action programme, coupled with the
mercantilist approach adopted by some donors in promoting demining firms from their own
countries, then poisoned the atmosphere. However, by the mid-1990s a donor support group
for mine action had coalesced, with UNDP taking the lead role.
The Review Team was unable to trace the ups and downs of donor coordination over the
years. This task is always difficult given the regular turnover of personnel among donor and
UN agencies, resulting in a loss of institutional memory. This turnover among donor
representatives is also one of the reasons why donor coordination is a thankless task –
knowledge and enthusiasm needs constant rekindling and new members to the group often
115

This is particularly true in light of the greater resources being made available to it through budget
support assistance from donors and IFIs, which is discussed later in this report.
116
Note: “Appropriation” is the amount provided for IND in the annual budget approved by the National
Assembly (although no budget to date have ever itemised an amount for IND); “BER” is the annual
Budget Execution Report (i.e. statement of actual spending) produced by the Ministry of Finance and
Planning; “CGE” is the comparable report on actual spending issued by the Tribunal administrativo
(Mozambique’s Supreme Audit Institution).
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arrive with different expectations concerning the coordination agenda (see Textbox 9 –
Defining coordination). In the case at hand, until the establishment of the IND, there also was
the problem of trying to coordinate donors in the absence of active government engagement,
at least with respect to the domestic side of the government’s mine action programme.117
Textbox 9 – Defining coordination

The term coordination embraces different issues, including (in order of ambition):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Simple information exchange to identify gaps and overlaps;
Information exchange intended to fill gaps that some party has identified (e.g. resource
mobilisation);
Coordinated or joint assessments of needs, so all parties have a similar understanding of
the problem to be addressed;
Agreement on common objectives to meet the agreed needs;
Agreement on a common strategy to meet the agreed objectives;
Coordinated programming, so actions by different agencies are of complementary scale,
are undertaken in a logical sequence and, collectively, address all essential requirements;
Joint assessments and evaluations, so different agencies devise future plans using a
common base of information.

For example, a joint government-donor working group supporting a Sector Wide Approach
(SWAp – discussed later) would have all the above issues on its agenda. Coordination can be
taken even further, by harmonising procedures or even developing a common budget and
pooling funds to finance it.
Dissatisfaction with a coordination mechanism can arise simply because different members
have different expectations concerning how ambitious the coordination agenda should be.
As well, donor coordination mechanisms should never be intended to usurp the recipient
government’s authority or responsibility. A donor coordination group should facilitate the
dialogue between donors and the responsible government authorities and, where there is broad
agreement, facilitate resource mobilisation aligned to the government’s programme. Thus the
agenda of a donor coordination group typically is impoverished in the absence of an active
and committed government authority.
This being said, reasonably consistent levels of support mobilised for IND and ADP suggest
that donor coordination was at least adequate for most of the period since the establishment of
the IND. However, many donors expressed concern that over the past 18 months the donor
coordination body has only been convened twice, and then discussion was limited almost
exclusively to the planned Review of Mine Action in Mozambique rather than a wider
dialogue on issues deemed of strategic importance by various donors.118
However, it is clear that mine action in Mozambique is entering a new phase, and there are
many strategic issues that need thorough discussion among donors and between donors and
the government. The donor support group needs to be revitalised to deal with the critical
117

Again, Mozambique has always played a high-profile role on Mine Action’s international stage.
Both UNDP and, from the government side, IND have had to cope with significant capacity
constraints over the past year or more, due to the suspension of the UNDP officer responsible for mine
action, the termination of the Deputy Director at IND, and the vacancy in the CTA position at IND.
118
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issues of linking mine action to development planning, realigning mine action capacities to
focus on emerging priorities, and making the transition to more complete government
ownership of a sustainable programme – particularly in light of the perceived donor fatigue.

Analysing Donor Fatigue
The term donor fatigue is much in use within the international mine action field, with
Mozambique being no exception. However, donor programming decisions are subject to
many factors, and different factors carry more or less weight with the various donors.
Accordingly, the term donor fatigue needs to be unbundled.
One approach for doing so is to examine: (i) the perceived need for continued international
funding; (ii) factors affecting the supply of international assistance for mine action; and (iii)
the degree of confidence donors have that their funds will contribute to a sustainable solution
within a realistic timeframe. The principal factors underlying the apparent donor fatigue vis-àvis mine action in Mozambique are listed below:119
•

Main factors influencing the perceived need for international funding
•
•
•
•

•

Main factors influencing the supply of international funding for mine action
•
•
•

•

The number of victims has been reduced to a low level relative to other mine-affected
countries and in comparison with other causes or mortality and morbidity in
Mozambique (particularly HIV/AIDS and malaria, but also traffic accidents, etc.);
The announcements by international demining NGOs that they will achieve “mine
impact free” status in the near future within their respective theatres of operations;
The absence of significant financial contributions to mine action from the GoM and
the apparent lack of growth in those contributions; and
The absence of any mention of landmine contamination or mine action in the first
PARPA or in subsequent State Budgets.120

The competing demands for official development assistance for other countries and,
within Mozambique, other development needs;
The decision by many donors active in Mozambique to shift increasingly from project
aid to programme funding and general budget support; and
The winding-up for many donors of special funds earmarked exclusively for mine
action, which were established in the build-up to the Convention.121

Main factors influencing the confidence that funding will contribute to a sustainable
solution
•

Perceptions that the National Mine Action Strategy does not articulate a sustainable
solution to the contamination problem;

119

Many of these are analysed more thoroughly in subsequent sections.
Important developments in 2005, particularly increased financial contributions from the GoM plus
mention of mine action in the new government’s ‘five-year programme’, are noted in the final chapter.
121
For one example, Canada has spent all of the C$100 million in its first tranche of funds dedicated
exclusively to mine action, and has committed most of the $72 million in the second (and, apparently,
final) tranche. Future support for mine action will have to come from CIDA’s regular budget.
120
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Perceptions that some mine action funds have been misused or have financed nonessential purchases; and
Perceptions of an absence of government ownership concerning its landmine
contamination problem.

Many of these factors are based on fact (e.g. numbers of landmine victims) or on broad trends
which are outside the influence of the mine action stakeholders (e.g. the shift to programme
aid and budget support). Others however are perceptions that could be changed: most
fundamentally in terms of whether more aid will contribute to a durable solution and whether
the GoM is fully committed to addressing its contamination problem. There is ample
opportunity to address these perceptions by:
•
•
•

Formulating a national strategy that incorporates credible plans for a sustainable solution
to the country’s medium- and long-term mine action challenges;
Enhancing transparency and accountability within the key organs of the mine action
programme, and taking decisive action whenever problems arise in the use of funds;
Taking credible steps to assume greater responsibility for the country’s mine action
problem, including enhancing the institutional foundations of the programme (i.e. its
structure plus the legal and regulatory framework); the appropriate incorporation of mine
action into the PARPA; and the infusion of additional government funds.

In other words, the dangers inherent from donor fatigue can be addressed, but the onus is on
the GoM to exercise the rights and responsibilities of “ownership” – the rights to determine
priorities and to formulate plans for addressing these; the responsibilities to contribute
materially to the solution and to account for the results achieved. We return to these
fundamental issues in the penultimate chapter of the report.

Assistance for Capacity Development
Management tools
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
Information management is an integral part of mine action. The International Mine Action
Standards 08.10 states that “planning for mine action requires accurate and timely
information about the form, scale and impact of the threat posed by mines, UXO and other
explosive hazards.” One of the main findings of the study on socio-economic approaches to
mine action was that “in many ways, mine action is as much about information as it is about
mines.” (GICHD/UNDP, 2001)
The information flow from operators to IND reflects the importance of information
management to some extent, but data on the operators’ actual tasks and work progress often
arrives at IND only after work has completed, reducing IND’s role to that of a passive
“acknowledger” of work instead of an active coordination body.
Mozambique uses IMSMA as a central data management tool. IMSMA was installed in
Mozambique in 2000 during the Landmine Impact Survey process as a central database for all
mine action information. The main database is located in Maputo, with regional databases in
the IND offices in Beira and Nampula. This decentralised structure requires tight data
management in order to keep information between the different databases updated and
50
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synchronized. This coordination has not been successful. Data are often mislaid between
operator, regional office, and Maputo. Many issues concerning information management have
only been vaguely defined or are handled on an ad hoc basis, with adverse effects on the
quality of data available to IND and to the programme as a whole.
The IMSMA database is supported by GICHD, which has trained database operators and
makes periodic visits to work with IND on operational issues. This assistance has been
additional to the information management TA at IND since 2002. However, the performance
of the information section remains below what is required for IND to plan, manage, and
coordinate.
It is important to note that, originally, IMSMA was not designed to support data entry from
multiple locations, as is done in Mozambique. However, IMSMA now is being completely reengineered, and the new version (due later in 2005) will make decentralised data entry far
easier to manage. The new system will then be installed in many countries, which will take
time, and it remains unclear whether Mozambique will be toward the head of the queue – an
issue addressed again in a later chapter.
Geographic Information System and Mapping
The Geographic Information System (GIS) functionality within IMSMA is extremely
advanced and would be the envy of many other departments in developing and developed
countries. This capacity however remains much underutilised; printing maps occasionally for
IND’s own purposes or on request from a demining operator. This differs markedly from the
situation in some other countries in which the Mine Action Centre operates IMSMA (or
another system with GIS functionality), and where there is great demand from a wide variety
of organisations for maps showing suspected contamination.
As well, IND does not appear to have contacted other government agencies that conduct
periodic socio-economic surveys to see whether and how the socio-economic picture of
landmine impact might be updated using data collected by such agencies (such as Core
Welfare Indicator Cluster surveys – CWICs – and more extensive Living Standards
Measurement Surveys – LSMS).
Financial Management Information System
Although not specifically within the remit of this Review, the Team noted that the financial
management system within IND is run on an Excel spreadsheet. It is inappropriate for an
organisation with several million dollars per year in expenditures to be operating without a
proper accounting and financial management package.

Technical advisers
At IND
Since the initiation of the programme, there have been significant levels of TA support
provided both to ADP and, more recently, to IND. Since 1999, IND has had 10 different TA
with a peak of six in place in 2001. While progress has been made, IND’s performance in
certain areas falls short of what is needed over the long term. This is not necessarily the fault
of individual TA. As noted above, the management style and administrative shortcomings of
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IND – and more generally in Mozambique’s public service – mean that many staff lack
motivation or clear sense of purpose, and are performing below the levels at which they could.
Individual capacities appear to have been built, but they have not been exercised. Staff need to
know more precisely what is expected of them and how their performance will be assessed.
The emphasis of the TAs should now be to support IND’s Director in defining and instituting
concrete performance targets that would allow a clear assessment of the true capabilities of
the middle management and staff. Only then can future capacity building efforts be properly
focused. In addition, the CTA should assist the Director in designing and instituting the type
of policies needed to support decentralisation, as well as three other complementary tasks:122
•
•

•

Completing an inventory of the specific services IND should be providing to mine action
operators and to public agencies, provincial governors, and any other bodies whose work
programmes are impacted by landmine and UXO contamination;
Initiating an outreach programme to reach government agencies responsible for
infrastructure programmes to ensure these agencies are aware of the mine action
programme, the services IND and its implementing partners can provide, and good
practices in addressing contamination issues;
Presenting the case for mine action in supporting poverty reduction and, more generally,
Mozambique’s socio-economic development, to the bodies responsible for the formulation
of the second PARPA and to the budget officials in the Ministry of Finance.

Fortuitously, the new CTA has a strong background in development management – precisely
the skill set required at this juncture.
At ADP
ADP had a succession of military TA, who provided appropriate assistance during the
emergency phase and whenever ADP absorbed new assets or implemented new techniques.
However, ADP appears technically competent and well managed in terms of operations, and
an extension of this type of advisory services may well fall into the “nice to have” rather than
“need to have” category. The critical need now is for advisory services relating to its planned
transition to an independent legal entity.
With respect to the specific plan in place to convert ADP into a local NGO, there is urgent
need in particular for a business plan and for draft statutes of association. However, there is
no consensus among stakeholders (GoM, UNDP, supporting donors, plus the staff and
management of ADP) that re-establishing ADP as a local NGO is the optimal, or even a
viable, solution. What is required at this stage is a more systematic exploration of the
transition options – not-for-profit, government agency, commercial firm – in light of the
current assessment of future needs and the likely actions of other demining operators. This is
discussed in the penultimate chapter.

122

A more complete exposition of why these tasks are a priority is contained in Chapters 7 and 8.
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4. Links between Mine Action and Other Arenas
The performance of an organisation is dependent on the capacities of its human and other
resources, the quality of its management systems, and the vision of its leaders. But even well
led organisations with sound systems and capable people may be unable to meet their
performance objectives, because organisational performance is also affected by:
•
•

the social, political, and economic environment, and
the performance – or lack thereof – of other organisations with which it must work to
promote common or complementary objectives.

Thus, the performance of any single mine action organisation is dependent in part on that of
other organisations within the national mine action programme. Similarly, the performance of
the programme overall is affected – for better or worse – by how well it links and works with
other groups of organisations (what we have termed “arenas”). These include government
bodies at various levels (the government arena), organisations in the international arena, and
those operating at the very local level (community arena). The figure on the following page
illustrates in a simplified form this “architecture” of arenas and linkages among them.
In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the nature of these linkages for Mozambique’s
mine action programme. Note however that forging strong links requires an understanding of
how the other arenas function; that is, how the diverse organisations within each arena work
with one other. For mine action in Mozambique, three issues are of particular importance at
this juncture:
1. How to link mine action to the government’s development planning and management
systems;
2. How to link to the international assistance community; an important issue as Mozambique
in general, and mine action in particular, remains heavily aid dependent; and
3. The nature of the linkages between the GoM and the international assistance community
in general, as numerous reforms are underway designed to make aid work better.
Thus, if the organisations within Mozambique’s mine action programme wish to improve
their collective performance in terms of promoting the country’s development objectives, they
will need a deeper understanding of how the government works; how the donors work; and
how the government and donors work together. Accordingly, the next chapter examines (i)
national development planning and management, (ii) aid delivery and donor coordination, and
(iii) aid management123 in greater detail.

123

We will use the term “national development planning and management” to refer to the government
processes to set development priorities and spend the financial resources it controls to advance those
priorities. The next two terms refer to how official aid agencies manage their funds, both individually
(“aid delivery”) and collectively (“donor coordination”). Finally, “aid management” refers to the joint
efforts of the government and aid agencies to align donor funds with national development priorities.
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International Arena

Figure 17 – The Architecture of Mine Action in Mozambique
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The Government Arena
Working with Different Levels of Government
Provinces and Districts
Constitutionally, Mozambique is a unitary state with a national government and
administrations (i.e. non-elected public servants without a distinct constitutional mandate) at
the provincial and district levels. The traditional philosophy of successive governments has
been centralist, with little authority delegated to the provincial and district levels. In practice
however, provincial governors and district administrators have had a fair degree of latitude, if
only because the size and diversity of the country, coupled with weak transportation and
communication networks, making close oversight by officials in Maputo impossible. Given
that, for many years, public service delivery in much of the country depended on international
assistance (see Textbox 10 – Demining in Support of Area Development Projects), many
governors and administrators were able to forge constructive links with international NGOs
and other aid agencies working in their regions, managing their affairs without much input
from the capital.
Textbox 10 – Demining in Support of Area Development Projects

During the post-independence civil war and much of the post-conflict period, the central
government lacked the capacity to set the development agenda in a concrete fashion. In this
vacuum, donor countries used a number of mechanisms to maintain a modicum of coordination, including what might be termed “co-ordination by avoidance” – essentially,
dividing the country into distinct regions and sectors, with one country then adopting a sector
within a region. For example, GTZ (the German aid agency) ran a large integrated rural
development (IRD) project in Manica and Sofala.
Landmine and UXO contamination was a significant concern in this area – particularly when
rehabilitating roads and bridges. Accordingly, GTZ included funds for demining within its
IRD project. Following competitive bidding, it engaged Minetech from Zimbabwe to provide
the demining services, and hired a German demining expert to provide QA services.
In about 1998, the GoM and the donor community commenced planning for a more
comprehensive sector-wide strategy for rural development, eventually leading to a national
programme termed PROAGRI. GTZ began to wind-down its IRD project, providing support
instead to PROAGRI.
It is unclear from IND records how much demining was financed under the GTZ project. IND
records suggest Minetech accounted for 66 per cent of all clearance in the country from 199297, and for 48 per cent of all clearance in 1998. However, the vast majority of Minetech’s
work was on roads and power pylons, and this should be interpreted as both survey and
clearance rather than clearance alone.
Mine action has largely fit into this mould, with the ‘humanitarian’ operators based in
different parts of the country124 using individual approaches for setting priorities. In broad

124

To a degree, the location of the demining NGOs mirrored the geographic pattern of the
development NGOs. Thus NPA based itself central Mozambique, where many of the Norwegian and
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terms, the operators would develop lists of priority tasks in a province and then discuss these
with the governor, who would endorse a final list (perhaps with the opportunity to make
choices among tasks). This list would then constitute the provincial mine action plan for the
coming year. Operators would then submit these to CND and later IND, which would simply
compile these into the national plan.
There has been growing emphasis on community consultations125 in addition to obtaining
input from district administrators or police chiefs. Note that these consultations concerning
priorities are never a one-way street. Operators always provide technical input on each
potential task so local officials know, for example, there may be a choice between one large,
time consuming tasks versus a number of smaller tasks. They also screen tasks to prevent
egregious abuses of authority and some have developed more formal processes for working
with local officials and communities to assess the likely socio-economic benefits from each
potential clearance tasks.126 Recently, HALO Trust has been working closely with local
authorities to ensure declarations of “Mine Impact Free” districts and provinces are endorsed
by administrators and governors respectively.
Also of note is that, in at least two cases (HI in Inhambane and HALO Trust in Zambezia), the
international demining NGOs had voiced the explicit intention of turning responsibility for
certain units over to provincial authorities, so these would remain as “provincial
capacities.”127 In neither case has this concept progressed far; stymied perhaps by the
ambiguous legal authority that governors exercise over provincial government departments
coupled with the limited fiscal capacities of provinces at the present time.128
In recognition of the importance of closer contacts with operators, sub-national
administrations, and mine affected communities, IND has attempted to decentralise in recent
years by opening offices in Beira (for the central region) and Nampula (covering the north).
While some useful innovations have been introduced to capitalise on the opportunities created
by decentralisation,129 the move has not had dramatic impact, at least to this point in time, and
donors financing this initiative advised the Review Team of plans to end their support.
Working with the National Government
CORE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT UNITS
Until this year, national economic management functions were for the most part centralised in
the Ministry of Planning and Finance130 and, particularly, in the National Directorate for
other Nordic development NGOs had their projects, while HALO Trust opened first in Zambézia, where
a consortium of British development NGOs were based.
125
See, for example, Millard and Harpviken, 2000.
126
NPA’s Task Impact Assessment is probably the most developed of these processes.
127
From the start of its planning, HI intended to transfer responsibility for some of its small teams that
conduct “proximity demining”, while HALO Trust at one point wished to create small teams for rapid
response to community requests (the so-called “fire brigade concept). See also Craib, 2003.
128
These constraints are discussed in more depth in the next chapter.
129
For example, the introduction of special forms for district administrators to list all known SHA in
their jurisdiction, ranked in priority order and including a brief description of the socio-economic impact.
130
The new government has created distinct ministries covering planning and finance, but the exact
split in responsibility between these was not yet apparent by the time the Review mission ended. Of
course, there is also a central bank responsible for monetary policy, but this is not an issue for us.
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Planning and Budgeting (DNPO). It is responsible for compiling many of the key planning
and expenditure management instruments, including:
•
•
•
•

The Government Five-Year Programme;
The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework;
The annual Social and Economic Programme (PES);
The annual budget (OE).

In addition, the unit was heavily involved in the preparation of the initial Action Plan for the
Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA – Mozambique’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper).
These items are touched upon later in this chapter, and covered in greater detail in Chapter 5.
The senior officials in DNPO professed little knowledge of either IND activities or the mine
action programme, in spite of the fact that an officer from DNPO apparently serves on IND’s
Technical Council.
SECTOR UNITS
In theory, the IND Technical Council should provide a platform for solid working relations
between IND (on behalf of the MA programme) and most of the relevant government units at
the national level. In addition to the Ministry of Planning and Finance, and to Foreign Affairs
itself, seven sectoral ministries are represented on the Technical Council: Defence, Interior,
Public Works & Housing, Agriculture & Fisheries, Social Affairs, Labour, and Health.
Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case as little or no sustained dialogue appears to
exist between IND and other government units (see below). In part, this may be due to more
widespread capacity constraints across the government,131 but it also reflects the weak
mandate of the Technical Council. In spite of this, some government units have put good
systems in place to arrange for demining services they require; particularly in support of
infrastructure rehabilitation.132 However, they have developed their own systems through their
own trial-and-error, and IND has not taken the lead in these issues..
ROADS AND BRIDGES
Together with the Electricity Company (EDM), the National Administration for Roads (ANE)
appears to have the best system in place. ANE first encountered serious problems with
landmine and UXO contamination during its Emergency Road Programme (1994-96). Under
intense time pressure, it worked with UNDP and donors to make arrangements for stand-alone
demining services – typically mechanical “treatment”133 followed by survey and clearance –
131

Most ministries lack an adequate management structure at the top to ensure the different units
within a ministry co-ordinate among themselves. Thus, there may be no mechanism for a ministry’s
representative on the IND Technical Council to communicate relevant Mine Action decisions and
information to the different branches of the ministry. For example, there are 10 National Directorates
within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER).
132
Most public works projects now underway or planned in Mozambique are for rehabilitation or
reconstruction of existing networks and facilities, rather than for development of new infrastructure.
This reflects to sorry state of the country’s infrastructure stock following decades of war.
133
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) do not recognise any machine that, on its own, clears
land to humanitarian standards. Thus, areas that have been covered by mine clearance machines are
considered “treated” rather than cleared.
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so as not to delay the work of the civil engineering firms selected as prime contractors for
each rehabilitation project.134 This proved extremely unsatisfactory, as many explosive
devices were missed,135 causing the road work to stop, with ANE bearing the cost of delays.
As a result, ANE has developed a system whereby the prime contractor assumes complete
responsibility for demining services. Tender documents make it clear that the bidders must
include a specialised sub-contractor for landmine/UXO survey and clearance.136 After the
award of contract, the prime contractor is not allowed to mobilise the road works crews until
the demining sub-contractor produces a certificate from IND that the roads, bridges, gravel
pits, and other worksites relating to the roads rehabilitation project have been cleared.
Subsequently, any missed devices incidents are the responsibility of the prime contractor and,
after mobilising the heavy equipment and work teams, delays due to missed devices would be
extremely costly. Note that ANE does not require external QA – it leaves this responsibility to
the prime contractor.137
Financing for the requisite demining works is provided in the budget for the road
rehabilitation project. A provisional two-to-five per cent of the total budget is allocated for
demining services, but then ANE pays for actual and reasonable expenses. The planned work
programme for ANE over the next decade is $1.7 billion,138 implying that the budget
provisions for demining should be between $3.4 million and $8.5 million per year on average.
ANE maintains close contact with IND, with two of its engineers serving in the liaison role. It
sends all its project plans to IND and requests all the relevant contamination and clearance
records. Note however that, even if IND certifies that a road segment has been entirely
cleared, ANE still requires the prime contractor to sub-contract a demining firm to complete
another survey and clearance operation – given its costly experiences with missed devices in
the past, ANE wants to put all responsibility for clearance on the prime contractor.
While IFIs and donor agencies provide the bulk of the financing for the road rehabilitation
projects once these have been designed, ANE also needs demining support for the design
teams. This it requests from IND, and IND has been able to arrange for this (presumably by
asking one of the international NGOs, ADP, FADM, or Ronco/QRDF).

134

It was in mid-1994 that UNDP/OPS issued its large contract for road survey and clearance to the
Lonrho/Royal Ordnance/Mechem consortium. Ronco was also doing road survey and clearance work
by this time.
135
ANE acknowledges that, in some cases, the roads contractors may have planted mines
themselves in order to justify work stoppages. They certainly would have the incentive to do so if, for
example, they were delayed anyway because of delays in mobilising heavy equipment or in obtaining
spare parts: creating a “missed device incident” justifying a work stoppage would shift the financial
cost of the delay onto ANE.
136
ANE requires that the demining sub-contractor be licensed by IND. There has been one case
where IND has disapproved of a sub-contractor as it was not registered.
137
Yet the system works well because it is founded on good incentives structure: the prime-contractor
will bear the cost of any delays in works that might result from devices discovered after road works
start. They also bear the cost of site insurance and their insurance companies will require credible
certificates of prior mine survey and clearance. Hence they must be serious in finding a sub-contractor
for surveying and demining and equally serious in enforcing quality control.
138
Some of this is financed by IDA credits (i.e. low interest loans) from the World Bank, with most of
the rest coming from other donors, either through grants or soft loans.

58

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
The main contamination problem faced by EDM relates to the expansion of the electricity
distribution network. Many pylons in the existing network had been mined for defensive
purposes by FRELIMO during the civil war, but most of these were cleared by humanitarian
operators or under commercial contract.139 However, when opening a new power corridor to
Zimbabwe in 1995, EDM began to encounter minefields around Cahorra Bassa Dam. It was
completely unprepared and neither the project schedule nor budget provided for demining
services. It approached NPA, which referred it to CND, which – given the importance of the
project – placed it as top priority. NPA did the work.140
Since then, EDM has contingency plans for possible landmine contamination, and has tried
various models for managing this work. At one point it would include provision for demining
in the project budget, but then issue separate tenders for demining firms. However, they
encountered problems similar to those experienced by ANE when it used that approach.
Currently EDM includes demining in the project design and budget, and requires the prime
contractor to engage a specialist firm to do a combination of demining and brush clearance for
both the power line corridor.141 Note that, unlike ANE, EDM also requires the prime
contractor to engage a separate QA firm, as well as to provide all clearance certification from
IND prior to mobilising crews and equipment for the power line construction itself. In its
project plans, EDM budgets between five and 10 per cent for demining, brush clearance, and
external QA.
EDM’s master plan for the expansion of the grid over the next 15 years is budgeted between
$750 and $800 million. Some of this is for work in urban areas, where contamination and
brush cover is less of a concern. Assuming $450 million is for works in rural areas, this
implies budget provisions for demining and brush clearance of between $1.5 and $3.0 million
per year on average for the next 15 years. These estimates do not include power stations.
WATER
The National Water Authority – a parastatal that maintains major water infrastructure such as
dams, and then sells to bulk water users – has also experienced significant problems in the
past due to mine contamination. However, unlike those in the Roads and Electricity subsectors, the Water Authority does not include demining services in the responsibilities of the
prime contractors. Instead, it has always approached IND (or, previously, CND) to request the
demining required before the start of work on the water system infrastructure.

139

IND records shows Minetech alone surveyed and cleared over 360 km of high tension power lines
from 1992-97, claiming 72 million m2 in “clearance”. The latter is a highly improbable figure as it
implies clearance averaging 100 metres on both sides of the power line. As well, most of the
“clearance” was probably survey work.
140
This is a good example of the confusion created by the term “humanitarian demining”. International
demining NGOs typically obtain grants for “humanitarian” purposes. A commercial project to sell power
to Zimbabwe is important in development terms for Mozambique (and for Zimbabwe), but clearly is not
humanitarian in nature.
141
We believe the “demining” is more in the nature of “battle area clearance” (i.e. visual inspection for
surface explosives in advance of the bulldozers doing the brush clearance). This is appropriate for
areas in which mine fields are not likely to exist, and the main concern is light calibre UXO.
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The rehabilitation of the Massingir dam in Gaza is a good example. The civil engineering and
hydro-mechanical works, financed by an $8 million loan from the African Development Bank
(AfDB), began in April 2004 after long delays in the tendering process. Aware of extensive
landmine contamination in the area,142 some years ago the Water Authority requested UNDP
and CND/IND to arrange clearance. Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able to
broker financial assistance from Japan and the U.S., and Mechem was engaged via a
competitive tender process to undertake the demining.
IND also arranged for demining services in support of the Water Authority’s work to
rehabilitate a number of dykes in Gaza following the major floods in 2000. The Dutch
government paid for the civil engineering works, but Water Authority officials are unaware of
the financial arrangements made for demining.
Neither Water Authority personnel not contractors have reported any problems with mines or
UXO on work sites following demining. As well, the Water Authority has not experienced an
accident in recent years relating to more routine work, such as maintenance of hydrometric
stations, many of which are situated by bridges.
At the same time, the processes adopted by the Water Authority to address contamination
concerns are not ideal. Separate contracting for civil engineering and demining raises
transaction costs, and leaves the Water Authority at risk for the cost of work delays should
explosives be uncovered after the demining has been completed. As well, it is unclear which
organisation bears residual liability should an accident occur in an area certified as cleared.
This is particularly true as records of earlier clearance tasks are incomplete and lack an audit
trail (see Textbox 11 – A Major Demining Project).
Textbox 11 – A Major Demining Project to Support Dam Reconstruction

Demining of the areas surrounding the Massingir Dam began about five years ago, starting
before IND was established. The current staff at UNDP and IND did not have the details of
this project. However, records compiled by an earlier GICHD study show donations from
Japan for the “Mechem tender” of $1 million in 1998 plus $846,000 in 2000, together with $1
million from the U.S. in 1999 for Mechem. As well, a contribution from Switzerland in 1998
of US $173,250 is shown going to Mechem. (Lambert-Madore, 2002, Appendix 5) Assuming
this all related to Massingir, the total project cost was just over $3 million.
IND clearance records credit Mechem with clearance of 738,100 m2 in 1999, nothing in 2000,
and 72,551 m2 in 2001 – a total of 810,561 m2. Managers at the Water Authority believe that
Mechem may have been engaged sometime before 2000 for clearance in support of
rehabilitation of the Corumane dam.
Regardless of whether these cost and clearance records relate only to Massingir or to multiple
projects, it implies a cost of about $3.70 per m2, (but one cannot be certain that the clearance
records are complete, particularly for the period before IND was formed).
Personnel from the Water Authority do not know the details of the mine clearance works at
Massingir, but thought it had been done using mechanical clearance techniques and were
unaware whether this was supported by other demining assets (dogs, manual teams).
142

The dam had been heavily protected by FRELIMO forces during the civil war, and they had laid
extensive protective minefields.
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Further investigation revealed that the project had been managed by UNOPS, initially on
behalf on CND. The UNOPS tender required the contractor to use “a combination of
mechanical mine clearance equipment, manual clearance, sensor technology and other skills
or technology required to achieve the required clearance standard.” Mechem won the tender
and employed mechanical equipment and explosives detection dogs for survey, and manual
teams for clearance to a standard of 99.6 per cent (the standard used before IMAS was
adopted in 2001). UNOPS also contracted an independent quality assurance firm.
Sources: UNOPS, Statement of Work: Massingir Dam Mine/UXO Clearance Project; UNOPS,
Statement of Work: Massingir Dam Quality Management Project

This year the Water Authority will begin rehabilitation of another of the existing dams, and it
is conducting feasibility studies for constructing three new large dams. Thus, its draft sector
work programme is large indeed – in the range of $1 billion over the next five years –
although this has not yet been approved by the new government.
RAILWAYS
Mozambique’s railway system is undergoing significant restructuring. The railway authority
(CFM) has been “corporatised” albeit not privatised,143 and the rights to provide rail services
are being awarded by international tenders. For example, an international consortium recently
has been awarded the concession on the Sena line, and will be investing tens of millions of
dollars on rolling stock and facilities as part of the agreement. CFM however is responsible
for upgrading the 600 kilometre rail line itself, and has received an IDA credit of $110 million
from the World Bank for this purpose.144
The renewal of rail operations on the Sena line is a vital development initiative for
Mozambique. It opens access to the large Moatize coal mine in Tete and improves access to
Malawi, but also will turn a number of other public and private investments into feasible
propositions, including:
•
•
•
•

Exploitation of heavy mineral deposites at Micaune (in Zambézia), limestone quarries
at Muanza (Sofala), and fluorspar at Mont Muambe (Zambézia);
A number of rice production and processing schemes in Zambézia;
Establishment of large-scale irrigation systems in Urema-Zangoe (in Sofala),
M’Condedzi-Revuboe (in Tête), and Chinde (Zambézia); and
Integrated rural development projects near Trigo (Tete) and Gorongoza (Sofala).145

Rail lines were, of course, constant targets during the civil wars, and contamination from both
landmines and UXO is a very real concern. The first 90 km of the Sena line was demined in
1998 by Minetech,146 with funding from Ireland147 and QA by Ronco. Ronco then cleared a
143

Corporatised means it has the legal structure of a corporation. In the case of CFM, all the shares
are still held by GoM rather than sold to private investors.
144
$5.5 million of the loan is for institutional strengthening.
145
Source: map entitled Major Anchor Projects: Sena Line, CFM.
146
IND records suggest that Minetech cleared 12.5 metres on each side of the centre line.
147
The Review Team has been unable to find any reference to this a “mine action” funding. The
financing may have been bundled into a broader “Beira Corridor” project financed by Ireland.
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further 118 km with State Department funding, apparently in 2001. In both cases, few mines
or UXO were found.
When the World Bank conducted its environmental impact studies relating to the upgrading of
the Sena line, it advised that clearance would be required to at least 15 metres from the centre
line and, ideally, to 25 metres. However, the Bank did not incorporate funds for demining into
its loan,148 leaving this cost to be covered by CFM from the government’s contribution to the
project.149 CFM sought assistance from the State Department via Ronco.
In 2003, CFM began the reconstruction of the first section of the Sena line and, pressed for
time, “cleared” to 10 metres from the centre line with assistance from Ronco and the Quick
Reaction Demining Force (QRDF). Basically, the QRDF (supervised by Ronco) used Battle
Area Clearance techniques in advance of CFM bulldozers and work crews, which did bush
clearance for access roads needed for the rail line rehabilitation. Few if any landmines or
UXO were encountered150 except those left overnight by villagers for the deminers to find
(suggesting the villagers are afraid to keep these munitions or to deliver them to state
authorities – see Textbox 12 – ).
Textbox 12 – The Swords into Ploughshares disarmament initiative

Prolonged civil conflict indicates the existence of deep divisions within a society, and
intensifies such divisions, increasing the likelihood of future conflicts should the country be
unable to build political and social institutions that allow for peaceful resolution of disputes.
For this reason, a variety of peace-building initiatives are warranted.
One such initiative in Mozambique is the “Swords into Ploughshares” programme sponsored
by the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) – an umbrella association of Protestant
denominations. In its view, the Peace Accords only “opened the door to peace.” The post-war
demobilisation projects just covered “official” soldiers, but both sides had distributed guns
and other munitions to civilians in friendly communities, largely for self-defence. As well, at
least the RENAMO forces established weapons caches in rural areas they controlled. After the
war, local communities – particularly in areas that had supported, and subsequently voted for,
RENAMO – were afraid of turning over these guns and munitions to government authorities.
Recognising this problem, and the danger of having so many weapons in local communities,
CCM initiated the Swords to Ploughshares programme in 1995. CCM personnel make and
maintain the contacts with the local communities, but work in cooperation with the ministries
of Defence and the Interior, who provide specialists (e.g. non-uniformed police to transport
148

CFM officials believe they were advised by the Bank’s task manager for this project that the World
Bank did not provide funding for demining. If so, this is a misreading of Bank policy, which was issued
in 1997. That policy remains unchanged, but in 2003 the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit
of Bank issued a Task Manager’s Guide and, in late 2004, a Social Development Note entitled
“Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative” which reaffirmed the Bank’s willingness to
finance demining in support of reconstruction and development investments.
149
The Bank and most other providers of project loan funds normally require a financial contribution
from the recipient government, in part as an indicator that the government sees the project as a high
priority. Almost one-third of CFM’s capital works programme (which includes improvements of the
Machipanda railway from Beira to Zimbabwe) is non-World Bank financed – this could be from
government’s own funds, or from grants/soft loans from donors.
150
This suggests that clearance of at least the known minefields had been done shortly into the post
war period, perhaps by soldiers from FADM and the Zimbabwe army, which had been deployed to
keep the vital Beira transport corridor – one of Zimbabwe’s principal links to a sea port – open.
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guns to disposal sites or non-uniformed FADM engineers for clearance of minefields laid to
protect weapons caches).
Initially thought of as a temporary initiative, it has continued to this day because “the guns
kept coming.” The project is based in CCM Maputo headquarters with offices in Zambézia
and Niassa. However, CCM has never been able to maintain teams in every province.
The fact the Swords into Ploughshares project has been running for 10 years suggests that
many caches of landmines and other munitions remain in the rural areas. Presumably, most of
these are known by the rural communities themselves. When deminers are in the vicinity,
villagers leave the unwanted munitions by the demining camps for disposal. That this is done
secretly at night suggests the villagers are afraid of revealing these caches to state authorities
for fear of reprisal. It raises interesting issues concerning MRE and disarmament programmes.
The Tete branch of the line, from Sena itself to Moatize, is not yet cleared (work stopped in
part because the QRDF was deployed to Iraq for some months). However, reconstruction of
the line is not yet scheduled, so there is less urgency in completing the demining and bush
clearance. CFM plans to clear to 15 metres from the centre line, and hopes the State
Department will fund Ronco to assist in this.151 IND records suggest there is low risk of
contamination, so the work should go briskly provided CFM obtains the financing.
The existing CFM work programme also provides for the improvement of the Machipanda
railway from Beira to the border with Zimbabwe. Demining will be required, particularly in
the “flats” near Beira where all bridges and culverts will need to be surveyed and, perhaps,
cleared. However, no financing has yet been put in place for this $25 million project.
In the future, the line from Quelimane to Mocuba in Zambézia will require upgrading, but
CFM has not yet investigated whether landmine and UXO contamination will be an issue.
SMALL SCALE INFRASTRUCTURE
Many other government units are responsible for smaller scale investment projects, often in
rural areas. These should be important clients of IND and the demining organisations, but
often are not. For example, officials from the National Directorate for Irrigation in MADER
said they had no exchange of information with IND or any of the demining operators. In
planning their annual work programmes, they ask district administrators whether there are any
landmines in the district – if there are, they simply do not plan any small scale irrigation
works in the communities suffering from contamination.152 They do not follow-up with IND
or with operators active in the area to see if the reports of contamination are true, or whether
the precise areas suspected of contamination would interfere with the irrigation project.
When they are advised by district administrators that a village was contaminated but the areas
have been cleared, they do not contact IND to request clearance certificates. Similarly, if they
are told there is no contamination, they do not check with IND to verify this information.

151

Its second option is for FADM to undertake Battle Area Clearance.
This is a good example of why LIS findings concerning the degree of impact of contamination on
communities should not be relied upon after a few years – community members may not even be
aware they are being negatively impacted when government units, development NGOs, etc. deny
them much-needed community development investments because of the suspicion of landmines.
152
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Once the annual work programme has been planned, the Directorate engages small
contractors to do the actual work. The Directorate does not include any clauses concerning
landmine or UXO contamination in these contracts.
The planned work programme for small-scale irrigation in four provinces (Maputo, Sofala,
Manica, Zambézia) is about $22 million over the coming five years. It is unclear to the
Review Team whether the Directorate is investing similar amounts in the other provinces.
In the same ministry, officials in the National Directorates of Forestry and Economics
reported that they were unaware of any dealings with IND. Their colleague in the Agriculture
Directorate said that, for their projects in most cases, the road surfaces would already have
been cleared, but the roadsides might still be contaminated. They would contact IND if there
was any concern. However, most agriculture projects now are commercial schemes and
privately financed. The public sector now simply facilitates private sector investment by
promoting producer associations, providing extension services, and encouraging private
investors, and would not get involved in the design or implementation of the investment itself.
Officials at the National Directorate for Rural Development were more informed concerning
contamination issues and the mine action programme. This appears to be due to the fact that
many of them were actively engaged with demining issues in the immediate post-war period
when there was a big push to clear roads and sites for returning refugees and IDPs.
The situation has changed in many respects. First, clearer development priorities (farm lands,
feeder roads, resettlement sites) are emerging from the centre. But government units at the
provincial and district levels are better placed to take responsibility for implementing work
programmes. Thus, coordination with the mine action programme is not done in Maputo but
in the provincial capitals and district centres, which seems to work well (even though there
are no mine action committees established at the provincial or district levels).
STATISTICS AND MAPPING
As noted previously, CIDA funded a toponomy digitization project with DINAGECA, the
national mapping authority, so full use could be made of the GIS functionality incorporated
into IMSMA. Since then, there appears to have been little collaboration between IND and
DINAGECA.
One of the main problems faced by countries that have implemented an LIS has been the
absence of any mechanism to update the socio-economic data fields – thus, the LIS provides
only a snapshot of the contamination impact at a point of time, when a moving picture is
needed. However, other agencies in Mozambique collect a great deal of statistical information
that could provide IND with a sense of how the impact of contamination may be changing
over time. Accessing and analysing socio-economic statistics collected by other agencies
(chiefly INE – the National Statistics Institute) would also help in the task of ensuring the
mine action programme is aligned with the government’s broader development priorities. For
example, INE has poverty data aggregated at the national, provincial, district, and locality
levels. Starting in 2000, INE has also conducted periodic surveys using the Core Welfare
Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ surveys), which give an indication of how the pattern of
poverty is changing over time. As well, it is compiling data on all physical and social
infrastructure (schools, health facilities, wells/boreholes, other water facilities, etc.) –
potentially of great use in preparing annual plans for the mine action programme.
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There has been limited contact between INE and IND. The latter contacted INE to obtain a
listing of community sites (required for the LIS). Since then, INE has contacted IND to
borrow GPS equipment for recording the location of physical and social infrastructure.

Development Planning and Budgeting
The main development planning and expenditure management instruments, which are the
principal means for getting public sector bodies to work together in support of government
priorities, are covered in greater detail in the next chapter. Here we simply note whether IND
or the mine action programme has received any mention in these important documents.
Macro Planning and Budgeting
Shortly after each election, the incoming government produces its Government Programme,
outlining its priorities for the coming five years. However, the PARPA (Mozambique’s
Poverty Reduction Strategy) has now become far-and-away the most important medium-term
development planning document, and is the fulcrum for policy and planning discussions
between the GoM and the international assistance community. Neither the mine action
programme nor the word “landmine” appear anywhere in the PARPA. This omission has long
been a concern to the donors supporting mine action.
Similarly, neither IND nor the mine action programme has ever been noted in the annual
budget. Since 2001 however, actual recurrent expenditures relating to mine action have been
reported in Budget Execution Reports (BER),153 and the BER for 2003 also reported an
estimate of capital expenditures for mine action (although this likely represents those donor
financed capital expenditures the government could identify – perhaps from customs records
of equipment imports).
IND has issued projections suggesting that government contributions to mine action will
increase to $1.75 million in 2005, $2.25 million in 2006, and $2.75 million thereafter,154 but it
is unclear to the Review Team whether this has been endorsed by budget officials in the
Ministry of Planning and Finance (the senior budget officials we met had no knowledge of
any discussions or commitments).
Sector Planning
Sector plans do not exist in all cases. Where such documents are extant, typically they have
been the outcome of a prolonged government-donor effort to reorient development planning
and management on a sector-wide basis – what has come to be termed a Sector Wide
Approach to Programming (SWAp). SWAps exist for Health, Education, Agriculture, and
some of the sub-sectors in Public Works such as Roads and Water. The Review Team did not
have the opportunity to examine these sector plans, but in our meetings with officials from,

153

Actual expenditures were about $350,000 in 2002 and $470,000 in 2003, about 45 per cent and 58
per cent of the budget respectively.
154
This is made up of $0.5 million annually for IND and $0.75 million annually for equipment, plus
GoM contributions to demining starting at $0.5 million in 2005 and rising over two years to $1.5 million.
IND, Communication Elements of Plans to Implement Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention, June 2004,
p. 6.
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and donors to, many of these sectors, no one was aware of any description or analysis of
landmine and UXO contamination within the sector plans.155
Provincial and District Plans
It appears that neither provincial nor district development plans are now prepared on a
systematic basis in Mozambique, in part because more government and donor funding has
been allocated on the basis of sector priorities adopted via SWAp arrangements.156 However,
district planning and budgeting has been piloted in Nampula, this pilot is now being replicated
in the other Northern provinces and in Zambézia, and the government has announced this
initiative will be implemented nation-wide. These documents would be excellent vehicles for
analysing the local impacts of landmine and UXO contamination.

The International Arena
Regional and International Mine Action Links
Mozambique was among the first countries to sign and ratify the Ottawa Convention, and the
GoM hosted the first annual Meeting of States Parties in 1999. Since then, Mozambique has
remained extremely active in Convention matters, with both the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of IND regularly attending Meetings of States Parties as well as the recent
Nairobi Review Conference.
The GoM is also supporting regional mine action initiatives. The Director of IND is a member
of the SADC Mine Action Technical Committee, and Mozambique has actively supported the
principle regional demining initiative promoted by SADC, the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Game Park, created in 2000, straddling South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.157
In addition, the Director of ADP has been extremely active in both the regional and
international mine action arenas. He is widely viewed as the most experienced and highprofile manager of local demining operators in the Lusaphone world.

Links with Mine Action Donors
Mine action clearly was not a priority for the GoM immediately after the 1992 Peace
Agreement. This appears to have reflected not the intrinsic importance of landmine and UXO
contamination, but rather:
•
•

The fact that ONUMOZ, the UN overall, and ICRC had been given an explicit
responsibility for mine action;158
The understandable difficulties the two warring factions had in addressing issues related
to demilitarisation in the immediate post-conflict period;

155

A number of World Bank project documents for large infrastructure projects do touch on such
contamination – typically in the environmental and social impact reports.
156
It is understandably difficult to get people to continue producing plans when there is no money to
implement those plans.
157
However, most donors were moving slowly on this project because of concerns over the political
situation in Zimbabwe.
158
For the latter two, this was through the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance, endorsed
by both RENAMO and FRELIMO in July 1992.
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•

The more general capacity constraints of the government, coupled with the number and
magnitude of urgent matters on its agenda.

Given this, UN bodies (principally UNOHAC and ONUMOZ) assumed the initiative for
planning mine action. Lack of coordination among the different UN bodies, ponderous
administrative rules and regulations, and the decision to push for an integrated AuthorityMAC-Operator (the so called “Cambodia model”159) soon led to friction between the UN and
the mine action donors. Soon thereafter, major donors also squabbled among themselves over
the award of large contracts for commercial demining.
Given this fractious environment, it was unsurprising that mine action operations began as a
series of independent, ill co-ordinated initiatives – emergency responses to facilitate the return
of refugees and safeguard humanitarian assistance workers. The EC, through ICRC, financed
Gurkha Security Guards and Lonrho to clear roads in Sofala and Gaza. USAID had Ronco
clear roads in Sofala, Manica, and Zambézia. GTZ engaged Minetech to survey roads and
rural communities to support UNHCR and to prepare the ground for its planned integrated
rural development project.
Both HALO Trust and NPA also started their mine action operations during this emergency
response phase, engaged initially by the UN. Shortly thereafter, the international demining
NGOs began receiving support directly from donors. Meanwhile, ADP was created almost as
an afterthought to provide a vehicle to employ the first cohorts emerging from the mine
training facility. By mid-1995 when the GoM finally created NMCC and CND, Mozambique
was already divided among the three big humanitarian operators.
The international mine action NGOs maintain their own relationships with donors and line-up
their own funds. UNDP raises funds to support ADP and provides assistance in resource
mobilisation to the GoM – a process that undoubtedly has been helped by the high profile the
Minister of Foreign Affairs has developed on the international stage. The Ministry has also
been able to raise funds directly from donors to support some of the infrastructure projects
such as the Massingir dam and the Sena Railway.
Thus, what might be termed a coordination-by-avoidance approach evolved, with a number of
distinct programmes co-existing in the country, sharing information, heading broadly in the
same direction, but managing their internal affairs and external relations more-or-less
independently. It works after a fashion.160 It is adequate for avoiding major overlaps and ‘turf
battles’ among operators, which can escalate so easily into squabbles among their respective
donors. The IND (and CND before it) has not yet made a concerted effort to stamp its
authority on the individual operators.
After about 1996, donor coordination for mine action settled into a routine, with UNDP doing
most of the legwork to convene donors periodically, more to exchange information than for
joint planning or serious policy dialogue. Donors rightly wanted to emphasise that it is first159

Military engineers from industrialised countries were dominant among the mine action advisers to
UNOHAC and ONUMOZ. At this point in time, most individuals with such a background were more
comfortable with clear lines of “command and control” such as would be found in armies and which
worked well in the type of professional armed forces existing in their home countries.
160
It was also the approach commonly used by donors for aid delivery during the emergency and
post-war recovery phases – donors adopting a sector in a region of the country and, more-or-less
staying out of each other’s way.

67

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

and-foremost the responsibility of the government to take responsibility for the country’s
landmine contamination problem. The government did indeed show leadership in some
respects, but principally in the context of the international forums that are part of the Ottawa
process. In the absence of an active and engaged government interlocutor, it is not surprising
that the donor support group had a modest agenda.
It appears the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing the GoM, was comfortable with this
level of interaction with donor representatives within Mozambique. It suited that Ministry’s
natural orientation to focus more on the world stage than on the domestic front. As well,
Mozambique’s active participation at international mine action events made a good
impression in donor capitals, leading to continued financial support to the country’s mine
action programme.161
In spite the provision in its statutes for semi-annual meetings with the cooperating partners
(including donors and UN agencies), IND has only convened annual meetings.
Another concern is that ADP does not have regular meetings with its donors to keep them
informed, alert them to strategic issues, and to solicit their advice when warranted.162 This
seems inappropriate considering the long-standing plans to convert ADP into an independent
organisation, which will then be responsible for its own resource mobilisation.

Local Communities Arena
Local authorities
The initial period of operations is always difficult for demining operators because of the lack
of solid information about where minefields are and which ones pose the greatest threats to
people or impose the most serious constraints to development. This is particularly true in the
immediate post-conflict period as people may not have returned to their home communities
or, where they have, may not yet be aware of the location of hazards. Given this, it should
come as no surprise that all the humanitarian demining organisations were criticised
concerning some tasks they selected during their first period of operations in Mozambique.163
Most evaluators recommended closer consultations with communities and local authorities.
Such recommendations were implemented, but sometimes in a cursory fashion – the demining
personnel almost always had technical backgrounds and often seemed unaware that local
politics and social divisions can turn the identification of priorities from the bottom-up into a
“minefield” for the unwary.164 The well-known study by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo
161

In the build-up and aftermath to the Ottawa meeting at which the Mine Ban Treaty was agreed,
mine action had such a high profile that most of the funding decisions were made by officials based in
donor capitals, often drawing on special funds ear-marked solely for mine action. This situation is
changing gradually as mine action is being “mainstreamed” within at least some of the national
development programmes. Thus, and unlike the case with most official development assistance,
attending international meetings can be a good fundraising strategy.
162
UNDP has convened a number of meetings with donors since the collapse of ADP in April 2005.
163
In some cases, such as demining around Cahorra Bassa dam, a secondary objective of the
operator (in that case, NPA) was that it served as a good training site for their newly inducted
deminers. See Suhrke et al., 1997.
164
A complicating feature in parts of Mozambique is that there may be an official authority plus a
traditional authority. For many years, FRELIMO hewed a standard socialist “vanguard party” approach
and tried to undermine traditional leadership structures. Thus, the most knowledgeable and respected
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(PRIO, Millard and Harpviken, 2000) contained a number of examples of land that had been
cleared in the mid- to late-1990s at significant expense, but which remained underused,
demonstrating the need for more thorough consultations before undertaking tasks.
Further improvements have been instituted. HI’s concept of proximity demining requires
close consultations with local people to identify small tasks that will deliver significant
benefits in terms of improving community access to important facilities or sites. NPA is using
its Task Impact Assessment (TIA) approach to ensure the beneficiaries of any clearance task
are identified in advance and to assess whether there are any other impediments that would
prevent the land from being used without delay, and in the intended manner, after clearance.
HALO Trust works closely with district administrators and provincial governors to determine
priorities and attain “mine impact free” status on a district-by-district basis.
Consultations between IND and local communities remain less developed. Decentralisation
may improve the situation, but little authority has yet been delegated to the regional offices165
and at least one regional office is performing at a very low level. This is not to suggest
relations between IND and local authorities are unfriendly; rather, IND personnel in the
regional offices still have little real influence over which hazards are cleared. This decision
remains largely in the hands of the operators, and local authorities quite reasonably deal first
with the operators while keeping IND informed.

Community development actors
In the early days of mine action, many basic services were delivered by international NGOs.
In the immediate post-conflict period, when there was significant worry over landmines and
ignorance concerning the location of minefields was rife, support for these NGOs was a
priority. For example, the original DfID grant to support HALO Trust’s work in Zambézia
was predicated in large part on support for the work of a consortium of British NGOs,
TRINGO. (Craib, 2003) NPA located to a region that was heavily populated with Norwegian
and other Nordic NGOs. With so many organisations operating in such a confused
environment, there probably were cases in which community development projects were
delayed because of lack of coordination with whichever demining operator was based in the
region, but the Review Team has not uncovered any evaluation reports from the time that
highlighted this as a significant problem. We presume such coordination has been adequate.
In recent years far more aid has been channelled through government coffers or delivered in
the context of joint government-donor sector strategies. Basic public services are now being
delivered through or in close cooperation with the relevant government department. Officials
at the district and provincial level appear to be attuned to any problems these governments
might have with SHA, so consultations with local officials appear to be the right approach for
operators and, where it is active, IND.

person in the eyes of the community may not have been identified as a local authority to demining
organisations and others seen to be working in conjunction with the state.
165
The point of consultations is not, of course, simply to identify local priorities: it is to address these
priorities. Local authorities will allocate little time or effort on consultations with an IND official if that
person cannot influence whether problems are solved by operators after these have been identified.
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Summary
The links between the mine action programme and the government arena are in some
instances good, but further improvements are required. IND, as the national authority, does
not engage with the government’s core economic management units. Neither IND nor mine
action has yet received mention in the two most critical development management
instruments – the PARPA and the annual state budget. Government contributions to mine
action are extremely modest.
Links with certain units in sector ministries do exist, but this reflects the initiative of those
units rather than IND. IND has been able to provide support when approached. However,
other government units whose work programmes are adversely affected or distorted by
contamination, but which do not take the initiative to approach IND or the independent
operators, are receiving no advice or assistance. A proactive approach by IND is required to
ensure these government units are aware that assistance is available to address contamination
problems. A proactive approach would also pay dividends in spreading best practice among
government units responsible for infrastructure rehabilitation and development.
Perhaps the most important finding of this review is the existence of substantial demand for
demining services – engaged mainly through competitive processes – to support infrastructure
rehabilitation and development. This demand appears likely to continue at a robust level or to
increase for the next decade. National mine action authorities do not seem to be aware of the
magnitude or scope of this demand, or the fact that demining services in support of major
infrastructure work is almost certainly the main contribution of mine action to Mozambique’s
development and to poverty reduction.166
The Review Team also found that planning and implementation procedures relating to
demining support differ significantly across the various government units responsible for
infrastructure programmes. Procedures range from excellent to non-existent. There is
tremendous opportunity to enhance the developmental and poverty-reduction impact of mine
action simply by turning best practice into common practice.
Links between the humanitarian operators and both provincial governors and district
administrators appear for the most part to be adequate and improving. Links between IND and
sub-national administrations remain weaker in general. Decentralisation should have paid
greater dividends in this regard, but the regional offices are hobbled by the failure to delegate
adequate authority. One of these offices is making a good effort at carving-out a useful role
for itself, but the other needs clearer direction and support from IND in Maputo.
Links with the international arena range from excellent (in matters relating to the Convention)
to inadequate (with regard to productive dialogue between the government and the supporting
donor representatives in Mozambique). The GoM has also lent support to regional mine
action initiatives, although it remains unclear whether these will pay dividends for the
participating countries.

166

For example, a recent IND document stated that “Focus has now moved from clearing Roads,
Bridges, Railways and Power Lines to Land release.” IND, 2004, Communication Elements of Plans to
Implement Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention, (marked draft but apparently submitted), p. 1.
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Once again, the international NGOs appear to have good relations with most of their donors.
A concern expressed by donors during the mission was the lack of a regular forum comprising
ADP’s management and the donors providing support to the ADP programme.
Links between the humanitarian operators and the local communities arena have improved
over the years and now appear adequate or better in most cases. Those between IND and local
communities are more hit-and-miss. Again, a problem here has been the failure to followthrough more decisively with the decentralisation effort by delegating appropriate degrees of
authority to regional offices, coupled with clear direction concerning priorities and expected
levels of performance.
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5. Development Management in Mozambique
Linking mine action with development requires that MA managers are aware of how
development planning and economic management is done in a country. What are the main
planning processes? What level of government is responsible for which decisions? What do
MA managers need to do, when, and with whom to ensure (i) they know which government
units will need mine action support in the coming months or years, and (ii) the need for MA
services is properly reflected in the various development plans prepared by the government.167
Mozambique is a poor country, heavily dependent on financial assistance from donors and
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as The World Bank. This greatly complicates
the task of development planning and economic management, in part because there are so
many donors, each with their own views on what the priorities are, each supporting many
projects, and each with their own rules and reporting requirements. In Mozambique, the
international assistance community has been making a concerted effort to harmonise their
procedures, to align assistance more closely with the government’s priorities, and to channel
development financing through the government’s economic management systems.
Mozambique is a hotbed of experimentation on new ‘aid modalities’. The new development
assistance philosophy and aid modalities will have an enormous impact on any aid-dependent
sector, such as mine action.

Constitutional Framework
Separation of Powers
The 1990 Constitution established a republican form of government, with a president (the
head of state) elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term. The president appoints the
prime minister (the head of government) and the other members of the executive branch of
government (the Council of Ministers or cabinet).
The legislature (Assembly of the Republic) is elected at the same time for a five-year term.
The legislature is an independent branch of government. It is intended to exercise oversight of
the executive on behalf of the citizens, principally through the budget cycle. Annually, the
executive is required by law to present its work programme (in Mozambique, the Economic
and Social Programme or PES) and the estimates of the financial resources required to
implement this programme (the “budget estimates”) to the legislature each year for debate and
enactment, following which it becomes the “State Budget” (OE in the Portuguese acronym)
giving the government legal authority to raise finances via taxes, loans, and grants, and to
spend funds for the purposes outlined in the budget. Subsequently, the executive is held to
account through biannual reports on the implementation of the PES plus Quarterly Budget
Reports, and when the report of the Administrative Tribunal (the Supreme Audit Institution in
Mozambique, reporting to the legislature, not the executive) on the government’s annual
financial statements is presented.

167

National development plans are prepared by the central economic management units (budget,
planning, etc.), but development plans are also prepared by sector ministries and (often) by lower
levels of government (currently, 10 provinces and 128 districts, plus 33 autonomous municipalities).
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While the Constitution allows a situation in which the President is from a different party than
the one holding a majority in the Assembly, since independence the majority in the legislature
has always been from the same party as the President. This, coupled with the fact that the
legislature has few resources and little capacity, means the executive branch of government
has great latitude and is not held to account in a meaningful way.
The judiciary is the third branch of government. It has its own exclusive jurisdiction, intended
to ensure the rule of law prevails (i.e., the other branches of government act in accordance
with the law and, ultimately, the Constitution). In practice however, the judiciary has little
independence from the executive as the President appoints the Attorney General and the
President of the Supreme Court, and the actions of the executive are rarely constrained by
judicial oversight.

Decentralisation and Deconcentration168
Constitutionally, Mozambique is a unitary state, with a central government and sub-national
administrations at the provincial and district levels.169 The structure of provincial and district
administrations mirrors that of the central government, albeit with smaller departments. Thus,
most public services are provided through the vertical chain of sector ministries. In a large
and diverse country such as Mozambique, with widely dispersed populations and weak
transport and communications networks, the quality of many public services is highly
dependent on the capacities of sub-national levels of the state to adapt these services to local
needs and conditions – things like road maintenance and public works to support community
development simply cannot be coordinated properly from the centre. Traditionally however,
Mozambique’s government has been very centralised, and to date it has taken only tentative
steps at deconcentration.170
Provincial governors are appointed by the President, holding the status of a cabinet minister,
and are supposed to effect coordination among provincial departments. Such coordination is
difficult because civil servants at the provincial level are appointed by the respective sector
ministers and are expected to follow policies and priorities dictated by the national department
in Maputo, leaving governors and district administrators only nominal authority over the
provincial and district directorates of the central ministries.171 Capacities at the provincial and
(even more so) district levels are weaker than in the central government, as better conditions
of work and promotional opportunities attract the best qualified to Maputo.
Preliminary efforts to stimulate multi-sectoral sector planning at the provincial level were
initiated in 1993 when provincial administrations were required to formulate Triennial Public
Investment Plans (PTIP) for a share of the national investment budget (12 per cent for all
168

This section is based on Annex 3 of World Bank, 2001, Public Expenditure Management Review.
In theory there are elected assemblies at the provincial and district levels. However, the legal basis
for these is not recognised in the 1990 Constitution, and local elections were last held over 20 years
ago. In recent decades, local governments are elected only for municipalities.
170
Deconcentration refers to the delegation of specific responsibilities to lower-level administrations
(i.e. administrative entities not under the authority of a sub-national government of elected officials).
Decentralisation is a broader term, and can also entail devolution of authority to locally elected bodies.
This is being done for municipalities, but as landmine and UXO contamination now has little impact in
urban areas, our focus is restricted to provincial and district administrations.
171
This is the fundamental weakness of the dupla tutela or dual-reporting system inherited from the
Portuguese colonial system.
169
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provinces in 1995, rising to 15 per cent in 1997). This has lost steam with the newer emphasis
on national sector investment programmes formulated in Maputo, often with significant donor
involvement,172 though a number of provinces have continued local planning in the form of
strategic provincial development plans (e.g. Inhambane, where Ireland financed international
and local consultants to assist in formulating the provincial development plan in 2001).
District administrators are appointed by the Ministry for State Administration (MAE). In
March 2000 the Council of Ministers approved the concept of “integrated administration” at
the district level which, inter alia, formalises the structure and roles of Local Councils and
District Consultative Councils (including civil society), but the legal and regulatory
framework and policy guidelines to empower these bodies and the district administrations
have not yet been adopted. A model developed in Nampula province173 is now being
replicated in other Northern provinces with additional finance provided by The World Bank
among others.174 A District Development Fund (DDF) facility has been established to finance
small-scale public investments and micro-projects identified and implemented by
communities themselves.175 Access to the fund depends on better District Development Plans,
giving a strong incentive to administrators to invest more effort in this exercise.
In spite of their limited administrative and fiscal capacities, provincial and (especially) district
administrations should be important partners for the MA programme because they are
responsible for territorial planning (provinces) and territorial administration (districts), as well
as oversight (albeit nominal) of sector departments operating within their territories. In
addition, both governors and district administrators have significant status as local authority
figures, and many have shown significant initiative in resolving problems and disputes within
the communities within their territories.
The responsibilities delegated to provincial and district administrations with respect to land
management are particularly important from the perspective of demining. Outside municipal
areas, should a citizen or community apply for the right of land use and benefit over a specific
parcel, a district administrator must issue an opinion following consultations with the
cadastral service, local communities, and the owners or occupiers of adjoining land (Decree
66/97, article 27). The delegation of authority for authorisations then is:




1,000 hectares or less – authorisation by provincial governors;
between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares – provincial governors issue an opinion and
authorisation is granted by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries;
over 10,000 hectares – the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries issues an opinion and
authorisation is granted by the Council of Ministers.

172

These cover (at least) education, health, agriculture, water, and roads.
Nampula District Planning and Finance Project, supported by UNDP, UNCDF, and the
Netherlands. The pilot effort was in three districts of Nampula, but the model has now been replicated
in the rest of Nampula and most of Cabo Delgado, and has more recently started in 13 districts in
Tete, Zambézia, Sofala, and Manica.
174
The Mozambique Decentralised Planning and Finance Project, with an IDA credit of $30 million.
175
The latter projects are intended to include special programs targeting poor and vulnerable groups,
including victims of mines. We have been unable to ascertain whether any such grants have been
made for this purpose. Funds would be granted to community associations and would require in-kind
counterpart contributions by association members. Implementation could be contracted-out to local
NGOs. (World Bank, 2000, p. 5)
173
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Textbox 13 – Land Law in Mozambique

In 1997 the GoM enacted a new Land Law (No. 19/97) and the following year the Council of
Ministers issued the Land Law Regulations (Decree 66/97). Under article 46 of the 1990
Constitution, all land ownership in Mozambique is vested with the State. However, all
Mozambicans (as well as legally registered foreign corporations) and communities may hold
the right of land use and benefit, through three mechanisms:
•
•
•

occupancy in accordance with customary norms (restricted to Mozambican citizens
and communities);
occupancy in “good faith” (restricted to Mozambican citizens who have occupied land
in good faith for at least 10 years);
formal authorisation by state authorities.

The occupancy rights of communities, and those of citizens with respect to personal dwellings
and “family development” (e.g. households practicing subsistence agriculture) are not subject
to time limit. Rights based on formal authorisation exist for five years in the first instance
(following an initial “provisional authorisation”) and, should a “definitive authorisation” then
be granted, for 50 years (renewable for another 50). Rights over land cannot be sold, but can
be inherited. As well, buildings and other improvements can be sold and, should this happen,
the right of land use and benefit could be transferred.
Source: GoM, 2004, Land Law Legislation, MOZLEGAL, Maputo.

National Economic Management
Effective national economic management is a complex task. Experience suggests it requires at
least the following ‘instruments’:
•
•
•
•

a statement of strategic development choices made by the government of the day,
reflecting its philosophy and vision for the country’s future;
a set of medium-term (three-to-five years) plans that lay-out work programmes at the
national, sector, and area (e.g. provincial; district) levels;
a sound estimate of the resources that will be available over the medium-term – regularly
updated – to aid the government in determining how much it can afford to spend on the
various programmes outlined in its medium-term plans; and
annual work programmes and the budgets (which should be the financial reflection of the
work programme).

Mozambique has all of these, although each instrument has weaknesses and, in many cases,
the links among them remain tenuous. In general, planning is more advanced than
implementation, including financial management, largely because the latter items require
capacity in depth which takes significant time to develop.

Statutory instruments and processes
The GoM is required by legislation to present to the Assembly a number of documents
outlining its priorities and work programmes, together with the estimated costs of these
activities.

76

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

Five-Year Plan
Within 90 days of its inauguration, a new government is required to present a five-year
development plan (the “Government Five Year Programme”) covering its term in office. This
is based principally on the political manifesto of the elected party. In the most recent Five
Year Programme – released after the Review Mission – the new government for the first time
gave significant attention to mine action as a cross-cutting issue. Based on past experience
however, not all the priorities mentioned in Five Year Programme will be reflected in
subsequent annual budgets.
While still not a legal requirement (and never to date subjected to Parliament’s decision), the
PARPA (see below) now serves as the development plan in practical terms and, in a sense,
usurping the role originally foreseen for the Five Year Programme.
Annual Social and Economic Programme (PES)
This is the government’s analysis of the state of the economy and a presentation of
government priorities (both new initiatives and ongoing projects) for the coming year. It is
presented as a complement to the annual budget.176 The GoM does not have the funds to
finance many new initiatives, so the PES still represents more of a wish list than a concrete
plan. Ministers and their departments then try to find donors to make their wishes come true.
State Budget (OE)177
The budget represents the allocations of funds available to the treasury (both the
government’s own revenues and donor support delivered via the budget) to all departments
and public agencies. Budgets cover a one year period (Mozambique follows a 1 January to 31
December fiscal year), but the full budget cycle (formulation-execution-audit) covers three
years, broken as follows:
Time – Budget Cycle Phase
Feb-May yr-1 – Forecasting
May-Sep yr-1 – Formulation

Key Tasks
Develop economic and fiscal forecasts for coming 3 years
Formulate PES & OE (annual estimates for revenues &
expenditures)
-1
Oct-Dec yr – Adoption
Presentation of PES & OE estimates and adoption by
Parliament
Jan-Dec – Execution
Collect revenues, pay for budgeted activities, & account
Yr+1 – Reporting & auditing
Prepare report on budget execution (Relatório de Execução
Orçamental and Balanço do PES or BEP); and prepare the
Consolidated State Accounts (Contra Geral do Estado or
CGE) that are then audited by the Tribunal Administrativo,
which submits the audited accounts to parliament.
Quarterly and Bi-Annual Quarterly cumulative Budget Execution Reports and midReport and Monitoring
year Balanço do PES
176

Formerly, a rolling three-year Public Investment Programme (PTIP) was also prepared and
presented with the budget (the first year of the PTIP would correspond to the capital estimates portion
of the budget). As the functions served by the PTIP are now covered by the annual review of the
PARPA, this is no longer prepared.
177
This section is based on Annex 4 of World Bank, 2001, Public Expenditure Management Review.
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In most countries, the budget is the most important instrument for planning and financial
management: initiatives proposed by ministers and departments will remain simply wishes
unless financial resources are allocated to them through the budget approval process. Of equal
importance, the budget is the principal mechanism through which the legislature can hold an
executive to account. A government is legally required to present its budget each year to the
legislature for debate and approval.178 As well, a country’s Supreme Audit Institution (SAI –
for Mozambique, the Administrative Tribunal) conducts an annual audit to determine whether
the government has spent funds for the approved purposes, as outlined in the budget. The SAI
reports directly to the legislature and not to the government.
Unfortunately, in many aid-dependent countries such as Mozambique, the budget does not
fulfil these fundamental purposes. First, the bulk of funds spent on public services and
investments in Mozambique come from donors rather than the revenues raised by the
government.179 Most donor funds, as well as fees and charges collected by ministries, do not
pass through the Treasury so the government is not in a position to account for them. As well,
the GoM has only an incomplete picture of how much funding donors will provide in the
coming year.180 Thus, the budget does not reflect the governments true work plan and the
government is not in a position to account for most of the expenditures made on its behalf.181
The mechanism through which a legislature can hold the government to account on behalf on
the citizens is significantly flawed.

PARPA
The Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) is Mozambique’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The initial impetus for preparing this was to qualify for
debt reduction under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative,182 which set a
tight deadline given that the guidelines for PRSP preparation called for extensive participation
by civil society and other domestic interest groups, and further consultations with donors and
the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF).183 Thus, the initial draft was prepared
by a small group of technocrats in Maputo, and only then were consultations undertaken with
provincial authorities, private sector associations, civil society, and international partners.

178

Typically, a government has very circumscribed authority to spend public funds without prior
legislative approval.
179
In addition, the budget omits large sums collected directly by ministries (receitas próprias).
180
Various mechanisms exist to facilitate the exchange of information between the GoM and donors,
but actual spending by donors may bear scant relationship to announced plans because of delays in
starting projects, administrative snags, and the possibility of cuts to a donor’s budget for that country.
181
The accounting system is, thus, said to cover only about a quarter of the resources being applied
by government institutions.” (Batley, 2004, p. 9)
182
PRSPs were initially conceived to operationalise the Comprehensive Development Framework
(CDF) principles – holistic, participatory, and country-owned planning focused on achieving poverty
reduction results – advocated by World Bank President James Wolfensohn. Shortly thereafter it was
agreed that countries seeking debt relief under the HIPC initiative had to complete a PRSP.
Mozambique received debt relief of over $2 billion in net present value terms via the HIPC ($1.7 billion
in 1999) and enhanced HIPC ($306 million in 2001) initiatives (IMF, 2004a, footnote 3 on p. 9; p. 36)
183
To qualify for HIPC debt relief, these two institutions also had to approve PRSPs based on the
findings of a Joint Staff Assessment (JSA).
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Further, the HIPC deadlines left insufficient time for modifying the document to fully reflect
the input from the consultative process.184
In spite of these constraints, Mozambique’s PARPA is generally acknowledged to be one of
the better “first-generation” PRSPs produced in sub-Saharan Africa, in part because
significant poverty assessment and analysis work had begun in the mid-1990s. The PARPA
has stimulated a rapidly evolving partnership among the GoM, IFIs, and donors (see below),
and provides the anchor for their joint development agenda. The GoM has also been open to
more sustained consultations with civil society, trade unions, academics, and business
associations, spawning a mechanism called the Poverty Observatory.185

Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF)
A one-year planning horizon is inadequate for determining how to re-allocate financial
resources to better align with government priorities, and for determining the future
implications of new initiatives. A MTFF is an attempt to link medium-term (three-year)
forecasts of financial resources with medium-term plans for sector expenditures. Mozambique
produced its first MTFF186 in 1998. However, Mozambique’s MTFF has not yet proved to be
a valuable tool for national economic management, in large part because of the same
problems that afflict the budget. Conceptually, the MTFF should serve as the financial
reflection of the PARPA but, as actual events evolved, the first attempts at producing the
MTFF predated the PARPA. In addition, the MTFF is not a legislative requirement, and at
least some in the government feel there is little reason to devote considerable effort on
improving the MTFF process.187

Sector Planning
Truly worthwhile national development plans and budgets can only be based on wellconceived sector plans (see Textbox 14 – The Missing Middle in Poverty Reduction). In nonaid receiving countries, sector ministries have a strong incentive to develop sound plans – if
they do not, they will not obtain adequate financial allocations through the annual budget
process and, increasingly, the MTFF.
Motivations are very different in heavily aid dependent countries as the national budget often
covers only staff salaries and modest amounts for non-salary recurrent expenditures. In such
cases, ministers may, quite understandably, avoid serious struggles with their cabinet
colleagues over budget allocations (which can make political enemies), preferring instead to
devote their energies in seeking donor funds. Of course, donors have their individual agendas,
and ministers in desperate need of funds are unlikely to turn away any donor proposal, even if
it does not fit into the government’s vision for the sector or address what the government feels
the priorities should be. In aid dependent countries, many sectoral ministries lack any
184

See de Sousa, 2002. On modifications that were made, see IMF and IDA, 2001. For more general
critiques of first generation PRSPs, see Stewart and Wang, 2003, and Oxfam, 2004.
185
This in turn stimulated greater efforts by civil society organizations represented in the Poverty
Observatory to form a poverty monitoring network called G-20.
186
Termed the CFMP – the acronym for Cenário Fiscal de Médio Prazo or Medium Term Fiscal
Scenario.
187
In fact it has not been even discussed or approved by the Cabinet. It has mainly remained an
exercise of technocrats within MPF with their IMF counterparts.
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officially endorsed strategy, while for others the strategy is written in such broad terms that
there is no discernable focus (thus ensuring that any donor-funded project will ‘fit’ the
strategy).
In Mozambique’s case, sector work programmes are often “a mosaic of programs based on
different philosophies, of differing quality, and with widely differing cost structures…”
(World Bank, 2003b, p. iv) Without sound sector strategies, the national development plans,
annual work programmes, and budgets will almost certainly be deficient as well.
Textbox 14 – The Missing Middle in Poverty Reduction

Many observers focus on the national or macro level in development – the need to keep the
key macroeconomic indicators such as the budget deficit, trade balance, and inflation rate at
reasonable levels. Others focus on micro “grassroots” development at the community level,
often through self-help measures. While getting the big pieces right and enhancing the ability
of communities to address their own problems are both vital, there are also the in-between or
meso issues including sound sectoral development plans and the need for infrastructure such
as road and communication networks to connect the micro communities to the macro national
market. Some recent work has tried to overcome that omission.
For example, a recent paper submitted to the Development Committee (the ministers, mostly
from industrialised countries, who sit of the Boards of Governors of both the World Bank and
the IMF) outlines a number of channels through which reliable and cost-effective provision of
infrastructure services promote the achievement of the MDG goals, including:
•
•
•

By stimulating economic growth which in turn lifts people out of poverty;
By increasing the welfare of poor households, who often have to pay significant sums for
poor substitutes in the absence of basic services such as water and power; and
By assisting in the provision of basic education and health services, which add to “human
capital” – often the only asset poor people may have.
(Development Committee, 2003)

The paper concluded that many poverty reduction strategies do not fully account for the
importance of infrastructure investments. In a similar vein, a report on the challenges facing
“second generation” poverty reduction strategies (PRS) notes that sector ministries have not
been actively engaged in most PRS processes to date – a trend reinforced by the actions of
many donors to deal directly with the sector ministries responsible for the donor’s priorities.
Given the focus that many donors now have on poverty reduction and high-profile issues such
as HIV/AIDS and primary education, these typically are the social sector ministries, leaving
the productive sectors such as agriculture under-funded, reducing growth and, hence, poverty
reduction. (ODI, 2004)
The simple fact is that achieving sustainable growth and poverty reduction on a national level
is a very complex task. It requires macroeconomic growth. It needs to draw upon the energy
of people in their own communities, who will always and everywhere be the primary engine
of development. But success and sustainability at both the macro and micro levels is based
largely on what happens in the middle.
This message is particularly relevant for mine action. The greatest contributions mine action
is making to Mozambique’s development is in this middle zone: promoting infrastructure
development and supporting the sector plans of ministries.
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Aid Coordination and Management
It has long been recognised that the existing systems for planning and delivering international
assistance are flawed in many ways, including:


Fragmentation – too many assistance agencies supporting too many distinct projects in a
country, each with different management arrangements and reporting requirements, raise
transaction costs188 significantly and can overwhelm the capacities of governments in
recipient states;



Proliferation – the tendency of donor agencies to operate in too many sectors and in too
many countries means they cannot build and maintain sufficient expertise and knowledge
of local conditions to design good projects, and often cannot maintain even the
administrative continuity necessary for proper oversight of project implementation;



Lack of predictability – financial disbursements by donors often bear scant relationship to
their announced commitments due to administrative snags, disagreements with recipients
over implementation progress, etc., making it impossible for national economic managers
to predict aid flows or manage their own financial resources effectively;



Lack of transparency – donor domination of the development agenda means local officials
cannot be held to account in a meaningful way by their own legislatures and citizens; and



Incoherence – different arms of donor governments (e.g. the official development agency
versus the export promotion agency versus the diplomatic wing) have different objectives
vis-à-vis developing countries, and these different objectives can be in conflict.

At best these systemic problems raise costs and reduce the positive impact of aid; at worst
they can contribute to “institutional destruction” and even state collapse.189

New thinking
Because of these recognised shortcomings, many in the international assistance community
have advocated a thorough re-vamping of aid system. In broad terms, there is an emerging
consensus that aid should focus on poverty reduction and the aid system should be
restructured so the country is “in the driver’s seat” in terms of setting priorities and policies
based on a “holistic perspective” and informed by stakeholder participation. Whenever
possible, assistance should be delivered through the recipient government’s own systems,
both to keep it in the driver’s seat and to move toward the long-term goal that governments
should be accountable first and foremost to their own citizens.
This new thinking underpins the new fashion for Poverty Reduction Strategies, and the
PARPA has become the lynchpin for development dialogue in Mozambique. However,
implementing this new approach will require reforms to the donor-side of the development
dialogue as well; in short, better “donorship”. This has spawned a number of initiatives on

188

The costs of negotiating, administering, monitoring, and enforcing agreements.
These problems have been well known for over 20 years. See Morss (1984) on ‘institutional
destruction’ caused by project proliferation for an analysis that could have been written yesterday.
189
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harmonisation of donor practices, good humanitarian donorship, limitations on tied-aid,
linking relief and development, and many more.190

New modalities
The new consensus is to focus on poverty with the government’s own Poverty Reduction
Strategy setting the agenda, while recognising that individual donor agencies need to reform
their own practices. But in practical terms within a single country, how do donors improve
coordination among themselves and with senior policy makers in the recipient government? A
number of “aid modalities” are being tried to improve both policy dialogue and the delivery of
aid. The main categories are:


Pooled or basket funding, through which a group of donors working in the same field
agree to combine their resources, rather than each administering its own programme. The
principal aim is to reduce transaction costs for the developing country. This is not a new
concept and, within the mine action field, pooled funding arrangements have long been
common. UN trust funds for mine action are, essentially, pooled funding arrangements.



Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) are designed to formulate a single, governmentadopted strategy for a sector (e.g. Health, Education, Agriculture, etc.), which all donors
then agree to support with whatever delivery mechanisms are available to them: for
example, some donor members of a SWAp will still finance distinct projects while others
will move to non-project or “programme” aid. The intent is to enhance both (i) coherence
and (ii) co-ordination in implementing the strategy, and (iii) to reduce transaction costs by
establishing a single monitoring, evaluation, and research agenda.



Direct budget support, through which a group of donors who accept the recipient
government is broadly committed to sound policies aimed at poverty reduction, agrees to
channel some assistance through the government treasury, without earmarking these funds
for a specific purpose. The government thus is able to allocate donor funds through its
own expenditure management system, in line with its own priorities. In exchange, the
donor group typically requests an enhanced dialogue with the government,191 and
agreement on how to monitor government expenditures (i.e. to ensure the extra funds are
going to public services and investments to reduce poverty rather than, say, to defence).

These different modalities can be used in combination. For example, some donors may agree
to pooled funding within a sector once a SWAp has be agreed with the government.

Key issues for Mozambique
The relationship between the GoM and the donor/IFI community has evolved rapidly since
the General Peace Agreement. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, donors dramatically
increased their assistance to meet the country’s many and urgent needs. However, government
capacity was very weak and it was unable to take the lead on the development agenda. By the
mid-1990s however, the government’s commitment to peace and development was widely
acknowledged and many donors provided encouragement and additional support to the
planning units in both the Ministry of Planning and Finance and the sector ministries to enable
190
191

Similar initiatives are brewing within the international NGO community.
Generally this type of dialogue emerges in the process of negotiating a shift to budget support.
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the government to engage more actively in formulating the country’s development strategies
at the macro and sectoral levels.
This support has paid many dividends, initially in the form of SWAps covering a number of
sectors (Health, Education, Agriculture, etc.) or sub-sectors (Roads, Water, etc.). This does
not mean there were not significant problems along the way. In the Roads sub-sector for
instance, the consensus assessment of the first efforts at implementing a more coordinated,
government-led approach was negative, in part because of poor coordination among the
principal donors. (Montes et al., 2000, p. 44) The Roads sub-sector appears to be far better
managed today, but this is the culmination of many years of support by donors. The Health
SWAp is another example of the time and effort required on the part of progressive elements
among donors and within the GoM to put the first generation of SWAps in place.192
Textbox 15 – The evolution of a SWAp

An evaluation of the EC Country Strategy for Mozambique summarised the evolution of the
SWAp for Health as follows:
“A sector approach in the health sector has been developing for a number of years, but
progress has been slow and competition between donors is reported to have been high. A
1997 assessment argued that the donor working group was ‘large and heterogeneous, more
suitable for discussion than joint action’.
Milestones in the development of the sector approach include:
• 1995 Joint Govt/donor audits of MoH finances
• 1996 Donor coordination group began
• 1996 Joint donor pool for drugs and TA…
• 1998 Govt/donor Health Sector Coordination Committee formed, to begin SWAP process,
and MoH established Technical Support Unit for Strategic Planning…
• June 1999 joint Govt/donor meeting to build consensus on movement towards SWAP…
• May 2000 Code of Conduct signed by most donors, calling for common procedures,
national pay rates, transparency, gradual move towards budget support, etc.
A recent WHO report highlighted a number of significant constraints which remain:
• Insufficient consensus within MoH…
• Difficulties in MoH/donor relations. Some resistance from the MoH to the close control
required by some donors.
• Limited capacity within MoH, particularly in strategic planning and in managerial
capacity at provincial level.
• Disagreements between donors, particularly in assessments of capacity and commitment
of MoH.
• Limited coordination of the activities of non-State actors.”
Source: Montes et al, 2000, p. 46.

By 2000, momentum had also emerged for a more radical shift to budget support. From an
initial group of four donors, the budget support group grew to seven donors by the end of
2000, 14 by 2004, and currently numbers 16 (referring to itself as the G-16 Programme Aid
192

One of the avowed objectives of the new aid modalities is to reduce transaction costs. This may be
a final outcome, but transaction costs increase during the transition from “old aid” to the new modality.
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Partners or PAPs). This group and the GoM have agreed to a set of mutual obligations – a
performance assessment framework (PAF) for monitoring government performance193 and
commitments by donors concerning the delivery of programme aid (see Textbox 16 –
Commitments by Programme Aid Partners
Textbox 16 – Commitments by Programme Aid Partners

Article 13 in the Memorandum of Understanding between the GoM and PAPs states:
PAPs are committed to providing Programme Aid in a way that
• Is aligned with Mozambican instruments, processes and systems of financial management,
including: (1) Providing assistance for and undertaking dialogue around the PARPA,
PES, priority aspects of the PES set out in the PAF, the CFMP and the OE. (2) Using
government processes and documentation. (3) Following the government cycle for
planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting and funding.
• Increases the predictability of the flow of donor funds, including by making multi-year
agreements on programme aid, providing GoM with information on Programme Aid
commitments in time for the information to be used in policy and budget planning, linking
response mechanisms to agreed, realistic targets and indicators, disbursing according to
the agreed disbursement schedule and not interrupting in-year disbursement, unless
underlying principles are violated.
• Ensuring transparency of conditions and funding.
• Improving harmonisation by eliminating bilateral conditions and bilateral administrative
and reporting requirements (as far as possible given existing legal and statutory
requirements, which should be reduced over time).
• Lessens the administrative burden of their assistance on GoM by increasingly mounting
joint missions, undertaking joint analysis, using joint procedures and by reducing the
number of visits and overlapping activities;
• Enhances the capacity of the GoM to meet its commitments by providing appropriate
technical assistance and capacity building.
Taken from Gerster and Harding, 2004, p. 7.

One of the implications of the push to general budget support is a realignment of influence
within both the donor community and the government. The PAPs in G-16 now have enhanced
policy dialogue with senior government officials, marginalising at least some of the donors
who cannot or choose not to shift to budget support.194 On the other side, the Ministry of
Planning and Finance has become more powerful within the government, in part because its
senior officials are the main interlocutors with the G-16, and in part because budget support
puts more resources through the government treasury for allocation through the budget
process, rather than directly into sectors. Yet weaknesses of MPF management of the budget
cycle do not make it a clear winner, and the newly-announced split of MPF into separate
ministries for Finance and Planning may lead to the recovery of lost power by line ministries.
193

There are two main parts to the PAF; one dealing with progress toward Mozambique’s Millennium
Development targets and the other with “process indicators” for tracking progress in implementing key
reforms agreed through policy dialogue on such items as financial management, decentralisation, and
legal sector reform. One of the government’s objectives is to tighten the link between the PAF and the
social and economic priorities outlined annually in the PES.
194
However, the non-PAPs include some big donors such as the United States, which may be
substantially increasing its aid to Mozambique, and Japan. These are likely to wield significant
influence, at least in certain sectors.
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Summary
Linking mine action with development requires that MA managers are aware of how
development planning and management is done in a country. What are the main planning
processes? What level of government is responsible for which decisions? What do managers
need to do, when, and with whom to ensure (i) they know what government units will need
mine action support in the coming months or years, and (ii) the need for MA services is
properly reflected in the various development plans and budgets prepared by the government.
Mozambique is a poor country, heavily dependent on financial assistance from donors and
IFIs. Senior officials in the mine action programme also need to be aware of how the
international assistance community operates in their country if they expect to be able to
explain mine action achievements in ways that speak to donors’ priorities.
The international community assisting Mozambique is also experimenting with new ways of
working together and with the government. The way aid is managed is changing dramatically,
and managers in any aid-dependent sector need to stay informed if they hope to get the
resources they require.
To date, mine action managers do not appear to be well informed concerning these three
fundamental questions: (i) how does the government arena work? (ii) how does the
international assistance arena work inside Mozambique? and (iii) how do the two arenas work
together? As a result, the landmine issue is missing from the PARPA and the State Budget.
In addition, national mine action managers seem not to have thought strategically about how
to engage more successfully with these two arenas. There is no evidence of outreach to
government units that should be allies of the mine action programme, to prepare a compelling
case to the core national economic management units for more government resources. There
is little evidence that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IND have sought to strengthen
partnerships with mine action donors inside Mozambique, which stands in stark contrast to
the strategic and successful approach taken on the international stage with respect to the
Ottawa process.
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6. Assessment of Current Status
Socio-economic impacts
Humanitarian
The direct humanitarian impact of contamination has been greatly reduced over the past
decade, in large part because the resettlement of people in their rural communities is complete
and local residents generally are aware of local hazards and how to avoid these. As well,
clearing access to essential community assets is almost complete in many regions, and is well
advanced in others. However, even after these priority clearance tasks are concluded, there
will remain a residual risk due principally to:
•
•
•

Continuing population movements (e.g. people re-locating communities because of
depleted soil fertility, drying-up of shallow wells, migration to roadside sites, etc.);
Expansion of the economic “footprints” of established communities due to population
pressure, depletion of common pool resources in the immediate area, and expansion of
economic activities resulting from better access to markets; and
Increased presence of outsiders (traders, etc.) as access roads reach remote communities.

As well, community development projects could pose ‘life-and-limb’ risks to both project
workers and local populations (e.g., excavation work exposing buried landmines and UXO).
Finally, should conflict erupt in a neighbouring country, minefields near the borders and in
remote areas could pose humanitarian hazards to refugees entering Mozambique.
As noted earlier, deminers may also impose additional humanitarian risks on local
communities: directly by spreading HIV/AIDS and STDs; indirectly by improving
transportation to remote communities and, hence, exposing them to vectors of infection.

Reconstruction
In spite of the extensive demining efforts, landmine and UXO contamination still imposes
constraints on the continuing reconstruction effort. The scope of this problem remains
significant for investments in the rehabilitation or reconstruction of secondary and tertiary
roads, railway lines, power distribution grids, etc. because this type of infrastructure was
extensively mined during the conflicts. For the most part this is more of a cost than a safety
issue, and this cost burden would be reduced if the contamination and clearance records were
more complete and accurate.
In some cases at least, the contamination hazards are being addressed by issuing commercial
contracts for demining support, with the costs borne by the infrastructure project. This is the
most appropriate manner for financing the necessary work as the priorities are reasonably well
defined and the work can be monitored by those with a strong incentive for ensuring the
efficiency and quality of the demining services.195
195

For national roads and for the electricity grid, prime contractors are required to include demining
sub-contractors (and, sometimes, an external QA firm) in their bid and bear two main risks: (i) liability
should a worker or civilian suffer an accident on land demined by the sub-contractor, and (ii) cost
overruns due to delays should explosive devices be discovered after mobilising the road construction
assets. Regardless of how the prime contractor manages the first type of risk (e.g. by requiring the
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Development
The evidence suggests that landmine and UXO contamination is not a significant problem in
forests and other areas which have not yet been exploited for natural resources or settlements.
For investments in new infrastructure, therefore, the constraints imposed by suspected
contamination will arise mainly when the construction works approach existing infrastructure
and settlements. Still, this would include significant areas which are now listed in IMSMA as
suspect. As the focus for the infrastructure sectors remains on rehabilitation, a concerted effort
by the MA programme in verification surveys to reduce the suspected hazardous areas and a
general clean-up of IMSMA data is likely to pay significant dividends once the national
development agenda turns to investments in new infrastructure. Should IMSMA records be
more reliable, the payoff will be in two forms:
•
•

Cost avoidance, as many infrastructure investments can be re-routed during the design
phase to avoid confirmed hazards and the requisite clearance costs; and
Cost reduction, as expensive demining support services can be more tightly targeted on
the areas which are, in fact, contaminated.

Once again, the most appropriate way for large physical development projects to address the
landmine and UXO hazard is by internalising the costs within the project budget. When such
investments are privately financed, there may be a case for public subsidies or at least for the
government to contract directly for external QA services (see Textbox 17 – Public and Private
Investments). As well, for reasons of enforcement and other transaction costs, there remains a
good case for central financing of demining services in support of small-scale community
development investments. Funds could be provided through government’s own revenues,
general budget support, or a pooled funding arrangement.
Textbox 17 – Public and Private Investments

The most appropriate way to finance demining in support of large public investments in
infrastructure and other physical facilities will generally be to include the cost in the project
budget and have the prime contractor assume responsibility for the work. For private
investments however, where the removal of hazards will provide broader public goods (i.e.
safety and public access, or to promote regional development objectives) that cannot be
captured by private investors, there is a proper case for public subsidies, either to: (i)
reimburse the private investor for at least part of the actual and reasonable demining costs, or
(ii) by government provision of the demining services.
There are some complex policy issues at play in such decisions. For example, a private
investor may not have an incentive to ensure clearance or permanent marking of sites adjacent
to access roads required for an investment (say to a logging concession). In this case, the
government should probably contract directly for external QA to ensure safety standards are
enforced and, perhaps, also subsidise a portion of the demining itself.
Mozambique’s investment promotion agency should be asked to study the options and
prepare policy guidelines for consideration by the GoM.

sub-contractor and QA firm to carry site liability insurance), the financial implications of the second risk
could amount to tens-of-thousands of dollars per day. This is ample incentive to closely monitor the
work of the demining sub-contractor.
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The findings from the Review Team’s quick survey of a few government units and parastatal
bodies yield the following estimates for the medium-term demand for demining services in
support of infrastructure reconstruction and development:
Work program
$millions/year
$170
$30*
$31
$200
$5***

Estimated for
demining
2%-5%
5%-10%**
2%-5%
2%-5%
2%-5%

Projected demining costs/year
Low
High
$3.40
$8.50
National Roads
$1.50
$3.00
Electricity
$0.61
$1.53
Railways
$4.00
$10.00
Water
$0.10
$0.25
Small Irrigation
Total (in millions)
$9.61
$23.28
* Rough estimate for rural distribution network only; ** includes brush clearance; *** four provinces
only

Of course, it would be inappropriate to treat these projections as anything more that
suggestive, but clearly they do suggest the market for demining services will be robust over
the next decade, and that demining for infrastructure investments – rather than “humanitarian”
demining – will constitute mine action’s major contribution to improving the wellbeing of
Mozambicans.

Extent of Contamination
It is important to preface this section by stating clearly that Mozambique will not be able to
clear all landmine contamination within a foreseeable period of time, let alone by the deadline
imposed by the Mine Ban Treaty. ‘Mine free’ status is not a meaningful target in any practical
sense, even with substantial increases in resources. Conversely, ‘mine impact free’ is a
meaningful and worthwhile target.
One of the shortcomings of the MA programme has been its failure to paint a clear picture of
the extent of contamination; this more than three years after the delivery of the LIS results and
eleven years after the start of the programme. The most recent figures from IND at the time of
the Review Mission196 showed some 246 km2 of suspect hazardous area (SHA) – a 56 per
cent reduction from the 558 km2 figure generated by the LIS but still a daunting figure given
total clearance of about seven km2 in 2003. All operators (and the IND itself) are confident
that the current IND figures still overstate the true extent of contamination, but what might be
a realistic figure?
Further analysis clearly shows that virtually the entire reduction in the SHA estimate is from
the region covered by HALO Trust. Using IND figures to compare HALO areas versus the
rest of the country gives the following picture. A combination of resurvey and clearance
(mostly the former) has allowed HALO to reduce the SHA in the four Northern provinces by
79 per cent, while the SHA has declined by only nine per cent in the rest of the country.

196

IND subsequently has released its Annual Report for 2004 which shows about 172 km2 of SHA
rather than the 246 km2 stated here. We have not updated this section to reflect this new SHA
estimate as the Annual Report does not contain the detailed figures required for the analysis which
follows. The principal results of the analysis are not affected by the updated estimate from IND.
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Figure 18 – Reduction in Suspected Contamination (IND data)
400
350

square km

300
250
200
2001
150

2004

100
50
0
HALO

Other

Further, a province-by-province breakdown of the data makes it clear that IND has not yet
entered all of HALO’s re-survey data, and its current figure still overstates the SHA in the
four Northern provinces by a wide margin. IND current data suggest that HALO has reduced
the SHA in Cabo Delgado and Nampula by 98 per cent and 95 per cent respectively, but only
by 85 per cent in Niassa and 28 per cent in Zambézia. Thus, the SHA figure for the Northern
provinces would be far smaller but for the fact that IND has not entered HALO “cancellation”
reports for all provinces into IMSMA on a timely basis.
Figure 19 – SHAs in Northern Provinces (IND data)
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Accordingly, the Review Team obtained HALO Trust’s data on its latest estimates of SHA,
and the following picture emerges (using HALO data for the North, and IND data for the rest
of the country). HALO claims to have reduced the SHA by almost 99 per cent through a
combination of re-surveying SHA and clearing those confirmed hazards that are now
impacting people in these four provinces.
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Figure 20 – Reduction in SHA (HALO Trust data)
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HALO Trust’s resurvey work has not been subject to external assessment (indeed, IND does
not have the capacity to perform such QA), and the Review Team only had time to visit a few
sites and check a small sample of HALO Trust’s records. From this limited review, HALO’s
approach appears reasonable, and the records it generates provide a far more accurate picture
of the extent of contamination than the LIS figures.197 We are confident that, if re-surveying
was pursued systematically in other parts of Mozambique, the area estimates of SHA in those
regions would fall dramatically – conceivably by 90 per cent or more from the initial figures
generated by the LIS. This suggests the true state of contamination nationally might be as
little as 25 km2 or even less.198
It is vital to emphasise that we are not advancing the figure of 25 km2 as an estimate of the
true contamination. Indeed, the state of the clearance and survey data makes it impossible to
put forward an estimate for the contaminated area with confidence. Rather, the ten-fold
difference between the most recent figure issued by IND and the seemingly plausible figure of
25 km2 serves as a measure of our ignorance, and emphasises the importance of lessening this
ignorance. In a later chapter we recommend that IND and the non-commercial operators agree
upon a systematic re-survey programme, with nationwide coverage, to address this important
deficiency. However, there remain some questions concerning both the aims and the specific
methods for such a re-survey. Ideally, such an effort would provide a clearer picture of both:
•
•

The boundaries of each SHA;
The socio-economic impact of each SHA and the likelihood that clearance will
generate immediate socio-economic benefits to deserving beneficiaries.

HALO Trust re-survey methodology appears to provide more complete reduction and
demarcation of SHA, but the Task Impact Assessment approach employed by NPA seems
superior for assessing the socio-economic implications and, hence, for establishing priority

197

Once again, the LIS conducted in Mozambique was not designed to generate accurate estimates
of the area suspected of contamination; it was designed to identify the most impacted communities.
198
ADP states that it also conducted a re-survey in the three Southern provinces, where it now
estimates the SHA is about 19 km2 – only 16 per cent of the figure given by IND as of October 2004,
as IND has not entered the new ADP records into IMSMA. The Review Team was not provided with
the ADP resurvey data.
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rankings for clearance. The two approaches are complementary and it should be feasible to
combine both in one re-survey effort, whether with a “hazards” or a “communities” focus.
HALO Trust does not differentiate their costs of survey per se, as this activity is part of an
integrated approach, which includes task planning in the event an SHA is identified.
Although the HALO re-survey methodology and the NPA’s TIA does entail some resources,
it seems clear that the returns in terms of enhanced understanding of the contamination
problem more than balance the additional costs.

Treaty perspective
The Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines was negotiated to advance
multiple objectives. Obviously, humanitarian concerns – particularly for innocent civilians –
loomed large. In addition however, the Convention promotes the overall disarmament agenda
and, even more broadly, the effort by many countries to construct an international system in
which the rule of law prevails to constrain the unbridled pursuit of national interests. Thus,
proponents of the Convention advocate strict adherence to its obligations even where such
actions do not serve any immediate humanitarian or developmental purpose.
Article 5 of the Convention obliges mine-affected states to:199
•
•
•

Make every effort to identify all areas in its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel
mines are known or suspected to be emplaced (i.e. mined areas) and
Ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other
means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians… (paragraph 2)
Destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into
force of this Convention for that State Party.200 (paragraph 1)

The Convention does not require a State Party to certify that it is mine free – only that it has
made “every effort” to identify, mark, and clear mined areas. As well, paragraph 3 of Article
5 makes provision for a State Party to request an extension of up to ten years for clearing the
minefields identified.201
An additional factor when considering the implication of a request for extension: the
Convention imposes an absolute obligation on a State Party not to use anti-personnel
landmines. Leaving defensive minefields in place along borders would probably be
considered “use”.
Three other points should be considered at this juncture:

199

These are re-ordered to reflect the logical operational sequence.
For Mozambique, the deadline is 1 March 2009.
201
Paragraph 4 of Article 5 outlines the information that should accompany a request for extension,
which includes “the preparation and status of work conducted under the national demining
programs…[and]…”the financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of
all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas”.
200
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•
•
•

no State Party has yet requested an extension for the deadline on clearance and, as it was
one of the first countries to ratify the Convention, such a request by Mozambique would
set a precedent (as would the subsequent decision by the States Parties);
Mozambique has played an active role within the international mine action community,
including hosting the first Meeting of States Parties in 1999;
the regional security and disarmament dimension.

The Convention also enjoins States Parties which are in a position to do so to provide
financial and technical aid to mine-affected States Parties, assisting the latter in meeting their
obligations. As these obligations extend beyond demining for the promotion of immediate
humanitarian, reconstruction, and development aims, Mozambique has a right to request
further assistance and wealthier States Parties have a duty to at least consider such a request.
It is beyond the mandate of the Review Team to untangle this skein. Suffice to say that the
promotion of the aims of the Convention entails broad foreign policy considerations for both
Mozambique and the other States Parties. As there are no practical means for attaining mine
free status, even for the contamination already identified:
•
•
•
•
•

the GoM will need to request an extension;
there exists a legal obligation on other States Parties to consider the request;
assuming the GoM also requests further financial and technical assistance, there exists a
moral obligation on other States Parties to at least consider this request;
issues such as disarmament, regional security, and the likely precedent-setting nature of
the decisions will be part of the deliberations; and
consideration will be given to Mozambique’s development priorities from a “practical”
perspective, but this may not be the decisive factor in donor capitals when arriving at a
decision.

Summary
It is clear that the need for mine action in Mozambique should no longer be viewed
principally as a response to a humanitarian crisis. Accident and victim numbers are down and
the remaining contamination, while not yet fully defined, is manageable. However, it would
be entirely wrong to conclude that the need for certain mine action services, particularly for
demining, will fall precipitously or (perhaps) at all.
First, “impact free” should not be understood purely as a static concept. A residual threat will
remain after the planned departure of the international demining NGOs. Economies and
societies are dynamic, particularly in countries such as Mozambique where the economic and
population growth rates are so high. These forms of growth cause a rapid expansion in the
economic and resource-use “footprints” of communities, particularly in rural areas of
countries such as Mozambique where land-extensive agriculture predominates. Residual
threats will emerge over time as clear and present dangers that need to be addressed.
Second, government, donors, and development banks are making substantial investments into
infrastructure networks. Many infrastructure projects require demining services, particularly
when the investment is designed to reconstruct existing infrastructure, which was heavily
targeted by both factions during the last phase of the civil wars.
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Third, Mozambique still has obligations as a State Party to the Convention. The attainment of
mine impact free status by the end of 2006 would represent an enormous achievement, but the
Convention sets an even more ambitious goal of mine free. This will not be achieved in the
foreseeable future, and Mozambique will need to request an extension. Further, the continued
existence of barrier minefields on some of Mozambique’s borders is of particular concern
given the absolute prohibition on the further use of landmines by States Parties.
Given its high profile in the Ottawa process, and as one of those in the first cohort of mine
affected states to be faced with the prospect of requesting an extension, Mozambique bears a
particular responsibility for upholding the aspirations of the Convention. Other States Parties
may be expected to give close consideration to a responsible request from Mozambique for
assistance in support of a responsible plan for meeting its international obligations, even
beyond the country’s immediate developmental and humanitarian requirements.
The Review Team has characterised Mozambique’s remaining mine action challenges as
manageable. It must be stressed that “manageable” problems must be managed. Failure to do
so would threaten to squander the important achievements made to date, and impose an
unnecessary constraint on Mozambique’s development and poverty reduction efforts.
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7. Responding to the Remaining Challenge
This Chapter analyses the nature of the remaining challenges – those apparent today and those
likely to emerge in the future due to residual contamination. It also outlines solutions where
these are feasible given the current institutional make-up of the mine action programme (i.e.
the programme structure plus the legal and regulatory framework in place). There are some
unresolved problems, in the sense that there are no readily apparent solution given the current
institutional make-up of the mine action programme. Thus, a credible solution will require
enhancements to the structure of the mine action programme plus its legal and regulatory
framework, which is the subject of the next chapter.202

The Different Challenges and Solutions
The humanitarian and development challenges posed by the remaining contamination can be
classified as shown in the following table. For practical purposes, the dividing line between
short-term and future would be the end of 2006, when the international NGOs plan to depart.
In addition there may be additional requirements relating to compliance with the Convention
(see Textbox 18 – The Convention’s provision against the use of landmines).
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the political systems of some states within Southern
Africa will be able to accommodate ethnic and other domestic social tensions, and it remains
conceivable that internal conflict could again erupt in the region. This could result in an
exodus of refugees into Mozambique, perhaps to sparsely populated areas with landmine
contamination that now has little socio-economic impact. Thus, there are reasons to maintain
certain mine action capacities within Mozambique as a disaster preparedness measure.

3. Humanitarian

4. Development

Big Task

Future: no current impact

2. Development

NGOs & ADP
clearing with grant
funding

Best practice
(clearance by
commercials financed
by project budget) in
some but not all sub203
sectors

Many options for
clearance of
emergent hazards
(but how to finance?)

Clearance should be
via commercial
tender & financed by
project budget

Small Task

Short-term: impacts now exist
1. Humanitarian

NGOs & ADP
clearing with grant
funding

Various
arrangements but
with some important
204
gaps

“Fire brigades”
needed to handle
residual risks (but
how to manage and
finance?)

Clearance should be
via commercial
tender & financed via
government systems

202

In that chapter, recommendations are made to re-structure the mine action programme
architecture. As a result, the roles now assigned to the IND may be separated into two distinct organs:
a Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA) and a Mozambican Mine Action Centre (M-MAC).
Therefore in the following sections, references to IND may have to be modified in future to M-MAA or
M-MAC as appropriate.
203
For example, the Water Directorate requests IND to arrange both clearance and financing of
clearance – a distinctly second-best approach. Best practice should be made national policy.
204
For example, small-scale irrigation works.
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A complete solution to any of the challenges noted in the table requires clarity on the
following components:
•
•
•

Demand – Who is identifying the task that needs to be done? How clearly is the task
defined? How much demand for demining services exists?
Supply – How should a task be assigned to an operator (e.g. competitive tender; ask the
humanitarian operator in that region to do it)? How to match supply with demand?
Financing – Who should pay? What kind of instrument should be used (e.g. contract;
grant agreement with a not-for-profit)? How does the financing organisation determine the
work has been done to high standard?

Demand, supply, and financing issues are discussed column-by-column in the next sections.
In some cases, particularly relating to the future challenges, one or more of these components
of a solution remain a matter of conjecture because an adequate solution would require
changes to the institutional make-up of the programme. These uncertainties are noted, along
with some discussion of the factors that will need to be considered to settle on a solution.
However, these are strategic issues and it is premature to define a specific solution for one
strategic issue in isolation of the others. What is required is to identify the main strategic
issues and to formulate a new strategy for the national mine action programme. Accordingly,
the next chapter re-visits these unresolved challenges as part of the discussion on what an
adequate strategy needs to incorporate and the process toward the formulation of a new
strategy – a Road Map.
Textbox 18 – The Convention’s provision against the use of landmines

It is clear the Convention places an absolute restriction on the use of anti-personnel landmines
by States Parties. Of course, a traditional use of landmines has been for passive defence –
barrier minefields to dissuade incursions by enemy forces. Indeed, large barrier minefields
were laid by the Portuguese along the border to Tanzania, and subsequently by FRELIMO
along the borders of, first, Zimbabwe and subsequently South Africa when those countries’
regimes were supporting RENAMO.
It is unclear the degree to which these minefields presently represent a major humanitarian
problem or a constraint on development.* But even if they are not, their existence along the
borders could be considered continued use of anti-personnel landmines by the Mozambican
authorities. If so, Mozambique has an obligation to clear them as soon as possible, and no
later than 2009.
In addition, should internal conflict erupt in one of Mozambique’s neighbours, there could be
large and sudden movements of refugees into Mozambique. Border minefields could quickly
emerge as a major humanitarian issue. Assessments of the socio-economic impact of such
minefields should incorporate a disaster preparedness component.
From discussions held between the team and government representatives (including FADM)
in both Maputo and the provinces, there was no indication of any desire to maintain these
minefields and, certainly, the FADM representatives appeared keen to assume some of the
burden of clearing these areas.
* The LIS did not show any border communities as heavily impacted; however, Review Team
members were advised by one informant that the minefields on the Northern border are a significant
concern for the Makonde people. As well, there may have been forced population displacements
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involved in which case the Review Team believes strongly that the border minefields represent both
humanitarian and development problems.

Column 1: Existing Humanitarian Impacts
Both Large and Small Tasks
Demand
Supply
Financing

Who? How to?
Clear all high & medium impact SHAs;
mark the rest
Humanitarian operators
Grants from donors

Unresolved Issues
Definition of “mine impact free”; Number
& extent of SHAs
None
None

The demining NGOs and ADP are committed to achieving “mine impact free” status within
the coming few years. However, each is using its own definition of what impact free implies.
The different definitions (some of which are have not been formalised) do not appear to lead
to dramatically different outcomes in general, but specific situations may arise where subtle
differences in the definition of impact free could lead to decidedly different outcomes for
mine-affected communities.
It should be possible to formulate a common definition among the operators, which then could
be incorporated as a national standard. Mozambique is one country and its citizens deserve
equal treatment. Therefore, the Review Team recommends:
Recommendation 1 – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to discuss their
various understandings of the term “mine impact free” (or, better, mine/UXO impact free) and
to initiate a process to formulate a common definition, to be adopted as a national standard,
which should incorporate the need for a sustainable demining capacity to address the residual
threat (i.e. the impacts that will emerge over time).

Issues:
1. The process followed to declare a community, district, or province “mine impact free”
should allow input by government officials at each level, but provide for exceptions
should an official be intransigent, refusing to sign-off that the area is impact free when
there is no evidence that remaining SHAs present a clear risk to civilians or a constraint
on development projects which are ready for implementation within a reasonable period.
2. Impact free should refer to people in communities, districts, provinces, etc. and not to
individual SHA in isolation.
For operations planning purposes, and for providing a clear benchmark to inform the strategic
discussion process with government and donor officials, it is important to determine in a
practical but operationally meaningful sense the extent and distribution of SHA which now
pose a risk to live-and-limb and/or constrain development efforts at the local community
level. This will require what in Mozambique is commonly termed “technical survey”, but
which we believe is better described as “systematic re-survey” (see textbox).
Recommendation 2 – IND should meet with HALO Trust, NPA, HI, and ADP to:



discuss alternative approaches to systematic re-survey,
agree on either (i) a common approach or (ii) a set of acceptable approaches for
undertaking systematic re-surveys that would lead to similar outcomes in terms of
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reduced, defined SHAs and to a preliminary classification of all SHA according to the
following or a similar schema:
The SHA is now exerting:
• a High impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
• a Medium impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
• a Low impact (economic/risk of accident/both) on a community
• no current impact on a community


agree on ways and means for re-surveying the country (including all records in IMSMA
which have not been re-surveyed) within two-to-three years.

Textbox 19 – Re-survey for Mozambique

In Mozambique, the task of systematically re-surveying SHAs is typically termed “technical
survey”. What is being done by HALO Trust, NPA, and HI does not appear to be a full
Technical Survey as traditionally understood or as implied in IMAS:* indeed, Technical
Survey of every SHA would require additional assets and training and would be an inefficient
use of resources.
The Review Team is recommending neither a technical survey of all SHA nor a new (and
expensive) LIS. Rather, what would be useful is a systematic process of, over time, resurveying SHA which are in the LIS database or which have been identified by other means
(e.g. reports from communities) in order to:
•
•
•

first, confirm or deny the existence of the SHA;
second, for those confirmed, provide a closer assessment of both the SHA boundaries
and its apparent impacts to determine whether it should be cleared or marked; and
third, for those to be cleared, undertake the task planning necessary to undertake
clearance in an effective manner (e.g. identification of the assets required, for what
duration, etc.). This would not require full technical survey.

Such an exercise will, of course, absorb some resources. However, the experience of the
operators in Mozambique and elsewhere suggests that the cost of additional surveying is more
than balanced by the increased benefits accruing from better task prioritisation (clearing the
right SHA) and task planning (deploying the right combination of assets for each task). In
Mozambique’s case, benefits will also accrue in terms of better strategic and annual planning
at the national programme level as a clearer picture of the extent of hazards emerges.
* In IMAS 08.20, Technical Survey is defined rather broadly in terms of its purpose: “The primary aim
of a technical survey is to collect sufficient information to enable the clearance requirement to be more
accurately defined, including the area(s) to be cleared, the depth of clearance, local soil conditions,
and the vegetation characteristics…[to]…enable subsequent clearance operations to be conducted in
a safe, effective and efficient manner.” However, it is generally understood that invasive methods will
be used to test for the presence of mines, metal fragments in the soil, etc. and IMAS 08.20 implies that
land will often be released (e.g. “Land released as a result of technical survey shall be of the same
confidence level as that would be achieved by clearance.”)

The full benefits from this exercise will not be garnered in full unless all parties have access
to data on SHA that are complete, accurate, and up-to-date.
Recommendation 3 – IND should meet with all operators to agree upon the information
management system to ensure IMSMA data are accurate and up to date, including:
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(if necessary) redesigned forms to be submitted by demining operators concerning resurveyed SHAs;
(if necessary) additional fields in IMSMA to record the better-defined SHA;
format of reports from the central IMSMA unit back to the operators so they can validate
that the new data they have submitted have been entered correctly;
205
clear and measurable performance standards
for all operators and the central IMSMA
unit; and
formats for monthly reports on progress achieved on the national re-survey and the current
figures (broken at least to provincial aggregates) on SHA, and clearance.

We are confident that IND management and staff have the basic capabilities to maintain
complete and accurate data on IMSMA. However, if IND is unable to do so within a
reasonable period (say, by the end of 2005), the GoM and donors should consider more
draconian action, perhaps by contracting out database management to a firm (with, of course,
clear performance clauses in the contract). This repository of information is too important to
Mozambique – now and in the long term – to be allowed to remain in its current state.
An improved version of IMSMA (version 4.0) will be available from GICHD before the end
of 2005. This will incorporate features that will significantly reduce the management burden
in co-ordinating data entry from multiple locations, as is done in Mozambique. However,
GICHD is supporting IMSMA in 40 programmes, and it will take time before the new version
can be installed in each. It is important that Mozambique is toward the head of the queue.
Recommendation 4 – The IND Director should draft a letter for the Minister’s signature to the
GICHD requesting the early installation of the new version of IMSMA at IND (supported by the
requisite training for staff), and documenting the reasons why Mozambique should be among
the first programmes to benefit from the new IMSMA.

Column 2: Existing Developmental Impacts
Large Tasks
Demand
Supply
Financing

Who? How to?
Government units responsible for large
infrastructure projects
Commercial deminers & QA firms
contracted by the prime contractors
Included in financing agreement for each
project

Unresolved Issues
What is the cut-off between “large” and
“small”
Are QA firms always required?
Not all financing agencies (e.g. World
Bank, African Development Bank) have
policies re: landmines.

For demining services in support of large infrastructure tasks, best practice comprises the
following steps, which are put forward as a recommendation for government-wide adoption:
Recommendation 5 – The Government of Mozambique should issue a policy statement that,
henceforth, provisions for demining services required to support any “large” infrastructure
investments shall be as follows:


financing for the required demining services will be provided in the budget for the
infrastructure rehabilitation, reconstruction, or development project, following
consultations with IND on the likely extent of contamination that will be encountered;

205

An example of a performance standard might be: within one month of receiving an operator’s
monthly re-survey report, the IMSMA unit shall return the corresponding data entry report to that
operator so it can verify that all records have been correctly entered – target performance standard, 98
per cent of records entered completely and correctly.
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tender documents soliciting proposals from potential prime contractors shall specify that
all bidders must include in their proposal (i) a demining sub-contractor, currently
accredited in Mozambique for landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal,
and (ii) a separate Quality Assurance sub-contractor, currently accredited in Mozambique
to provide external QA with respect to landmine and UXO survey, marking, clearance, and
disposal operations;
such tender documents shall specify that the successful prime contractor shall be
responsible for the efficiency and quality of work done by the demining and QA subcontractors, and that no claim for additional compensation due to the presence of
landmines or UXO shall be entertained;
these tender documents shall also specify the minimum liability insurance requirements
with respect to landmine and UXO contamination for the prime contractor, demining subcontractor, and QA sub-contractor, as currently specified in national mine action
legislation or regulations;
all tender documents and contracts shall specify the basis of payment (e.g. fixed-price or
actual-and-reasonable, plus progress payments) for expenditures related to landmine and
UXO survey, marking, clearance, and disposal operations.

Issues:
1. The cut-off point for “large” infrastructure investments requires further discussion – the
intent is to allocate responsibilities for demining services to prime contractors whenever
this is the most practical option. At some point, such responsibility may represent an
unwarranted burden on the management or financing capacities of potential prime
contractors, thereby reducing competition and constraining the expansion of otherwise
sound small contractors. The cut-off limits used by the World Bank for “international
competitive bidding” and “national competitive bidding” may be useful reference points.
2. This recommendation does not imply that the costs of demining services should invariably
be met by an agency providing international financing. Such costs could constitute a
portion of the contribution to an investment project provided by the GoM.
3. Sub-sectors which are now implementing large infrastructure investment projects without
provision for financing any demining services that may be required (e.g. water, railways)
should continue to seek assistance as early as possible from IND, so that agency can
identify operators and, where necessary, grants for the demining services. This should,
however, be considered an interim measure for projects that have already advanced to a
stage where the project financing arrangements have been agreed.
Recommendation 6 – The Government of Mozambique should advise The World Bank, other
development banks, and other agencies providing financial credits for large infrastructure
projects that:



Professional assessments of landmine and UXO contamination issues must be made
during the project design phase, and
Adequate provision for possible demining expenses must be incorporated into the
financing plan for such projects.

Textbox 20 – Engaging the World Bank in Mine Action

In the recent past, some public agencies in Mozambique have been advised by World Bank
project task managers that the Bank does not finance landmine and UXO clearance. Whether
this was ever true in the past, this is not the current policy of The World Bank.
The World Bank first became involved in financing mine action activities in the mid-1990s,
with loans to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina following the break-up of Yugoslavia. Facing
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this new challenge, the Bank issued the Demining: Operational Guidelines for Financing
Landmine Clearance in 1997.*
The Bank’s charter restricts it to financing reconstruction and development activities (the
official name of the oldest and largest part of The World Bank is The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development – IBRD). Accordingly, it cannot provide assistance for
humanitarian programmes. Other provisions in its guidelines include:
•
•
•

Landmine clearance must be an integral part of a development investment – the
Bank supports reconstruction and development, not landmine clearance per se.
Landmine clearance should be justified on economic grounds.
Implementation must be under the control of civilian authorities.

That being said, problems with its landmine projects in Bosnia led to an evaluation finding
that the Bank does not have a “comparative advantage” in landmine clearance** – which many
staff would interpret as a warning that loans for landmine clearance would not advance their
career prospects. Some loans were provided in exceptional cases, but most country
programmes were wary of mine action for some years.
However, faced with continuing requests, the Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction
(CPR) Unit prepared a more extensive Task Manager’s Guide*** in 2003. In 2004, a group of
donors and mine-affected countries, supported by UNDP, arranged a meeting with senior
officials in the Bank to encourage its more active engagement in financing landmine clearance
in support of reconstruction and development. The Bank’s management responded
constructively to that approach, and James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank,
approved another publication**** signalling the management’s endorsement for financing
landmine clearance in support of reconstruction and development activities.
Sources: *World Bank, 1997, World Bank Operational Guidelines for Financing Landmine Clearance,
7 February, Washington, DC.
** Alicia Kreimer et al, 1998, The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, World
Bank.
*** Buré, J. and P. Pont, 2003, “Landmine Clearance Projects: Task Manager’s Guide,” Social
Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, CPR Working Paper No. 10,
Washington, DC: World Bank
**** World Bank, 2004, “Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative,” Social Development
Notes, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, CPR Notes No. 20, Washington, DC

Small Tasks
Demand
Supply
Financing

Who? How to?
Government units responsible for small
infrastructure work programmes
Humanitarian operators; FADM; RoncoQRDF; possibly commercial deminers
Donor grants; GoM contributions for
FADM +/or commercial deminers

Unresolved Issues
How many such units are there? How
many tasks are required?
Will humanitarian operators accept the
tasks? Is there enough capacity?
How to manage GoM contributions?

Concerning smaller investment projects, the critical issue in the short term is to identify and
eliminate gaps in the provision of demining services required for such rehabilitation and
development projects. Policies of avoidance, such as currently practiced by some government
units responsible for community infrastructure, mean that Mozambican citizens in mine-
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affected communities are twice damned – suffering both from the contamination and from the
unwarranted withholding of public investments that would enhance prosperity.
It is urgent that all situations in which development investments have been avoided because of
contamination concerns are identified quickly, while substantial demining capacity remains in
the country and while donors are still providing earmarked grants for mine action: if anything,
higher priority should be given to providing such development investments in mine-affected
communities while adequate funding and demining capacity is in place.
Recommendation 7 – IND should immediately initiate a systematic outreach programme to all
public sector agencies which undertake or promote development investments:



To ensure all such agencies are aware of the extent and impact of mine and UXO
contamination on their planned development investments, and of the mine action services
available; and
For agencies which do not have clear policies in place for addressing contamination
concerns in an appropriate manner, or which are lacking systems to ensure these policies
are followed, to develop a clear, time-delimited plan to:
• inventory all development investments which have been avoided because of
contamination concerns;
• develop a joint plan with the agency concerned to schedule both the demining services
and the development investment;
• assist these agencies in formulating the necessary policies and implementing systems
to ensure these policies are followed; and
• agree on periodic meetings to review the agency’s investment programme, identify
possible contamination concerns, and initiate demining services to address these
contamination concerns.

It may prove that the demand for demining services in support of smaller infrastructure
projects will exceed the capacity that can be mobilised by the demining operators paid by
donor grants (humanitarian operators; Ronco-QRDF; some of FADM costs) or the GoM
(FADM soldiers pay etc.). In this case, a mechanism is required to contract commercial
demining and QA firms and of course to pay them. This cannot be determined until IND
completes the survey of government units and inventory of projects. Should commercial firms
be required in the short-term, the contracting and financing issues (e.g. pooled funding with a
tender board) need to be addressed as part of the formulation of a new strategy, as discussed
in the next chapter.

Column 3: Dealing with Future Humanitarian Impacts
Here, “large tasks” relate to standard minefield clearance operations, while “small tasks”
suggest UXO or spot demining done by mobile Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams –
sometimes referred to as “fire brigades”. The unresolved issues are similar for both types of
challenges, and so they are discussed together.
Large Tasks
Demand

Supply
Financing

Who? How to?
Growing communities when they begin
to encounter minefields that used to
have no impact.
Standard mine clearance platoons.
Unknown
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Unresolved Issues
How big will the demand be? How & to
whom do communities in need
communicate their need?
What type of demining operator?
Who will fund? What contracting
instrument should be used?
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Small Tasks
Demand

Who? How to?
Communities that discover UXO or arms
caches.

Supply
Financing

Fire brigade EOD teams
Unknown

Unresolved Issues
How big will the demand be? How & to
whom do communities in need
communicate their need?
What type of demining operator?
Who will fund? What contracting
instrument should be used?

It is impossible to predict how much future demand there will be for either EOD “fire
brigade” response for small tasks, or for standard demining operations because larger
minefields begin to pose a humanitarian concern. A better assessment will be possible
following the completion of the proposed systematic re-survey. Future demand will also
depend on the precise definition adopted for “mine impact free” and the timing of withdrawal
by HALO Trust, NPA, and HI. A third and perhaps the most important question is whether
adequate channels are in place for local communities to call on assistance from the
appropriate organisations. The best mechanism for this would probably involve communities
requesting EOD or demining assistance from the district administrator, but then what
organisation would respond, how would it be contracted, who would pay for the work, and
how would the work be monitored?
On the supply side, the management of specialised public services to Mozambique’s widely
dispersed communities has proven to be an extremely difficult challenge, and probably
exceeds the current capacity of the public service. However, contracting-out options would
not be easy to manage either. The geographic dispersion of relatively small tasks, coupled
with the requirement for timely response when public safety is at risk, make contracting on a
task-by-task basis infeasible.
Conversely, payment of a fixed fee to provide such a service for a period of time leaves
insufficient incentive for operators to devote adequate effort to maintain “readiness” (e.g.
equipment and vehicle maintenance), or to respond on a timely basis to all requests for
assistance. Some sort of financial bonus could be integrated into a contract to bolster the
incentives for high performance, but there appears to be no ready mechanism for monitoring
performance in providing public services over large areas.206
Similar albeit slightly more manageable concerns exist concerning how to supply more
standard minefield clearance services to address emergent risks (i.e. the expansion of a
community’s economic footprint brings residents into contact with a minefield that previously
had little impact). In areas where district administrators are well informed and responsive to
community requests, there would be ample lead time to notify the mine action authorities to
address the problem. The issues then are how to: (i) assign the work (e.g. via competitive
tender) (ii) finance the work and (iii) monitor performance of the demining organisation.

206

In some countries, donors have engaged local NGOs to monitor levels of public service delivery at
the community level (e.g. surprise visits to village health clinics to check these have a supply of
essential drugs on hand; random visits to village schools to see whether teachers are present and
giving instruction). This does not seem to be happening in Mozambique, perhaps because there is
little tradition of civil society organisations of this type: with a few exceptions local NGOs tend to be
small, with limited geographic reach. (See Lucas et al., 2004, Research on the current state of PRS
monitoring systems, especially pp. 14-19)
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The typically small humanitarian tasks that we can safely predict will emerge in the future
represent precisely the type of situation in which well-established international demining
NGOs enjoy a comparative advantage. The geographic dispersion of the tasks makes it
difficult and costly to monitor the performance of any organisation, but well-established
international demining NGOs combine technical capacity, not-for-profit status, and clear
governance and accountability structures. As a result, donors trust that such organisations will
have reasonably effective systems for self-monitoring.207 The planned withdrawal of HALO
Trust, HI, and NPA will leave a very real gap.
It is possible that local demining not-for-profits – a transformed ADP or an association of
demining staff laid-off following the withdrawal of the international NGOs – could fill this
gap. Such organisations would, of course, have to demonstrate the requisite technical and
managerial skills. But they would remain at a distinct disadvantage unless they adopt statutes
that self-impose far higher standards for integrity, governance, and transparency than are
required by Mozambique’s legislation for associations or foundations. Otherwise, they will
almost certainly face difficulties in resource mobilisation.208 (See Textbox 21 – Contracts or
Grants? Firms or NGOs? National or International?)
Textbox 21 – Contracts or Grants? Firms or NGOs? National or International?

Prolonged conflicts have lasting effects on societies, in part because the rule of law breaks
down, opening the door to corruption. Understandably, donor officials are wary of corruption,
and their decisions concerning which organisations to fund reflect this “risk aversion”, as well
as their perceptions concerning competence, costs, national ownership, and so on. One
researcher* has put forward a simple “corruption formula” as follows:
Discretion minus accountability = corruption
Thus, a useful way of analysing the risk of corruption is to consider the amount of discretion
left to organisations, as well as the mechanisms in place to make such organisations account
for how they have used the resources provided to them.
Recent studies by GICHD** illustrate how discretion and accountability concerns affect
funding decisions in the mine action field. In demining for example, the principal types of
discretion (and the associated risks of corruption or malfeasance) are:
1. Discretion in setting task priorities (e.g. which land will be cleared first) – there is a
danger that clearance decisions will reflect private interests rather than the public good;
2. Discretion in reporting (e.g. on quantities of land cleared) – if demining organisations are
paid on the basis of areas cleared, there are risks they will claim to have cleared more than
they have in fact done;
3. Discretion in determining the area required for clearance – if demining organisations are
paid on the basis of areas cleared, there are risks they will clear larger areas than are
required;
4. Discretion in the quality of clearance (e.g. whether SOPs and national standards are
207

Donors will still externally monitor whether the NGOs have adequate financial and quality
management systems in place for self-monitoring, but this is a far less onerous challenge than
externally monitoring all demining tasks.
208
Concern about resource mobilisation has, of course, been one of the major impediments to
progress in implementing the transition of ADP into a distinct legal entity.
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followed completely) – if demining organisations are paid or judged on the basis of areas
cleared, there is a risk they will take shortcuts to increase productivity, magnifying the
risk to deminers and civilians.
When would these types of discretion not be a great concern? Obviously, corruption risks are
minimal when some appropriate authority sets the demining priorities, the area of each task
can be clearly defined, and the quality of clearance operations can be readily monitored.
When these conditions are present, the best way to allocate demining work is via competitive
tender – competition will keep costs down, while tasks, areas, and quality standards can be
defined in a contract and easily enforced.
A good illustration is the process adopted by ANE for the reconstruction of major roads and
bridges. ANE sets the priorities, based on its schedule of roads projects. The areas to be
demined are clearly defined (the length of road times the width required from the centre line).
The responsibility for monitoring can be left to the prime contractor, as this firm will have to
bear significant costs if its work crews are delayed by missed mines or UXO, so it will closely
monitor the quality of demining (and may even engage a specialist QA firm to do this).
In countries such as Mozambique, this neat solution often cannot be employed. Consider the
broad task of making a province mine impact free. There are many SHAs in many
communities, so it is unclear how best to set priorities and which organisations have the
authority and expertise to do so. Many of the SHA are ill defined in area, so it is folly to pay
based on area cleared. Many of the impacted communities are remote, making monitoring of
clearance quality both difficult and expensive.
In such a situation, some donors will only fund demining organisations which are “inherently
trustworthy” such as well-established international NGOs. These are not motivated by profit,
but more importantly they live on their reputations – without continued support from donors
and, ultimately, their members, international NGOs have no means of sustaining themselves.
They must protect their reputations and will take care both in task selection and the quality of
clearance. As well, the typical contracting arrangement will be a grant agreement to pay for an
agreed set of assets for a period of time – rather than a contract to clear specified tasks, which
(first) would be difficult to monitor and (second) would add an incentive that would reward
higher productivity, perhaps at the risk of reduced safety standards.
While international NGOs perform valuable roles in mine action, it still would be ideal if
local people identified the priorities and if the demining tasks could be assigned by
competitive tenders, both to get the lowest price and to encourage the growth of local firms
and NGOs (which may not have established reputations or statutes that require high standards
of integrity, governance, and transparency and, hence, are not “inherently trustworthy”).
National mine action authorities are established in large part to create local systems for
establishing priorities and, then, to hold individual operators to account by undertaking QA
activities. However, local systems for establishing priorities may not be transparent (i.e. some
individual or organisation still has significant discretion and little accountability), and QA
regulations replace some forms of discretion with new ones, specifically:
5. Discretion in enforcing regulations – staff in the national authority could abuse their
authority by, say, demanding bribes before awarding licenses or clearance certificates; and
6. Discretion in setting the regulations – the national authority could set unreasonable or illdefined standards precisely to create more opportunities for soliciting bribes or, say, for
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favouring national firms over foreign organisations.
Thus, while the ideal is for legitimate national authorities to set priorities and for tasks to be
assigned by competitive tender, it is difficult to reach this ideal. Lack of knowledge of the
extent of SHAs plus difficulties in monitoring work in remote areas means many donors will
prefer to fund “trustworthy” international NGOs. Missing or poorly written mine action
legislation, standards, and SOPs leave too much discretion in the hands of local officials, and
donors or local citizens may find it difficult to monitor the decisions of such officials where
accountability mechanisms are weak.
* Robert Klitgaard. See for example Combating Corruption, United Nations Chronicle, online
edition, available at <http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1998/issue1/0198p90p.html>

** A Study of Local Organisations in Mine Action, forthcoming, GICHD, Geneva
In brief, this remains an unresolved problem. There is no straightforward solution which
promises to be effective to organising and financing future tasks needed to address
humanitarian concerns given the current status and plans of the organisations in the mine
action programme. A deeper strategic analysis of options for enhancing the programme’s
institutional make-up (i.e. its composition and structure plus the legal and regulatory
framework) is required before a credible solution can be determined. While this must
eventually involve the principal stakeholders and, particularly, the GoM, the next chapter of
this report lays out some options for this and other unresolved problems.

Column 4: Dealing with Future Developmental Impacts
Large Tasks
Demand
Supply
Financing

Who? How to?
Government units responsible for large
infrastructure projects
Commercial deminers & QA firms
contracted by the prime contractors
Included in financing agreement for each
project

Unresolved Issues
What is the cut-off between “large” and
“small”
Are QA firms always required?
Not all financing agencies (e.g. World
Bank, African Development Bank) have
policies re: landmines.

Once again, for larger infrastructure projects best practice has already been adopted within
some sectors in Mozambique, and the principal requirement is for the GoM to issue a policy
statement to make this standard practice. Recommendations 4 and 5 above address this issue.
Small Tasks
Demand

Who? How to?
Government units responsible for small
infrastructure work programmes

Supply

Many options

Financing

Many options

Unresolved Issues
None after IND completes outreach &
project inventory as per recommendation
6?
How best to manage the supply of
demining services?
Who will fund? What contracting
instruments should be used?

Once the grant-financed humanitarian operators exit (or are transformed), the situation is
somewhat more complex concerning smaller infrastructure projects, for two principal reasons:
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•
•

Transaction costs will be relatively high if tenders must be issued for demining support on
each small infrastructure project;
Firms bidding to serve as the prime contractor on smaller projects may not have the
financial resources to obtain insurance to cover residual risks, or the expertise to identify
and manage specialised firms to provide the demining services.

These problems could be addressed if IND works more closely with the public agencies
responsible for planning the work programmes in the relevant sub-sectors (small scale
irrigation; secondary road maintenance; district roads rehabilitation; etc.) to formulate joint
annual work plans. This would allow IND or a specialised procurement agency to combine a
number of small infrastructure projects into larger packages (e.g. by province or by subsector) for tendering. For example, tender packages could be issued for demining services to
support all small infrastructure projects planned for each province in the coming year.
Similarly, tenders could be issued for the provision of independent QA services to monitor
this work.
Thus, the implementation of recommendation 6 will make it feasible to establish some system
to manage competitive tenders for demining services in support of smaller infrastructure
projects. This would represent an important reform to the institutional make-up of the mine
action programme; a topic covered in the next chapter. Another issue, of course, is how to pay
for demining in support of smaller infrastructure works, and we now turn to the issue of
financing mine action in the future.

Financing Mine Action in the Future
Although grant funding has been reasonably steady to date, there has been a clear fall-off in
the numbers of donors financing mine action as a distinct activity. While records are
incomplete, the Review Team has compiled the following table, which is indicative of the
trend. From this list of donors, the number providing distinct support for the mine action
programme in Mozambique has fallen from 17 in the past to 13 as of last year (see table on
the following page). It appears set to decline this year and in the future, although there is some
uncertainty as many donors have not made their programming decisions past the current year
or next. While some of the largest donors (EC, Japan, US) have not ruled-out assistance in the
medium- to long-term, this trend has implications for the level of donor support in the future.
At the same time, the recorded financial contributions from GoM have been middling. While
these appear to be increasing, they still represent a tiny proportion of the total financing to the
programme. However, GoM records do not include the salaries and core costs related to
FADM deminers, nor (and more importantly) the obligations undertaken to finance major
infrastructure projects. The Review Team has not attempted to account for recent
expenditures on demining services in support of infrastructure projects, but the our partial
survey of planned infrastructure work programmes suggests the market for commercial
demining services could be in the range of $9+ million per annum over the coming decade.
Another consideration is that, while some past donors will not fund mine action as a distinct
activity in the future, they will continue to fund development projects and many of these
could incorporate demining in a support role. Of course, as discussed earlier, some public
sector agencies are basically “managing” any contamination problems by avoiding them,
leaving the citizens in mine-affected communities twice damned. Donors that fund the work
of these agencies may be unaware that this is happening.
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Austria
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
EC
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
USA
Totals

Pre-2004
X
X

2004
X

2005
X

2006
?

After 2006

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
?
X

?

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
17

X

X

?

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
?
X

?
X

?

?

Global support for NGOs not specific to Mozambique

X
13

X

X

?

X
10-11

X
5-10

?
Up to 5

The GoM could adopt policy measures to ensure adequate amounts of development aid are
provided for demining, thus levering-in additional funds for mine action. At the least, the
GoM could announce clearly that its policy is to give equal treatment to citizens in mineaffected communities and that suspected landmine or UXO contamination should not be a
reason for avoiding these communities’ needs for investments in community infrastructure
(such as small irrigation dams). The government could then ask donors to apply this policy in
their development projects,209 whether implemented by public agencies, NGOs, or firms, and
to include funds for the necessary demining services within their project budgets.
The GoM could go further by adopting a clear policy that, as a poverty reduction measure,
mine-affected communities should receive a degree of preference when formulating work
plans for community or area development projects. Once again, the government would then
have to request donors to apply this policy and to include funds for demining in their project
budgets.210 In this case, IND and demining operators would need to identify which mine
affected-communities could benefit from which type of development investment. The Task
Impact Assessment employed by NPA might, with modest adjustments, be the most useful
approach for accomplishing this task.
Recommendation 8 – The GoM should adopt a clear policy – and communicate this to both
public sector units and to donors – concerning the priority given to mine-affected communities
when planning and implementing community or area development work programmes and aid
projects. Two reasonable policy options exist; either…
•

equal treatment – communities should not be penalised by the presence of landmine or
UXO contamination and, if a community would benefit substantially from a small-scale

209

The government should also ensure that public sector units apply the policy.
The same should apply for the relevant SWAp and pooled funding arrangements. However, in
these cases the government policy vis-à-vis mine-affected communities would need to be incorporated
into the sector plan (for SWAps) or agreed upon by the group of donors pooling their funds.
210
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•

investment, the additional cost of demining support should not used as a reason for
211
withholding that investment; or…
priority treatment – the needs of mine-affected communities for small-scale
investments would receive priority attention when planning and implementing
community and area development projects.

Of course as “mine/UXO impact free” status is reached, requirements for grant financing of
mine action as a distinct activity will not be as burdensome as in the past, particularly if the
costs of demining services in support of major infrastructure, community development, and
area development projects are consistently built-into the individual project budgets as the
Review Team has recommended. While the financing gap cannot be estimated at this time,
the categories of needs that will depend on grants distinctly for mine action or the
government’s own resources can be identified clearly, as follows:
1. Humanitarian demining (EOD and minefield clearance) to address the residual risk after
the planned departure of the international NGOs at the end of 2006;
2. Demining services in support of small infrastructure investments which are not financed
by donor-funded projects, or where donors do not provide funds for demining services in
support of their projects.212
On average, the size of the tasks will be small while the task locations will be widely
dispersed. This implies that transaction costs (negotiating and enforcing contracts at all levels)
are likely to be high at best, and it will be vital to devise a mechanism that minimises these to
the extent possible. This suggests some sort of pooled funding arrangement (government and
donor funds), with a Mine Action Tender Board. Thus, a solution is feasible assuming such a
pooled funding scheme and a tender board arrangement are added to the institutional make-up
of the mine action programme. We return to the issue in the penultimate Chapter.

Estimating Future Financial Requirements and Sources
Future financing requirements must be derived from an assessment of the future needs. As
discussed in the previous chapter, a complete picture of the future needs cannot be formulated
at this time – additional work is required to (i) complete the systematic re-survey of SHA (as
per recommendation 2) and (ii) complete the inventory of public sector units that may require
demining services in support of their work programmes (as per recommendation 6). The
following table illustrates how a financing plan could be developed as better data on the needs
is generated.

211

In the language of cost-benefit analysis, the “shadow price” of such demining services would be set
at zero as a matter of government policy.
212
This could often be the case for existing projects and for those well-advanced in the planning
pipeline. As well, some donors may have their own policy restrictions that preclude them financing
demining (e.g. policies to avoid residual risks).
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Future financing requirements and sources:

Big Task

4. Development

Requirement – roughly $x million/year (for
area demining)
Financing sources (could be pooled fund):
• Government own funds,
• Donor grants

Requirement – roughly $x million/year
Financing sources:
• Government own funds,
• Loans taken by the GoM,
• Donor grants

Small Task

3. Humanitarian

Requirement – roughly $x million/year (for
“fire brigade” EOD teams)
Financing sources (could be pooled fund):
• Government own funds,
• Donor grants

Requirement – roughly $x million/year
Financing sources:
• Donor grants (part of community/
area development project)
• Pooled fund for other small invest.
o Donor grants
o GoM

Broken like this, some speculative estimates could be offered for the various categories.
Given the current state of knowledge however, huge assumptions need to be made and this
exercise is again intended mainly to illustrate how a financing plan might be formulated.
Humanitarian
• Assumption 1 – once HALO Trust, HI, and NPA withdraw after “mine impact free”
status is reached (and ADP has made significant progress toward that goal in the
South), assume that a local demining NGO somewhat larger than ADP today can meet
the residual demand for humanitarian demining.213 IND figures show ADP
expenditures averaged about $2.7 million over 2002 and 2003, but this appears not to
have included adequate provision for re-equipping and to build a fund to cover the
eventual costs of retrenchment. Assume $4 million.
• Assumption 2 – three-quarters of the annual costs will be for small tasks requiring
rapid response by small and mobile EOD teams (“fire brigades”). These teams will
require new equipment and training at a start-up capital cost of $1.5 million.
• Assumption 3 – Other start-up costs for establishing regional offices plus re-equipping
the traditional demining teams are modest ($0.5 million) as some facilities and
equipment from the international NGOs are transferred to the new local NGO.
• Assumption 4 – Donor grants cover all start-up costs and one-half of the annual costs.
• Total costs: Start-up – $2 million; annual – $4 million ($3 million for EOD teams; $1
million for traditional demining teams)
Development
• Assumption 1 – The lower-end figures for Roads, Railways, Electricity, and Water
represent the total demand for demining services in support of large infrastructure
projects. These total approximately $9 million per year.
• Assumption 2 – Development loans finance two-thirds of the demining costs in
support of large infrastructure investments ($6 million) and donor grants cover $1
million per year.
• Assumption 3 – Demining services in support of small-infrastructure investments are
half as big as for large infrastructure investments – i.e. $4.5 million per year.
• Assumption 4 – Donor-financed projects cover two-thirds of the costs of small
infrastructure projects ($3 million per year)
213

FADM might also contribute to this task, but this is not factored into the calculations.
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Using these rather heroic assumptions, donor grants earmarked to mine action would cover
start-up costs of $2 million. Annual costs of the demining programme would then be in the
range of $17.5 million, with financing broken as follows:

Large humanitarian
Small humanitarian
Large infrastructure
Small infrastructure
TOTAL

Donor grants
To Mine Action
Development
projects
$0.5
$1.5
$1.0
$3.0
$2.0
$4.0

GoM
Development
loans

$6.0
$6.0

Own funds +
budget support
$0.5
$1.5
$2.0
$1.5
$5.5

A number of additional comments are required at this stage:
•
•
•

•
•

•

First, these speculative figures do not include the costs of IND (or a possible
Mozambique Mine Action Centre, as discussed in the penultimate Chapter).
Second, the total cost of demining services ($17.5 million per year) required appears
to be approximately the same as in recent years.
Third, the purpose of demining is dramatically different that in recent years, with the
bulk ($13.5 million per year) going to support development and only $4 million per
year (23 per cent) for humanitarian demining to address the threat emerging from
residual contamination.
Fourth, the financing of the annual programme costs also would be dramatically
different than today.
Fifth, the required financing seems feasible, even with the prospect of reduced donor
funding for mine action as a distinct activity, provided the GoM adopts policy
measures to lever-in development financing (grants and concessional loans) to pay for
demining services in support of development programmes.
Sixth, the above analysis does not fully cover the likely requirement for clearance of
border minefields to meet Convention obligations and as a disaster preparedness
measure.

A final point needs additional emphasis. The viability of all that has been described above
will hinge on the institutional make-up of the mine action programme, and the
performance of its key organs (and we later recommend a national authority and a
Mozambican Mine Action Centre).

Linking with Development Management
The mine action programme and the problems of landmine and UXO contamination are not
given due recognition in the key macro instruments for development and expenditure
management: the PARPA and the State Budget. The second PARPA, to cover 2006-2010, is
to be adopted by November this year, while the estimates for the State Budget will be
formulated before then. It is essential that IND become actively engaged in the processes to
formulate these documents.
Given the recent split of Planning and Finance into two ministries, the division of
responsibilities for orchestrating the PARPA process remains unclear, but clearly the budget
directorate in Finance will retain the lead role in formulating the State Budget and (probably)
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the medium-term fiscal framework as well, which should be reflected in the financing plan for
the PARPA.
Recommendation 9 – IND should, with the utmost urgency, compile its case for (i) adequate
reflection of the national mine action programme and of landmine and UXO contamination as a
cross-cutting issue in the PARPA for 2006-2010 and (ii) the allocation of additional financial
support for mine action from resources available to the government treasury.

The discussion in Chapter 3 and 4 should make it abundantly clear that the contribution of
mine action to Mozambique’s national development and to poverty reduction cannot be
explained in terms of areas cleared or the numbers of landmine and UXO accidents. Rather,
the major contribution today, and for the foreseeable future, is in providing high quality
demining services to government units responsible for infrastructure work programmes: a
secondary contribution is through demining services in support of local development and
human security at the community level.
Thus, presentation of the mine action programme solely in terms of a cross-cutting issue or a
matter of human security would not only be inadequate but also inaccurate. The need for
demining services should first to be reflected in the sector and sub-sector plans for
transportation, water, power, agriculture, rural development, and so on, and only then second
as a cross-cutting issue in a separate section. The section on mine action as a cross-cutting
issue should focus primarily on how the programme will provide high-quality and timely
demining services to the government units in charge of infrastructure investments and to local
communities and authorities for community development: the secondary focus would be on
maintaining adequate security from landmine or UXO accidents.
This approach also should be more successful in making the case for additional budget
resources from GoM. The “stand-alone” case for additional resources to IND is, quite frankly,
weak. The case for additional GoM resources for mine action in support of national
infrastructure and community development programmes is far more compelling. The
government units responsible for delivering these programmes are the natural allies of the MA
programme, and IND needs to enlist their support to make the proper case for mine action.
Recommendation 10 – As part of its outreach to government units (as per recommendation 7),
IND should encourage and assist those units to reflect their requirements for demining
services into their briefs during PARPA consultations and their budget submissions.

Needless to say, this should not be a one-time exercise; rather, this outreach and consultation
process should be a central element of the IND annual work programme. It is the basis for
demonstrating the link between mine action and development, and for assessing whether the
existing capacities of the MA programme are adequate to support the country’s development.
Note that this also implies that the bulk of the public financial resources required for mine
action need not, and probably should not, appear in the budget for IND. These could appear,
say, in the budgets of the directorates for roads and bridges, water, small scale irrigation, etc.
One of IND’s tasks then would be to compile these figures for reporting to government and to
mine action donors so they have a picture of how much development funding is being
levered-into demining, and can better gauge how much support IND requires to inform
development planners and facilitate the provision of the requisite demining services.
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HIV/AIDS
The Review Team has made very specific recommendations concerning contract provisions
for demining services in support of major infrastructure projects. In addition, all tender
documents should specify that all personnel employed by demining or QA sub-contracting
shall be required to have a certificate of completion for an HIV/AIDS awareness course, or
some equivalent provision. Finally, all demining operators should be required to institute
similar measures: in some cases, these could be specified in grant agreements with, say, the
international NGOs, FADM, etc., and become part of the National Mine Action Standards.
The Review Team was unable to investigate the detailed procedures used by ANE or the best
practice provisions recommended by the HIV/AIDS Council of Mozambique. Therefore, we
leave this as a last recommendation for immediate action.
Recommendation 11 – The Director of IND should meet with, at least, representatives of ANE
and of the HIV/AIDS Council of Mozambique to identify best practice provisions relevant to the
needs of the mine action sector. Following discussions with operators and other interested
stakeholders, he should then:
•
•

have these best practices incorporated into the National Mine Action Standards; and
communicate in writing to all mine action donors requesting them to take appropriate
measures to ensure that all future funding agreements with mine action organisations
specify the adoption of these best practices.

Summary
The organisations within the mine action programme are already dealing appropriately with
humanitarian contamination problems that are apparent. Indeed, the current institutional
make-up of the programme was put in place to address precisely this type of problem, and it is
within sight of an important milestone – mine impact free status – which represents a
substantial achievement. Some work still is required to agree on a more precise definition of
“impact free” (which should incorporate UXO as well as sustainable capacity to address
residual risk), and in documenting the true extent of SHA, and recommendations have been
made in this regard.
Some public sector bodies responsible for major infrastructure work programmes have
devised excellent policies and procedures to address any problems posed by contamination.
Work is required to determine what other government work programmes are affected by
landmine and UXO contamination, and to ensure that they are addressing these problems and
are aware that assistance is available. Recommendations have been made in this regard and,
more generally, concerning the steps required to link the mine action programme more tightly
to the country’s development effort.
Some types of contamination problems that will be faced in the future cannot be addressed
adequately given the current institutional make-up of the mine action programme. The
strategic thinking concerning how to enhance this institutional make-up will need to embrace
these types of contamination problems, which is the subject of the next Chapter.
The following table summarises the analysis to this stage.
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Small Task

Big Task

Short-term: impacts now exist

Future: no current impact

1. Humanitarian

2. Development

3. Humanitarian

4. Development

Existing approaches
are appropriate

Solution
recommended

Solution requires
changes to the
institutional make-up
of the programme

Solution
recommended

Solution
recommended

Solution requires
changes to the
institutional make-up
of the programme

Solution requires
changes to the
institutional make-up
of the programme
(e.g. pooled funding +
tender board)

Existing approaches
are appropriate

While the future financing requirements for mine action cannot be estimated with precision at
the present time, it seems clear that adequate funds will be available provided the GoM takes
the appropriate steps. While additional financial contributions from the GoM will be required,
the most critical steps are not so much financial but rather policy measures that will lever-in
development assistance (grants and concessional loans) to pay for demining services in
support of development programmes.
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8. Toward a Sustainable Solution
This chapter outlines the minimum requirements that need to be in place if the mine action
programme is to address the future challenges posed by contamination in a sustainable
fashion. It also contains the Review Team’s recommendations for (i) how the programme
should be structured and linked to other arenas, and (ii) the process (or Road Map) to be
followed in developing the strategy. The final section of the report then touches on some
additional transition issues.

Strategy
Mozambique’s current strategy, the NMAP, is inadequate in light of the country’s current
needs let alone those of the future. A national strategy is designed to explain how the
country’s needs shall be met and, obviously, a good strategy needs to be based on a thorough
needs assessment. The Review Team has compiled some information that strongly suggests
that landmine contamination is far less a humanitarian emergency than a very real constraint
on development. The time has already come for the mine action programme to realign in
support of Mozambique’s development agenda, and the new strategy must reflect this.
The central purpose of the strategy is, or course, how to address the remaining challenges
posed by landmine and UXO contamination. Feasible solutions for a number of these
challenges have been recommended in the previous chapter, but others were identified as
unresolved given the current institutional make-up of the programme, coupled with the
planned withdrawal of the international demining NGOs. The strategy must address these
unresolved issues together as a set because they are interlinked. The following section
discusses this in some depth.

Strategic Thinking on Unresolved Issues
While clear solutions exist for many of the challenges posed by the contamination that will
remain at the end of 2006, there are no entirely adequate solutions for other contamination
challenges given the current institutional make-up of Mozambique’s mine action programme
(assuming the international demining NGOs depart as they have announced). Thus, reforms to
the institutional make-up are required to provide solutions to the following challenges:
1. How to contract and monitor the performance of demining organisations to provide “fire
brigade” services to address humanitarian/human security risks that will emerge from
residual contamination in the form of UXO and isolated landmines?
2. How to contract and monitor the performance of demining organisations to provide
standard demining services to address humanitarian/human security risks that will emerge
from residual contamination in the form of minefields?
3. How to contract demining organisations to provide demining services in support of small
infrastructure work programmes?214
These are strategic issues because they should not be considered in isolation from one
another; rather, the decisions on how to resolve them should be incorporated into a single
214

Of course, performance monitoring of this work must also be done, but assets already exist within
the mine action programme to do this (e.g. independent QA firms), so a reform to the institutional
make-up of the programme is not required for an adequate solution.
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strategy.215 This is because a decision on how to address one of these issues will affect, in a
material fashion, the optimal decisions for the other challenges. For example, if it is
determined to create a new organisation to provide fire brigade services, that organisation
may also be the best solution for standard demining to reduce future humanitarian risks.
Solutions to the above problems must also be considered in light of major changes to the
institutional make-up of the programme that are already planned. These are:
4. The withdrawal of the international NGOs around the end of 2006; and
5. The transformation of ADP from a project into a distinct legal entity.
Some of the inter-connections among these issues are now obvious. For example, the
following alternatives for the provision of fire brigade services have been discussed for a
number of years:216
•
•
•

Build this capacity into FADM;
Build this capacity into the police;
Build this capacity into ADP.

However, none of these options provide an adequate solution in the absence of a mechanism
to monitor the performance of whichever organisation is to provide the fire brigade services.
As was discussed at length in Textbox 21 – Contracts or Grants? Firms or NGOs? National or
International? – a great deal of discretion is left in the hands of an organisation responsible for
small demining and EOD tasks in dispersed and remote communities. Establishing an external
monitoring mechanism to reduce this discretion would be an expensive and manageriallychallenging proposition. However, in the absence of a credible external monitoring system,
donors are unlikely to fund the required demining services unless they have significant trust
that the organisation providing those services will effectively self-monitor the performance of
its personnel.
Such trust must be based on some combination of (i) high standards for integrity, governance,
and transparency, (ii) satisfaction with past performance of the organisation, and (iii) absence
of strong incentives that would reward abuses of discretion. While recognising there are no
perfect organisations, the use of well-established international NGOs – contracted through
grant agreements without strong performance incentives – is generally deemed the best option
available to donors.
It is clear that ADP in its current form as a UNDP project offers many of the same
“trustworthiness” features that underpin the success of the international demining NGOs in
terms of raising funds.217 However, continuing this arrangement is not ideal because:
•

the humanitarian risks posed by residual contamination will endure for an extended
period and an institutionally sustainable solution is required for the long term, and
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In the field of decision science, the definition of a strategy is “a situation in which several decisions
are to be made at the same time”. Spradlin, Tom, n.d., A Lexicon of Decision Making, prepared for the
Decision Analysis Society, available from <http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/daweb/lexicon.htm>.
216
This is clear from Craib, 2003, section 7.6.
217
The same is true to a degree with FADM and the QRDF, with Ronco providing monitoring services
on behalf of the US Department of State, although it is unlikely other donors would wish to build a
solution that hinges on a US company.
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•

it is inconsistent with the principle (which features centrally in the Convention) that
the primary responsibility for addressing the landmine problem lies with the country’s
government and its people.

Breaking the connection with UNDP would, however, raise questions concerning
accountability, governance, and transparency. This is the central quandary concerning
whether ADP could raise sufficient resources if it became a local not-for-profit, particularly
because (i) Mozambican law does not establish sufficiently high standards for integrity,
governance, and transparency of not-for-profits and, more broadly, (ii) Mozambique’s justice
system has not yet established a reputation as an effective and impartial upholder of the law.
Thus, none of the alternatives represents an entirely convincing solution – or at least one for
which donor financial support might be sustained until the GoM has the financial resources to
provide the required level of mine action services. Some interim measures could be put in
place to address the shortcomings of the various alternatives. For example, the Police or (to a
lesser degree) FADM would require significant capacity building assistance if they were to
take-on such a hard-to-manage responsibility. Obtaining funding from the GoM would be
more likely if it were to go to FADM or the Police. But without a credible mechanism for
monitoring task performance, many donors would be wary of providing funds for a solution
along these lines, so the GoM will likely end-up shouldering more of the financial burden.
ADP (or another group of deminers who wished to form a local NGO) would need less in the
way of additional capacity development, but steps are needed to address the lack of adequate
not-for-profit legislation in Mozambique. One reasonable measure would be for one (or more)
not-for-profit(s) to self-impose far higher standards for integrity, governance, and
transparency. However, one of the reasons the GoM might opt for this approach is that it
would increase the likelihood of further donor assistance – but how would donors know such
an organisation would actually live by such standards?218 As an additional measure, it might
agree to partner with an international NGO, with the latter bolstering donor confidence to
provide additional support to effect the transition and, just as importantly, helping the new
not-for-profit actually live by its high integrity, governance, and transparency standards –
capacity building to be an NGO rather than simply a demining organisation.
Thus, there are interim steps that could be taken, ideally with donor support, to put in place an
effective landmine/UXO fire brigade service. However, the GoM will need to assume a
growing proportion of the financial burden for such a public service, so no solution will be
sustainable without GoM endorsement. The GoM needs to indicate clearly which of the
alternative solutions it endorses. It should do this quickly, as further delay makes it ever more
likely it will have to address the problem without the support of the donor community.
Once again however, what the GoM decides concerning fire brigades also affects its options
concerning how to address the future humanitarian challenges posed by larger minefields.
Small, mobile fire brigades would be inefficient for large demining tasks. The same
organisation(s) – with a trusted self-monitoring capacity – could be used to manage both fire
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There are two problems here. The most obvious is that people could say they want to serve the
public good, but then put their own interests first once they obtain funding. More generally, combining
sound management with high transparency and accountability is an extremely difficult challenge,
particularly in a country such as Mozambique where there are few role models of “true” local NGOs
that are also effective.
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brigades and more traditional demining platoons. But other options are also available for such
larger demining tasks.
Because there will be fewer minefield clearance tasks, monitoring task performance is more
feasible. These could therefore be contracted out via tender processes either individually or in
batches (e.g. all the minefield clearance tasks in a province for a year), which would bring
competitive forces into play. But a competitive solution requires external QA for monitoring,
and at present the GoM does not have such capacities at its disposal. IND has had a
programme to establish its own QA teams, but with little success as yet. Independent QA
firms exist but IND has not sought funding to engage such firms to QA humanitarian
demining tasks.
As noted earlier, a number of other mine action programmes use independent firms for QA,
and we see no reason why this approach could not work in Mozambique. Thus, a realistic
solution does exist for external QA of minefield clearance tasks. But there remains the issue
of how to manage the competitive tendering process. In the past, for some very large tasks
CND and then IND used UNOPS for this purpose. UNOPS would probably not be a costeffective solution for tendering smaller tasks and, regardless, a national solution is eventually
required.
There are a number of tender board models within the field of mine action. A well-known
example is the Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF) that manages both a pooled-funding
arrangement and a tender board service in support of mine action programmes in the
Balkans.219 Tender boards have also been established in a number of sectors within
Mozambique (roads, electricity, etc.). Thus, good models exist and the difficulty lies not in
building the capacity for a mine action tender board, but rather in recognising that a tender
board in itself solves little: it will contribute to a solution if and only if complementary
measures are also taken (in this case, provision for external QA of minefield clearance tasks
and a feasible plan to finance both the clearance tasks and QA services). Strategic analysis is
required on the part of the GoM – ideally with the support of the donors – to formulate the
package of measures that are sufficient to address the specific contamination problem.
Again, what the GoM determines as its solution for minefields that will pose a humanitarian
threat as community “footprints” grow will also alter the range of options available for other
categories of contamination problems, and vice versa. For example, in the absence of a tender
board and a system for QA, it would be easiest to leave this type of humanitarian demining to
whichever organisation(s) provide the fire brigade services on a self-monitoring basis.
However, if the GoM decides to put a tender board/QA mechanism in place for providing
demining in support of small infrastructure investments, this mechanism might also be a
better solution for humanitarian minefield clearance as well.
The Review Team is not proposing specific solutions for the set of unresolved issues listed at
the start of this section. These are inter-related and must be considered collectively. The
questions concerning ADP’s transformation and what should become of the capacities built
by the international NGOs should also be factored into the strategic thinking leading to a new
strategic plan. Further, the best hope of continued assistance from the international donors
and, perhaps, the international NGOs lies in their buy-in to the new strategy, and such buy-in
is far more likely to emerge if they are involved in the strategic thinking.
219

The Slovenian International Trust Fund also uses independent firms for QA.
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Policy Framework
The current and future effectiveness of the mine action programme depends in large part on
the actions of many agencies not normally considered as part of the mine action field. For
example, government agencies whose work programmes are adversely affected by landmine
and UXO contamination need to be encouraged to address their problems squarely including,
whenever possible, lining-up the financing required. They also need to be assisted with
information and advice concerning best practice.
A clear policy framework is required to ensure these diverse agencies are working in concert
to address the contamination problem, rather than simply ignoring it together with the needs
of Mozambicans living in mine-affected communities. Thus the policy framework needs to be
government-wide and not directly purely to mine action organisations. The framework must
also support the strategy.

Regulation
Commercial demining will be growing in relative importance, and it appears likely the market
for commercial demining services will expand – perhaps markedly – within the medium-term.
This puts a greater premium on regulation. National standards need to be issued in
Portuguese. The licensing system through which firms and other demining operators are
accredited needs to function (and there are real questions whether this is the case today). More
fundamentally, there is no legislation to give national effect to the provisions of the
Convention and to confirm the legal authority underpinning any regulations that have been, or
will be, issued. Assuming a tender board is established for mine action, regulations will also
be required to guide its operations, ensuring adequate transparency and accountability, and
providing clear means by which its decisions could be appealed to an independent adjudicator
should a competitor have grounds to believe the tendering rules have been breached. Finally,
IND has not demonstrated that it has the capacity to provide QA services, and this type of
enforcement mechanism is required to avoid a competitive environment that rewards firms
that “race to the bottom” in terms of quality and safety.

Operations
Demining Capacities
The evidence suggests that, in the long-term, most demining work should be allocated via a
transparent competitive tendering process – there is simply no better way to do so when it is
clear what needs to be done and when the entity or individual that would bear the cost of poor
performance is also the one paying for it.220 It is probable that demining firms will represent
the bulk of the operational capacity in the country. But this is not certain: local not-for-profits
might also compete successfully on tenders if allowed to do so.
As well, local not-for-profits might be chosen over firms for providing services to address the
residual humanitarian threat, however large that may be. Whether local not-for-profits can
capitalise on this depends largely on whether they arm themselves with a distinct comparative
advantage relative to this “market niche”. That comparative advantage is not so much their
220

This is why it is best to have the prime contractor responsible for the demining sub-contractor.
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not-for-profit legal status; rather, it is their motivation to serve the public bolstered by far
higher standards imposed concerning integrity, good governance, and transparency.221
Because Mozambique’s laws for not-for-profits do not impose adequately high standards,
local not-for-profit demining agencies will need to self-impose these standards if they expect
donors and the GoM to entrust them with support in the form of grants.
Government also faces some strategic choices that will influence the composition of future
demining capacities. For example, it will need to determine what role, if any, FADM should
play in the mine action programme.

Information Capacities
Many public service agencies are forced to cope with landmine and UXO contamination.
They need complete and accurate information concerning contamination and clearance in
order understand how their planned work programmes may be affected. They may also need
information on possible solutions to any problems they face (i.e. technical advisory services).
Currently IND is not providing contamination and clearance information unless some public
service agency specifically requests it. Even then, the level of service provided is inadequate
because the IMSMA database records are not accurate and complete.
IND is not currently in a position to provide the technical advisory services required by other
public service agencies. First, it is not aware of what agencies need these services. Second, it
is not itself informed concerning how some of these agencies have devised workable solutions
to their contamination problems, so it cannot transmit this information to other units facing
similar problems.

Coordination
Assuming a proper strategy and policy framework is put in place, the demands on
“coordination” as a distinct activity over the long-term will be greatly reduced. The strategy
will provide strategic direction based on a sound assessment of the needs, the policy
framework will support that strategy (in part by putting the regulatory framework in place so
that adherence to policies is enforced), and most of the actual work will be handled via
competitive tendering.
That being said, there still will be need for forums of stakeholders to discuss issues and, when
amendments to the strategy, policy framework, or regulations are deemed necessary, discuss
the alternatives. These forums would include:
•
•
•

One for “inside the programme coordination” comprising national mine action authorities
and the operators (including representatives from commercial operators);
One for coordination with the government arena comprising the government agency
responsible for mine action and other government agencies which are in some way mine
action stakeholders; and
One between the government and the donors
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Put another way, funders cannot observe “motivation”; they can observe an organisation’s statutes
calling for integrity, good governance, and transparency, and then assess whether that organisation
adheres to its own standards.
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In addition, experience suggests that donors require their own forum so they can harmonise
their positions on policy matters prior to discussions with the government.
Forums currently exist for coordination discussions (i) among operators and IND, (ii) among
donors, and (iii) between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and donors. Some of these are
flawed in terms of composition (e.g. excluding commercial operators) or functioning, and
none of these have been active at the level required to formulate a sector strategy and policy
framework.
Most critically, there has not been a proper forum for policy dialogue between the government
and the donors concerning the humanitarian and developmental impacts of contamination
within Mozambique. In large part this is because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is by nature
oriented to the international mine action arena, which is guided by the Ottawa process and
attracts participants from donor capitals rather than field representatives based in mineaffected countries. The Ministry, supported by IND, has done a commendable job in the
Ottawa process, but has less to offer on how the programme operates within Mozambique.

Recommendations on the Programme Structure
International best practice for mine action is the following programme structure, supported by
appropriate legal, regulatory, and procedural instruments:
Level
Government

adopts

National authority
National Mine Action Centre
Operators

adopts
enforces
adopt

Instrument
Mine Action Legislation & Government-wide
policies
Regulations & National Standards
Standing Operating Procedures

The Review Team considered whether there was any reason why Mozambique would not be
well served by this best practice model, but could find no such reason. Accordingly, it is
reflected in our detailed recommendations, which follow the figure depicting the overall
architecture recommended for Mozambique at this time.
Note: The Review Team understands that the new government’s agenda is extremely heavy
and it may take time before it can give adequate attention to the mine action programme. As
well, the collapse of ADP has undoubtedly placed heavy demands on the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, reducing the time available for addressing long term issues affecting mine action. For
these longer term issues, it is far more important to arrive at a correct rather than a quick
decision. It may be best to defer decisions on the following recommendations relating to the
key organs of the mine action programme, making them instead as part of a new national
mine action strategy – an issue discussed in greater detail in the section following this.
Regardless, recommendations 12 through 14 are provided as a platform for discussions on the
appropriate structure for Mozambique’s mine action programme.
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Figure 21 – Recommended MA Architecture for Mozambique

International Arena
Development dialogue

G-16, IFIs, UN system, plurilateral
donors, bilateral donors, etc.

Government Arena
Responsible Ministry

Convention dialogue

States Parties, UN system,
specialist MA agencies, ICBL
members

Sector Ministries
Finance & Planning Ministries

Policy links

Provincial administrations

MA Authority (M-MAA)
M-MAC

District administrations
Working-level
linkages

Decentralisation

Implementing Organisations
(following national strategy)

Linkages with
support partners

Mine Action Support Group:
UNDP, EU, bilateral donor
agencies, US State Dept,
international MA NGOs

Linkages with beneficiaries &
other local stakeholders

Local Communities Arena
Development NGOs
Community Authorities
Local NGOs

Community Residents
Community Based Organisations

122

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

October 2005

Recommendation 12 – The Government of Mozambique should establish an inter-ministerial
body to serve as a national authority responsible for Mozambique’s mine action programme,
chaired by a minister whose responsibilities focus on the country’s socio-economic
development, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs serving as Deputy Chair, responsible for
Mozambique’s continued participation in the Ottawa process and for the regional dimensions
of landmine contamination problems. Other ministers on the body should be allowed to
222
deputise senior officials to represent them if they so choose.

The proposed Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA) would report to the Council of
Ministers, whose authority is required to adopt policy measures intended to have governmentwide effect and for final review of draft legislation for mine action before this is submitted to
the Assembly. The principal functions should be to:
•

•

manage the policy linkages
o within the government,
o with the donor support group, and
o with the international MA community,
provide the policy and regulatory framework for the operation of the MA programme.

Composition – ministers of:
Development and Planning (possible chair)
Foreign Affairs (possible deputy chair and
taking the lead within the Ottawa process)
Interior
Defence

Agriculture
Public Works
State Administration
Health
Social Welfare

Responsibilities to include:
•

•
•
•
•
•

Policy recommendations to the Council of Ministers, including
o guidelines for financing MA in support of national development priorities (e.g.
infrastructure projects)
o guidelines for financing MA in support of community development projects
o National Mine Action Legislation
Representing Mozambique at Meetings of States Parties to the Convention and other
aspects of the Ottawa process
Adoption of the National Mine Action Strategy, Standards, etc., as well as regulations to
guide the implementation of the National Mine Action Legislation.
Appointment of the Director of M-MAC (see below)
Appointment of a Board of Directors for M-MAC (see below)
Appointment of a Mine Action Tenders Board.

To further reduce the time pressure on the members of the M-MAA, the Review Team also
recommends the establishment of a second body – the Board of Directors for the M-MAC.
222

Traditionally donors have pressed for representation by ministers on such inter-ministerial bodies,
but this has resulted in a plethora of such committees which do not function because their members
do not have time to attend. This recommendation seeks to reduce the time burden on ministers, but
the Review Team recognises that the organisational culture within the government may make it
necessary to have only ministers
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This is the model now in place for the Roads sector where the senior Inter-Ministerial Roads
Commission (meeting at least once a quarter) is the body for government-wide policy while
the Board of Directors for ANE (meeting monthly) oversees policy implementation, including
the performance of ANE’s Managing Director.
Recommendation 13 – The Government of Mozambique should establish a Mozambique Mine
Action Centre (M-MAC) as a regulatory and public service body for mine action, and to provide
secretariat services to the Mozambican Mine Action Authority (M-MAA).
Recommendation 14 – The Government of Mozambique should appoint a Board of Directors to
oversee the implementation of the government’s mine action policy and the performance of the
M-MAC and its Managing Director. Members of the committee should be drawn from the civil
service and from other public agencies which depend on timely, high-quality mine action
services, together with representatives nominated by the private sector mine action operators
(both firms and not-for-profit organisations).

M-MAC should have a tripartite function: (i) regulatory, ensure the policies adopted by the
National Authority are observed, (ii) public service, to provide both information services and
technical guidance to other government agencies, development actors, and members of the
MA community (both within Mozambique and internationally), and (iii) secretariat services to
the National Authority.
The Director of M-MAC should be appointed on contract incorporating clear performance
clauses relative to all three of the Centre’s functions: regulatory; public service; and
secretariat. Appointment and, if necessary, removal of the M-MAC Director would be one of
the principal functions of the Board of Directors.
The core of M-MAC would be the Information Management Department, maintaining
IMSMA. This would hold both data inputs required under the legislation and policies
(accreditation records; requests for demining services; survey, marking, and clearance reports
from QA agents and demining operators; missed incidents and accidents reports; etc.). It
would also generate information (maps, clearance certificates, licenses, tasking folders, etc.)
provided as a service to government agencies, development agencies, MA operators, etc., as
well as reports to be submitted to supporting donors, Meetings of States Parties, etc.
IMSMA data would also provide the basis for ongoing needs analysis concerning how
contamination is constraining development. This data analysis would be complemented by
feedback from the ongoing work with government and other public sector agencies
responsible for national infrastructure and community development investments. The analysis
of the data within IMSMA would also be enriched by accessing other data sets available in
the government’s statistical directorate (INE) and its mapping and cadastral directorate
(DINAGECA).
Presumably, many of the staff members for the proposed M-MAC would be drawn from the
employee roster of IND. The current staff complement within IND does not appear to
incorporate individuals with the requisite skills in either data analysis or technical advisory
services.
Recommendation 15 – The Chief Technical Adviser to IND should assess the existing
capacities for (i) analysis of data from IMSMA and other sources of socio-economic and
geographic data, and (ii) the provision of technical advisory services to government and other
public sector agencies whose work programmes are impacted by landmine and UXO
contamination, then prepare a capacity development plan specifying the required levels of
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these capacities, how the capacities should be developed, how the staff responsible for these
functions would fit into the organisation structure of IND and/or the proposed M-MAC, and
what performance targets should be established for each position.

Likely there will be a need for a Mine Action Tenders Board to select demining organisations
to support smaller infrastructure projects after the departure of the international NGOs (and
perhaps before). In the past IND has provided tender board services, particularly following
the 2000 floods. Conceivably this function could be built into IND, although there are many
alternative models, including a regional mechanism such as the Slovenian International Trust
Fund (ITF) provides in the Balkans.223
A clear reading on the demand for tender board services must await the completion of IND’s
first round of outreach to other government and public sector units, and compilation of an
inventory of infrastructure projects require demining assistance. As well, there may be
sufficient capacity to meet current needs within the humanitarian sector (before the departure
of the international NGOs) together with FADM and Ronco-QRDF. A decision on the best
model for Mozambique can, however, be deferred and addressed as part of the development
of a new strategy for mine action.

A Road Map to a New Mine Action Strategy
Contents of the Strategy
The central task for the transition period is the formulation of a new strategy for the mine
action ‘sector’. This will differ in many respects from the existing NMAP. First and foremost,
it should focus on how mine action supports development in Mozambique, and outline this in
a very concrete fashion: merely asserting that mine action supports the government’s poverty
reduction strategy is completely inadequate.
In addition, the required strategy is not for the mine action organisations alone, but rather for
a broader set of actors and issues. It needs to incorporate the roles to be played by many
actors which are not normally thought of as mine action organisations. These include the
government and other public sector units responsible for infrastructure work programmes, the
international agencies such as The World Bank which provide financing for infrastructure
investments. This wider set of actors needs to be given policy direction, so the government’s
legal and policy framework needs to be incorporated into the strategy.
In short, what is required is akin to a sector strategy (although mine action is not a sector but
rather a cross-cutting activity). Modern sector strategies no longer limit themselves to a listing
of government investments. Rather, they articulate the government’s vision for all
components of the sector – public, private, community-based, etc. – and then list not only the
concrete investments government will make, but also the policy and public service measures
designed to encourage and enable the other components to fulfil their potentials. Obviously, a
good sector strategy should incorporate input from all stakeholders.
For mine action today and in the future, a national strategy should also reflect a partnership
between the Government and the donors. Once a strategy is in place – and accepted by all – it
223

This was established by the Slovenian government and endowed with $20 million from the US to
pay for commercial demining in the former Yugoslav republics, but released on a matching basis – i.e.
other Mine Action donations channelled via the ITF would be matched by the US fund.
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provides a foundation for a deepening partnership: one less dominated by funding issues but
giving more attention to the reciprocal responsibilities of the partners, with the government in
the driver’s seat and its partners providing considered advice and adequate support once they
are assured the government is steering in the right direction.
From the donor side, this new approach to working together in support of a government’s
strategy for a sector has acquired the ungainly name of Sector Wide Approach to
programming (SWAp). As a SWAp is rooted in the partnership concept, donors and
governments in developing countries have learned that the process followed in formulating a
sector strategy is all important. The same principle is true for a national mine action strategy.

Process
Recommendation 16 – As an essential first step, the Government of Mozambique should
announce its desire to work with donors and other stakeholders on a new strategy for mine
action, following the practices commonly used by Sector Wide Approaches to formulate and
subsequently implement that strategy.
Recommendation 17 – As an essential second step, the Government of Mozambique, the
UNDP, and interested donors should formulate (based on models from existing SWAp
arrangements) and adopt a statement of reciprocal responsibilities relating to the national mine
action programme. This should feature:
•
•

the GoM in the driver’s seat, exercising the rights and responsibilities of national
ownership,
the UNDP and donors providing considered advice and adequate support once they are
assured the government is steering in the right direction and is confirming its
commitment to mine action with appropriate policy initiatives and levels of funding.

Because of the way Mozambique’s mine action programme was established and has evolved,
there are many established interests at play, which can quickly lead to rivalries among key
actors. It is not possible to jump immediately to a strategy, as any such document will draw
criticism from actors who imagine their proper interests are being overlooked. The next step
should therefore be to seek agreement on the needs to be addressed. The principal failing of
Mozambique’s mine action community has been the inability to generate a clear and complete
assessment of needs.
The Review Team has compiled a more complete assessment of existing and future needs.
Undoubtedly there are omissions and inaccuracies, but it provides a basis for further work by
IND and other stakeholders, and some of the earlier recommendations specify at least some of
this work. This work should be done in cooperation, with the aim of achieving a consensus.
Once a consensus on the needs for mine action services is achieved, work can then proceed on
the strategy to meet those needs. Once again, it is important that all stakeholders have an
opportunity for input, including (for example) commercial demining firms and FADM. There
probably will be rival proposals reflecting the different interests, but the consensus achieved
on needs will provide a solid basis for assessing the merit of different proposals.
Ultimately of course, it is the government that will adopt a strategy based on a proposal
compiled by the M-MAC (or IND if the M-MAC has not yet been created) supported by its
CTA. The government should also benefit from the input from donors. Different donors have
different financing instruments at their disposal. Any reasonable strategy at this juncture will
provide different ways that international assistance agencies might contribute. Some may do
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so by incorporating funds for demining services directly into the project budgets for
infrastructure projects. Others may contribute for technical assistance or for financing and
equipping fire brigades. The strategy will lay out the needs and the approach the government
has chosen to address those needs, and different donors can decide how they can best
contribute.
Once the strategy is adopted, the foundation also exists for a deeper partnership between
government and the supporting donors. At the minimum this should embrace a common
research, monitoring, and evaluation agenda. The completion of a strategy does not signal the
end of strategic thinking. Strategic thinking is based on continuous analysis to get an ever
clearer picture of the needs. It is also based on continuous monitoring and regular evaluation
to assess what mechanisms for contracting demining services are working best, how the
various infrastructure work programmes are evolving and what this implies for demining
organisations, which district administrations are most active in calling for assistance to
address residual humanitarian issues and why.
Better performance in terms of analysis, monitoring, and evaluation will also encourage
donors to adopt more harmonised procedures; reducing their own work loads and lowering
overall transaction costs. Building on existing UN Trust Funds, pooled funding arrangements
would greatly help. Joint donor missions and joint evaluations (with significant input from the
government concerning the key evaluation issues) would also be a step forward.
It would be premature to attempt detailed recommendations concerning each step of the
process. It is important, however, to get the process underway.
Recommendation 18 – (Step 3 on the Road Map, but to get underway immediately) Building on
recommendations 1, 2, 7, and 10, the M-MAC (or IND if the M-MAC has not yet been created),
assisted by its CTA, should compile a document outlining a complete and accurate
assessment of needs for mine action services, now and in the future, and distribute that
document to all stakeholders for discussion and refinement.
Recommendation 19 – Further steps on the Road Map should be sequenced as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Step 4 – Confirm consensus on the needs assessment by formal adoption by the GoM,
UNDP, and supporting donors – this will then provide the basis for developing the
strategy itself;
Step 5 – Formulate strategic options for each of the unresolved strategic issues, for
discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors;
Step 6 – Formulate a draft strategy for discussion among the GoM, the UNDP, and
participating donors;
Step 7 – Adoption of the strategy by the GoM, the UNDP, and participating donors; and
Step 8 – Agree on a joint monitoring and evaluation plan for reporting on (i) the
progress in implementing the strategy, and (ii) the compliance of the partners in
224
discharging their reciprocal responsibilities.

Government agenda
The most important item on the government agenda is grappling with how it wishes to
structure the mine action programme to better link this with the country’s developmental
224

For example, a major concern from the government side will be donor performance on such
measures as (i) contributing to pooled funding arrangements for mine action rather than to separate
projects; (ii) the numbers of donors incorporating funds for demining within their development projects;
and (iii) measures to increase the predictability of funding (e.g. multi-year funding agreements).
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requirements. It would be ideal to start by identifying the ministry that should be responsible
for mine action, as well as the individuals who will need to play leadership roles: a Managing
Director for the proposed M-MACC and a capable individual in the policy unit of the
responsible ministry to advise on and then champion the needed policy measures. However, a
realistic assessment of the new government’s overall agenda suggests this ideal approach may
not be feasible in the short term.
Regardless, the essential core of the government’s agenda vis-à-vis mine action is to engage
the donor community in a more concerted fashion, with the view formulating a new national
strategy for mine action. This can be initiated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported by
the IND Director.

Donor agenda
The basic mechanism for orchestrating the donor engagement with the government already
exists, although it has not been very active in the past 18 months. Assuming the government
signals its willingness to adopt much of what is recommended in this report, in principles if
not in details, then the donor agenda will become much more active. The staff in most donor
agencies – and certainly in Mozambique where there is so much innovation – are already
stretched. UNDP and donor representatives will need to organise themselves to cope with a
mine action reform agenda that will pick-up pace.

Other transition issues
Capacity development and performance for a national MAC
Improvements to the programme structure and strategy will be for nought if IND or the
proposed Mozambique Mine Action Centre (M-MAC) does not perform well. Clearly the
provision of additional assistance for capacity building is of dubious benefit where staff
already have the capabilities for higher performance, but are not fully employing these
because of a lack of clear direction and incentives. At the same time, certain of the functions
of a MAC, many of which now fall under IND, must be performed well both to assist in
formulating a well conceived sector strategy and for effective implementation of that strategy.
Future efforts aimed at strengthening the MAC need to balance capacity building inputs with
performance outputs. This re-orientation to a performance focus should start right away.
Recommendation 20 – To initiate the next stage of capacity development, the IND Director,
assisted by the CTA, should institute a performance management approach to:
•

•
•
•
•

clearly define the levels of performance required for the key functions of a Mine Action
Centre, including: policy analysis; national planning; information exchange; regulation;
information management; and services to operators, government and other public
sector units, donors, and other stakeholders;
set measurable performance targets for each function;
communicate these performance targets to all staff;
monitor performance; and
take appropriate actions, including capacity building when necessary, when and if
there are gaps between actual performance and the performance levels required for the
proper functioning of mine action in Mozambique.

The support of key clients (operators, donors, and government/public sector units needing
demining services) should be enlisted in defining the necessary levels of performance,
establishing performance targets, and monitoring actual performance.

128

A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique

October 2005

Addressing capacity mismatches
Taking into account existing commitments for new equipment, there probably is sufficient
demining capacity in the country today to meet the short- and medium-term needs, and
perhaps longer – commercial firms will be responsible for meeting their own equipment and
staffing needs, while the humanitarian sector is already downsizing. However, there will be a
growing mismatch in the distribution of equipment and vehicles among humanitarian
operators, and there is the question of what will become of the equipment now in the hands of
the international NGOs, assuming they exit as planned at the end of 2006.225
In most if not all cases, the original donors will probably have to agree to any transfer of
equipment to another organisation. Most donors have blanket restrictions on grants to certain
types of organisations (for-profit companies, militaries), and there may be additional
constraints depending on the specific funding lines used to provide the equipment (e.g. UN
agencies may be ineligible for some lines). For example, ADP appears less well-equipped
today than are the international NGOs, and some of its existing equipment will soon need
replacing. Will it be eligible to receive surplus equipment from the international NGOs? What
if donors agreed to such a transfer, assuming ADP was to become a not-for-profit, but the
transformation was then delayed or ADP became a firm or a branch of the military instead?
This report is not the place to work through all these details. It is clear from discussions with
and reports on the international demining NGOs (e.g. Craib, 2003) that they have considered
and, in some cases, have in place, contingency plans for their exit from direct management of
mine action programmes.226 However, they do not believe they are in a position to adopt a
specific plan at this moment, precisely because the appropriate alternatives are contingent on
decisions that are beyond their control. In brief, the international NGOs are awaiting
government decisions on strategic issues, such as how to organise and manage demining
services to address the humanitarian threats that will emerge over time due to residual
contamination.
We have recommended that the GoM work in partnership with the UNDP and interested
donors to address these strategic issues leading eventually to a new national mine action
strategy. The fact that the international NGOs are planning to exit by the end of 2006 simply
means this process must begin as soon as possible.
One other point deserves emphasis. The international mine action NGOs (and ADP) have a
wealth of experience and expertise on how best to address the impact of landmine and UXO
contamination, particularly in remote communities. They have well considered views on what
will and will not work for the future. They also have intimate knowledge concerning the
constraints and obligations they face during the exit process. It is vital that this knowledge
informs the strategic decisions on how to address the strategic issues. The IND/M-MAC
should engage with the international NGOs (as well as ADP) in a far more energetic fashion.
In the previous chapter, we made a number of recommendations concerning the need for IND
to meet with the operators to discuss specific issues (systematic re-survey; exchange of data;

225

It may also be that HIV/AIDS will require additional efforts in training deminers.
For understandable reasons, the programme managers were wary of providing details to the
Review Team.
226
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etc.). IND/M-MAC needs to build on this platform of discussions to engage its operating
partners in a strategic dialogue as well.

The status of ADP
In spite of what project documents state, it is unclear that there is a consensus on the
desirability of ADP becoming a “local NGO”. Certainly, the apparent lack of even a business
plan or draft statutes of association would suggest that there remains a good deal of
ambivalence if not outright opposition to the proposal.
The Review Team has found no reason why work could not have begun on the preparation of
a business plan – or alternative business plans for, say, a not-for-profit association, a for-profit
enterprise, or a parastatal. There is a good deal of information provided in this report that
there will be “unmet needs” for demining services once the international NGOs depart, and
that there will be growing demand for demining services via competitive arrangements. The
management of ADP is well placed to expand on and refine this information and formulate a
business plan that capitalises on its comparative advantages. Any such business planning
should, of course, also consider the legal implications of Mozambique’s labour retrenchment
legislation, the status of equipment donated to UNDP for use by ADP, and the possible
availability of surplus equipment from the international NGOs.
The business plan(s) will also need to include feasible strategies for resource mobilisation –
indeed, that is the very core of a business plan. If it is to be a local not-for-profit, a substantial
portion of its financial resources will need to come from donors and the GoM, probably in the
form of grants in return for the provision of public services (i.e. humanitarian demining). The
issue of donor and GoM confidence in the new ADP will be paramount. It is clear that, should
ADP and its principal stakeholders opt for not-for-profit status, Mozambique’s legal
provisions for associations and foundations are, in themselves, inadequate to give donors and
the GoM assurance that it will remain an effective organisation focused on the public interest.
ADP would need to self-impose through its statutes far higher standards for integrity, good
governance, and transparency.
Recommendation 21 – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it should
transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should incorporate within its
statutes international best-practice with respect to provisions for integrity, governance, and
transparency.

Further, for an interim period until it builds a track record of performance and integrity as an
independent organisation, ADP would benefit from a partnership with an international NGO
which could provide assurance to potential donors and assist ADP in the transition to
operating as a “true” NGO. The principal assistance requirements relate to NGO management
and governance rather than technical capacities for demining.227
Recommendation 22 – Should ADP management, UNDP, and the GoM determine it should
transform into a Mozambican not-for-profit organisation, it should seek a partnership with an
international NGO willing and able to assist it in the transition into a well functioning and well
governed Mozambican NGO.

227

Of course, ADP may require some technical assistance should it undertake new challenges, such
as the management of mobile fire brigades to perform EOD and small mine clearance operations.
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Similar considerations and recommendations are, of course, relevant should the existing
workforces of the international NGOs decide to establish not-for-profit associations.
Time is of the essence in this matter. We have also recommended that the GoM begin
discussions with its principal mine action partners to formulate a new strategy for mine
action. Because of the inter-relationships among many of the strategic issues, decisions
concerning one issue could close-off attractive options for ADP’s management and staff. It is
important that they move quickly to identify what role(s) they could play and to prepare a
solid business case for the GoM, UNDP, and donors to consider in their strategic
deliberations.

The role of FADM
The Review Team believes that FADM, supported by Ronco plus equipment from the US, is
performing a useful role as a demining operator. Whether it should continue in this role, or
even expand, needs to be considered strategically however. An early decision by the
Government that FADM should, for example, be responsible for the residual humanitarian
threat, will close-off other options from consideration. Such decisions should be part-andparcel of the strategic plan, and not made in isolation of other factors.
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Update on Events Since the Mission
Reduction in the IMSMA Data-Entry Backlog
The Annual Report for 2004 was issued by IND in March 2005. Table 1 in that report
suggests significant progress has been made in reducing the data entry backlog for reports
from the operators. Data available at the time of the Review Team Mission indicated 246 km2
in SHA (itself a great reduction over the comparable 2003 figure of 528 km2), but figures in
the Annual Report show less than 172 km2. The improvement is depicted in the following
chart.
Figure 22 – Reducing the data entry backlog
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Inclusion of Mine Action in the Five-Year Programme
A newly elected government is required to present its “programme” to the legislature within
three months of its appointment. This programme outlines the government’s priorities for its
entire five-year term. For the first time, the new government included mine action as a crosscutting issue as part of its Five Year Programme.
Clearly this is an encouraging development, indicating that mine action has appeared on the
government’s agenda. It is, however, only a first step. In the past, Five Year Programmes
have been more of a wish list than a set of measures which could be properly financed and
implemented. More important is whether mine action is incorporated into the PARPA (see
below) and the annual budget. More important still to confirm the government’s commitment
to resolving Mozambique’s contamination problems is whether the amounts appropriated for
mine action in the budget are actually spent as planned.

The Crisis in ADP
In early April 2005, many ADP employees went on strike over the non-payment of wages.
Shortly thereafter, the government shut down all ADP operations and IND met a number of
times with the strikers as well as with UNDP and donors. Subsequent investigations showed
that the labour legislation provisions for layoffs would not apply to ADP employees, who
never had income taxes and social security contributions deducted from their wages and
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remitted to the government authorities. Regardless, by mid-June, IND had prepared a
recommended compensation package amounting to $1.8 million.228 UNDP contributed
$400,000 to that package, with the Irish Government donating another 250,000 EURO (over
$300,000), and payments were issued to some of the ADP staff in early July. Subsequently,
the GoM has indicated it will cover the balance – almost $1.1 million.
In addition, the GoM announced its intention to establish a national NGO, and UNDP is
providing assistance. A consulting firm has been engaged to work with ADP’s remaining
management team (the Director had resigned in the wake of the strike) to produce a three-year
business plan for the NGO. It is unclear, however, how many of ADP’s deminers are willing
to join the new NGO. It is also unclear to the Review Team whether the new entity will be
independent or whether all or the majority of its board members will be appointed by
government. In the latter case, the new entity would function essentially as a not-for-profit
agency of the government, albeit separate from the civil service.

Mine Action and the PARPA
In June 2005, UNDP engaged a local consultant to assist IND with outreach to various
government units that may require demining assistance, and in representing mine action
within the working groups created to assist in the preparations of Mozambique’s second
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PARPA). As noted in Chapter 5, the PARPA is
Mozambique’s de facto development plan, and serves as the principle framework for policy
discussions between the GoM and donors. It is important that the problem of landmine and
UXO contamination receives proper reflection in the PARPA, both as a cross-cutting issue
and within the sections that will cover plans for the reconstruction and development of
infrastructure networks (roads, railways, electricity distribution, water system, etc.),
community infrastructure (small irrigation works, etc.), area development projects (e.g., for
game parks and other tourist destinations), and agriculture/rural development. The new
PARPA also presents an opportunity for the mine action community to draw attention to the
needs of landmine survivors, as part of a broader programme to assist the disabled.

Summary
Clearly 2005 has been an eventful year for mine action in Mozambique. The sudden collapse
of ADP has presented the GoM, IND, UNDP, and donors with serious problems that need
immediate attention.229 How to meet the immediate needs for survey and clearance in the
Southern provinces? Can anything be salvaged from ADP, or will entirely new provisions
have to be made to address contamination in Southern Mozambique?
The Review Team can provide little in the way of further comment on the ADP situation,
which obviously must be dominating the attention of IND and its CTA.230 In this light, it is
encouraging that some progress has been made on other fronts, such as outreach to

228

It remains unclear to the Review Team whether this compensation package includes any payments
for prior years service, as per the labour legislation.
229
It also raises real questions concerning how matters were allowed to deteriorate to the point of
crisis, and with respect to some of the information emerging in the wake of the collapse, such as why
ADP employees were never registered with the government, thus escaping taxation and social
security obligations.
230
The other technical advisers at IND departed subsequent to the Review Mission.
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government agencies responsible for infrastructure investments and getting the mine action
programme more strongly reflected within the government’s development agenda.
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Glossary of Acronyms
ADP
AIDS
ANE
BAC
CIDA
CIDC
CMAC
CND
DHA
DoD
DoS
DPKO
EC
EDM
EOD
EU
FRELIMO
GDP
GICHD
GIS
GTZ
HALO Trust
HI
HIV
ICBL
ICRC
IDP
IDRC
IMAS
IMSMA
IND
INE
IOM
LIS
MAC
MADER
MA
MAE
MDD
MDG
MDN
MGM
MINEC
MINT
MISAU
M-MAC
MMCAS

Accelerated Demining Programme
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
National Roads Administration (semi-autonomous government agency)
battlefield area clearance
Canadian International Development Agency
Canadian International Demining Centre
Cambodian Mine Action Centre
National Demining Commission
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN now OCHA)
United States Department of Defense
United States Department of State
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
European Commission
Electricity of Mozambique
explosive ordnance disposal
European Union
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
gross domestic product
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Geographic Information System
German Development Organisation
Hazardous Areas Life-Support Organisation
Handicap International
Human Immunodeficiency Virus
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
International Committee of the Red Cross
internally displaced person
International Development Research Centre (Canada)
International Mine Action Standards
Information Management System for Mine Action
National Demining Institute
Instituto Nacional de Estatística (National Statistics Institute)
International Organisation for Migration
Landmine Impact Survey
Mine Action Centre
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Mine Action
Ministry for State Administration
mine detection dog
Millennium Development Goals
Ministry of National Defence
Menschen Gegen Minen
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Health
Mozambican Mine Action Centre
Ministry of Labour and Social Action
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MOPH
MOZMAC
MPF
MRE
MTFF
NGO
NMCC
NPA
OCHA
OE
OECD
ONUMOZ
PAF
PAP
PARPA
PEPAM
PES
PRIO
PRSP
PTIP
QRDF
RENAMO
SAC
SDC
SHA
SOP
SRSG
SWAp
TA
TIA
U.K.
UN
UNCDF
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNMAS
UNOHAC
UNOPS
U.S.
USAID
UXO
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Ministry of Home Affairs
Mozambique Mine Action Centre
Ministry of Planning and Finance
mine risk education
Medium Term Fiscal Framework
non-governmental organisation
National Mine Clearance Commission
Norwegian People’s Aid
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
Orçamento do Estado (State Budget)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN Operations in Mozambique
Performance Assessment Framework
Programme Aid Partners
Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
National Co-ordination of Education Activities to Prevent Landmines and
Other Explosive Devices Accidents
Plano Económico e Social (Economic and Social Plan)
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
Programa Trienal de Investimento Público (Triennial Public Investment
Programme)
Quick Response Demining Force
Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Mozambique National Resistance)
Survey Action Center
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Suspected Hazard Area
Standing Operating Procedure
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Sector Wide Approach
Technical Adviser
Task Impact Assessment
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Capital Development Fund
United Nations Development Programme
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Mine Action Service
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
United Nations Office for Project Services
United States
United States Agency for International Development
unexploded ordnance
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Appendixes
Appendix 1. Terms of Reference
Consultancy for Study:
A review of ten years of assistance to the Mine Action Programme in
Mozambique
Background:
UNDP, in partnership with various donors, has supported the Government of Mozambique in the area
of Mine Action since the early post-conflict period. Partnership with Government in this area has
included both operational demining activities and capacity building for the government institutions
involved with demining. Programmes have been financed through cost sharing arrangements with
donor partners locally and internationally through Trust Funds and other funding arrangements.
It is now more than ten (10) years since the mine action programme in Mozambique came into effect.
The country has now put in place a National Mine Action Plan (2002-2006). The plan covers all five
principle activities of mine-action, which include demining, mine risk education, victim assistance,
stock pile reduction and advocacy. The component of stockpile reduction was taken care of in
Mozambique when the stocks were destroyed in March 2003.
Mozambique has in the meantime made significant socioeconomic progress since the peace
agreement in 1992. The complete cessation of the civil war, introduction of multi party democracy and
the launch of a programme of economic reform mainly account for the progress. Recent changes in
the development area include a strong national development plan (PARPA), the introduction of the
Millennium Development Goals, NEPAD, finalization of Agenda 2025 as a vision and strategy
document for the country, and an increasing trend by major donors towards providing budget support
as opposed to project support, aimed at increasing harmonization of donor support.
Globally within the mine action area, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will convene the first
five-year Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, in Nairobi, 29
November-3 December 2004. Mozambique, which is co-hosting the conference, will together with
other participating countries, present the national experience in mine action.
In view of the above history and context, the UNDP Country Office in Mozambique, as the main
partner of the Government in the area of mine action, will undertake, in collaboration with Government
and donor partners, a comprehensive review of the mine action programme in Mozambique since its
inception. In agreement with the government, the study will incorporate the issues and address the
objectives that were envisioned in the national mine action mid term review. The present review will
look at the historical context of the programme, outline the achievements, relate them to the
overarching national development plans and most importantly analyze the tasks that lie ahead. The
analysis of the future of the mine action programme will be in the context of its relationship with the
intermediate and long term development priorities of the country, and the international commitments
and agreements the country has signed with its partners with regard to mine action.
General Objective:
The overall objective of this study is to assess relevance, efficacy, effectiveness, and impact of the
mine action programme in Mozambique since its inception, and analyze the extent of the task that
remains to be done. The analysis of the task that lies ahead will be placed in the current development
context and humanitarian situation in Mozambique. Links and relationships with the existent
development frameworks (most especially the poverty reduction strategy paper for Mozambique
PARPA), other sectoral strategies and the MDGs are to be highlighted. Recommendations for
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sustainable national interventions at the planning and operational levels, (with corresponding funding
strategies) will be made.
Main activities to be undertaken during the review
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Review and consolidate information from all reviews, evaluations and studies of a similar
nature that have been undertaken in Mozambique, on mine action.
Consult with a wide range of stakeholders, including government, donors, mine action
operators and civil society involved in development.
Analyse the international commitments made by Mozambique in the field of mine action
(ratification of treaties, status of implementation).
Collect information from direct beneficiaries of mine action programmes.
Analyse the current structure of the national mine action programme, at the policy and
operational levels, including both commercial and humanitarian operators, governance and
coordination mechanisms, etc.
Review the nature and extent of technical and managerial capacity built in the area of mine
action in Mozambique, including an examination of the role played by the technical assistance
in the form of experts and management tools extended to Mozambican institutions for capacity
building.
Discuss donor priorities and objectives on Mine Action,
Review the current development context and framework of Mozambique, and make an
analysis of the future of the mine action programme within this framework. Describe links with
the overall development priorities for the country.
Review the past and current deployment of resources for the mine action programme,
including prioritization, accountability and transparency
Make recommendations for the future of the mine action programme, taking into account the
lessons learnt and the current trends in resource availability. In this context, undertake an
analysis and present a forecast of future resource availability for mine action programme in
Mozambique in the context of the state budget, budget support and commercial demining.

Outputs:
The output of the study will be a review report, which presents an independent and comprehensive
analysis of the mine action programme of Mozambique, including achievements and future prospects.
Duration
The study will be undertaken over a period of eight weeks, including two weeks for desk review of
existing material, one month of fieldwork and data collection and another two weeks for compilation of
the report.
Submission of the Report
A draft report will be submitted to the UNDP Country office at the end of the eighth week of the
consultancy. The country office will share the draft report with Government and donor partners for
comment. The final report will be submitted to UNDP within one week of receipt of the consolidated
comments.
All reports should be submitted electronically and in hard copy.
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Appendix 2. List of Persons Met
Organisation/Name
United Nations
Maryléne Spezzati
Gana Fofang
Archie Law
Alberto Alface
Ricardo Mukonda
Lutful Kabir
Graeme Abernathy
Farah Ali
Augusto Nogeira

Position
UNDP Resident Representative and UN Resident Coordinator
UNDP Deputy Resident Representative
Regional Adviser, UNDP Johannesburg
Mine Action Programme Officer, UNDP
Project Officer Special Protection, UNICEF
Chief Technical Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)
Operations Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)
Finance Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)
Information Adviser, IND (on UNOPS contract)

IND
Gamiliel Munguambe
Aurelio Mavie Faduco
Orlando Fernando
Antonio Domingues
Deodata Uetela
Maria Isabel dos Santos
Joaquim Sylvetre Bila
Juma Dinis dos Carinas
Benilde Cidalia Budula

Director IND
Head of planning, IND
Head of operations, IND
Head of quality, IND
Head of database section, IND
Project manager, IND
IND regional manager, Nampula
IND regional manager, Beira
HR deputy, IND

Other Government of Mozambique
Dr. Leonardo Simão
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Col Diaz
Commanding Officer, FADM demining forces
Commander Lourenço João
Regional police commander, Inhambane
Alberto Simão
Governor, Sofala Province
Albino Saude
Provincial coordinator, Manica Province
Dr. Distina Winge
Director, External Relations, National Statistical Institute (INE)
Antonio Adriano
Head, Department of Cartography & Operations, INE
Gabriel Tembe (& others)
National Director, Rural Development, MADER
Adriano Chamusso
National Director, Economics, MADER
National Director, Agriculture, MADER
National Director, Forestry, MADER
Manuel Manges
Chief, Dept. of Standards, Directorate for Irrigation, MADER
Eng. Athanese
Director, National Roads, National Roads Administration (ANE)
Nelson Nunes
Chief, Operations Dept., ANE
Domingos Lambo
Deputy Director, Planning & Budget, MPF
Regional police commander, Cabo Delgado
Carlos Abudo
Provincial Coordinator, Nampula province
District Administrator, Morrapula District, Nampula province
Eng. Olinda de Sousa
Director, National Water Authority
Eng. Adelino Mesquit
Project Manager, CFM (Ports and Railways of Mozambique)
Donors and International Financial Institutions
Adrian Hadorn
Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland & G-16 co-chair
Dr. Bernhard Weimer
Senior Governance Adviser, SDC
Olli Sotamaa
Councellor, Embassy of Finland
Aidan Fitzpatrick
Attaché, Embassy of Ireland
Stacey Walker
Program Manager, AusAID
Charles Siebert
Counsellor, French Embassy
Cynthia Brown
Economic/Political Officer, U.S. Department of State
Kenji Ohira
Attaché (Economic Cooperation), Embassy of Japan
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Organisation/Name
Fumika Okane
Eduardo Manfredini
Michael Butschek
Berit Kristin Tvete
Lola Lopes
Alberto da Silva
Emidio Oliveira
Gregor Binkert
Maria del Mar Polo

Position
Consultant, JICA
Technical Unit for Cooperation, Embassy of Italy
Austrian mission
Embassy of Norway
Danida
Programme Support Unit, CIDA
Senior Programme Officer, DFID
Lead Economist, The World Bank
EC Delegation

Mine Action Operators
Steve Hughes
Jacinto Veloso
Atle Karlsen
Sara Sekkenes
Maxwel Gopani
Aderito Ismael
Frank Weetjens
Jacky D’Almeida
Lt Col Pete Curran
Florêncio Chongo
Les Brown
Steven Brown
Pasqual Isaías
Cameron Imber
Nelson Verissimo
Barkley Lozane

Regional Manager Armor Group
Director, JV Desminagem
Regional representative, NPA Southern Africa
Programme Manager, NPA
Assistant Programme Manager, NPA
Programme Manager, Handicap International
APOPO vzw
Director ADP
Adviser to Director ADP
Operations Manager, ADP
Country Manager, RONCO Consulting Corporation
Demining Program Manage, RONCO Consulting Corporation
Country Representative, Bactec Moçambique Lda
HALO Trust representative
HALO Trust manager
Managing Director, CCQ

Civil Society Organisations
Respeito Chirrinze
Volunteers & Youth Co-ordinator, CVM (Mozambican Red Cross)
Dr. Marta Cumbe
Programme Director, FDC (Community Development Foundation)
Reverend Dinis Matsolo
General Secretary, Christian Council of Mozambique
Others
Dr. Antonio Francisco
Manuel Cuambe
Anthony Hodges

Professor, Eduardo Mondlane University
Director, Project & Electrification, Electricidade de Mozambique
Project Manager, FoPOS, Oxford Policy Management
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Appendix 3. Accredited organisations231
“Humanitarian” Operators
• Afrovita
• APN (NPA)
• ADDAC (Agencia de Desenvolvimento de Antigos Combatentes )
• Handicap International
• HALO Trust
• PAD (Accelerated Demining Programme)
• RONCO
• ASM (Associação dos Sapadores de Moçambique)
• BNUC (Boa Nova de União Crista)
• FADM (Mozambique Armed Forces)
• CODEG (Conselho de Desmobilizados de Guerra)
• APOPO
• Necochaminas

Commercial Operators
• MMA (Mozambique Mine Action)
• BACTEC International
• Mine Tech
• ECOMS Desminagem
• Empresa Moçambicana de Desminagem
• JV-Desminagem
• Mine Kills Mozambique
• MF Investments
• SDS (Special Dog Services)
• REASeuro Worldwide
• Lince

Other Operators
• CCQ (Companhia de Controle de Qualidade)

231

Based on information provided by IND 26 Jan 2005
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Appendix 4. List of lessons learned from this Review
Lesson 1 (page 14)
When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination
following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before the international community
understands the true nature of the problem, and then more time before it learns from
experience how best to address that problem.
Lesson 2 (page 14)
In many post-conflict situations, the government is not in a position to give the necessary
attention to all facets of humanitarian needs. In such situations, the international community
requires an international organisation such as the UN to take the lead in defining the scope and
intensity of the humanitarian emergency, and to facilitate the preparation of a strategy to
address the emergency in a reasonably coordinated fashion.
Lesson 3 (page 15)
In the absence of a commonly endorsed assessment of needs and a commonly endorsed
strategy to address those needs, donors are likely to support a range of separate and relatively
uncoordinated mine action initiatives, implemented via firms or NGOs, in response to the
humanitarian emergency.
Lesson 4 (page 16)
Once a series of independent mine action programmes are established, it is more difficult to
put in place an effective mechanism for national coordination.
Lesson 5 (page 17)
A half-hearted attempt to impose coordination on a group of organisations with established
programmes is worse than no attempt at all. It does not solve the problem and it leaves the
government facing a credibility gap to overcome once it advances a better conceived
coordination mechanism.
Lesson 6 (page 20)
An information management system capable of maintaining complete and accurate data on the
landmine/UXO hazards, and on survey and clearance activities, is an essential capacity for a
national mine action programme. Failure to establish such a system in the early years of a
programme will severely constrain the ability of programme planners and managers to
formulate proper plans and priorities for years to come.
Lesson 7 (page 21)
Over time (and assuming a country does not return to conflict), MRE takes a progressively
lower profile within a national mine action programme – a reasonable trend given:
•
•
•
•

Risks to civilians are highest when they are unfamiliar with the contamination in the area,
such as when forced to flee conflict regions or when they return to their home communities
after the conflict ends;
MRE gradually reaches most of those at risk;
Lessons are quickly learned when local populations venture into contaminated areas;
Targeted survey and clearance operations gradually address the most dangerous
minefields.
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Lesson 8 (page 23)
Initiatives to establish orthopaedic and physiotherapy facilities available to landmine survivors,
and to enhance the skills of the medical and technical personnel at these facilities, often have
failed to deliver sustained benefits. Such initiatives should be undertaken as part of a broader
strategy designed to:
•
•

establish disability assistance programmes that the relevant government ministries, in
concert with local self-help organisations, can hope to sustain,
provide a range of other basic services including monitoring, transport to and lodging at
treatment facilities, and referral to services for psycho-social rehabilitation and economic
re-integration of landmine survivors and other disabled persons.

Lesson 9 (page 23)
National mine action programmes have a specific responsibility to promote programmes aimed
at meeting the needs of landmine survivors. However, except in rare cases – often during
emergencies – mine action programmes are not the appropriate vehicle for implementing these
programmes, which should be part of broader efforts at meeting the needs of disabled people.
Mine action programmes often can help to focus attention on the rights and needs of disabled
persons, and bringing to light serious gaps in services available to landmine survivors and
other disabled persons.
Lesson 10 (page 25)
Although typically the mechanisms are not in place for linking mine action into the broader
peace-building programme in a practical and concerted fashion, mine action can make
important contributions to the peace-building process.
Lesson 11 (page 40)
When confronted by a new type of challenge such as landmine and UXO contamination
following complex humanitarian emergencies, it takes time before adequate tools – such as a
means for assessing the true extent of the humanitarian needs – can be developed, tested, and
improved so they meet the true requirements in the field.
Lesson 12 (page 40)
Proper mine action planning requires reasonably complete and up-to-date data on both
suspected hazard areas (SHA) and the impacts of these on both communities and development
programmes. For countries with extensive contamination, provision needs to be made not just
for an initial survey to establish the baselines for physical contamination and socio-economic
impacts, but also for systematic efforts to update these data to refine understanding of the
contamination problem, and to assess progress.
Lesson 13 (page 43)
The potential benefits from developing capacities of individual staff members and functional
units within an organisation will not be captured in full until the organisational management
systems for (at least) human resources, financial management, information management, and
performance management are functioning well and there is appropriate delegation of authority
so staff and unit managers can use their skills and experience to discharge their
responsibilities and achieve the specific performance standards set for them.
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